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From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe

The Politics of Transition

Henry Wiseman
Alastair M. Taylor

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To Catherine, Suzanne, Angus, Graeme, Duncan, and other members of their postwar generation who are called upon, in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter, "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours. . . ."

CEUTA
MELILLA
Tunis
Algiers
TUNISIA
Rabat
MOROCCO
Tripoli
Benghazi
ALGERIA
Cairo
El Aiun
LIBYA
EGYPT
WESTERN SAHARA
MAURITANIA
CAPE VERDE IS.
Praia
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NIGER
UPPER VOLTA
Ougadougou
Khartoum
SENEGAL
Dakar
CHAD
THE GAMBIA
Banjul
MALI
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SUDAN
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
Ndjemena
BENIN
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IVORY COAST
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Accra
Lagos
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
LIBERIA
Monrovia
Abidjan
TOGO
Lome
CAMEROON
Yaounde
Bangui
SOMALIA
Mogadishu
UGANDA
Kampala
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Malabo
KENYA
Nairobi
SAO TOME E PRINCIPE
Libreville
GABON
RWANDA
Kigali
ZAIRE
CONGO
Brazzaville
Kinshasa
BURUNDI
Bujumbura
TANZANIA
ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
SEYCHELLES IS.
Victoria
Luanda
Moroni
COMORO IS.
ANGOLA
ZAMBIA
Lusaka
Lilongwe
MALAWI
ZIMBABWE
MOZAMBIQUE
Tananarive
MAURITIUS
MADAGASCAR
REUNION
NAMIBIA
Windhoek
BOTSWANA
Gaborone
Pretoria
Port Louis
Maputo
SWAZILAND
Mbabane
SOUTH AFRICA
LESOTHO
Maseru

Foreword

Southern Africa has witnessed three major conflicts during recent years. Angola and Mozambique gained their independence after waging a successful war of liberation against their Portuguese colonial masters. Zimbabwe gained its independence after a long struggle for liberation from the white minority who had gained control over the British colony of South Rhodesia by the unilateral declaration of independence. And the struggle for independence for Namibia continues against South Africa, which remains occupied in violation of United Nations' resolutions. These conflicts have involved not only the people of the region, but also the neighboring states, the Organization of African Unity, and the international community, directly or indirectly, causing serious threats to international peace and security. In its training seminars, off-the-record meetings, and workshops, the International Peace Academy has devoted considerable attention to peaceful resolution of these conflicts, with a special focus on peacekeeping and peacemaking processes.

This publication, dealing with the final phase of the transfer of power from illegal white minority control to freely elected majority rule in Zimbabwe, is in furtherance of the Academy's study on the development of the organization and modalities of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. The agreements and institutional arrangements brought into effect at Lancaster House and by the parties thereto, resulting in a temporary return of British authority and involvement of the Commonwealth, constitute a constellation of procedures that are at one and the same time both peacekeeping and peacemaking. Yet, while these procedures fall outside the mainstream of United Nations peacekeeping, they correspond in many ways to techniques adopted by United Nations peacekeeping for the supervision and monitoring of ceasefires and also in the supervision of the transfer of power.

In order to gain firsthand experience of this historic process of transfer of power, the Academy was fortunate in obtaining an observer

status for whom it dispatched to Salisbury its Director of Peacekeeping Programs, Dr. Henry Wiseman, to report on developments and procedures.

It is in the examination of these procedures, i.e., the roles of the British governor, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (British controlled with selected Commonwealth representation), the Commonwealth Observer group, and many independent observers, that the authors make a very significant contribution to the literature of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. This contribution will be invaluable in the Academy's training of military personnel and diplomats from around the world, and, indeed, for analysis by members of the international diplomatic community in negotiations and planning operations to be applied to the resolution of similar cases of conflict which threaten international peace and security.

While the authors of this study bear the sole responsibility for its content, the Academy is pleased to have sponsored and facilitated the considerable research and work that have gone into the preparation of this book. Moreover, the Academy is both hopeful and confident that the historical presentation and political analysis contained herein will contribute in some way to the future of conflict resolution.

The Academy wishes to express its appreciation to Dr. Wiseman for his reports from Salisbury and for undertaking the major responsibility for this study and to Dr. Alastair Taylor for his invaluable contribution to this publication.

This study was made possible by grants from the Donner Canadian Foundation towards the Academy's office of the Director of Peacekeeping Programs and from The Ford Foundation.

INDAR JIT RIKHYE MAJOR-GENERAL (RET.)
PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

On November 11, 1965, Ian Smith unilaterally declared independent the British colony of Southern Rhodesia. Since his aim was to perpetuate the rule of the 250,000 white minority over the millions of Africans (for a thousand years, he claimed), this "UDI" was a stupid move. It was a dramatic challenge which invited – and could have facilitated – a response.

Constitutionally UDI was a rebellion against the British crown. I urged the British government to respond by sending paratroops. If these had been accompanied by a broadcast speech by the Queen appealing for loyalty, I thought (and still think) that the Rhodesian forces would not have resisted. The rebellion might have ended within weeks, and tens of thousands of lives might have been saved. However the British government rejected this option and instead proposed economic sanctions.

Politically the Rhodesian Front's UDI challenged the international community as a whole, and particularly the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and the Commonwealth. There were voices which urged that the sensible reaction to what was seen as the

inadequacy of Britain's response to the "crisis" of rebellion would be to boycott or withdraw from international associations of which she was a member. This would have been counterproductive. The real problem was not the legal issue of rebellion in late 1965 but the human inequity of race discrimination which had been going on in Rhodesia since the beginning of this century. UDI provided the opportunity to get the international community seized of this issue and to try to develop the political will and the actions needed to resolve it. To this end the sensible strategy was to use and to strengthen the available international associations as instruments for consultation and persuasion to develop sensible collective policies, and for practical cooperation in implementing them.

One of these instruments was the Commonwealth. I had the privilege of serving as its first Secretary-General from 1965 to 1975. None of the international organizations concerned with the issue of race discrimination in Rhodesia can claim that its record in dealing with it has been satisfactory – there were fifteen years and much suffering between UDI and the achievement of an independent democratic Zimbabwe. But the Commonwealth undoubtedly played a constructive and in certain aspects and stages a decisive role in helping the people of Zimbabwe gain their freedom.

Since Britain rejected meeting UDI by a show of force, Commonwealth leaders from the beginning had to plan for what was called "the long haul." This involved the need to prevent recognition of the illegal regime. This was met in part by articulating and agreeing on a number of fundamental principles, prominent among them was racial equality, but also including agreement that no settlement would be made that was not shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. In 1972 this proved decisive when the Pearce Commission found that a proposed deal worked out between Sir Alec Douglas Home and Ian Smith was not acceptable to most of the African population. In the end, happily, the more far-reaching commitment that there would be no independence before majority rule was also honored.

Collective decisions seldom have a single motive. Many Commonwealth leaders were doubtful that economic sanctions would prove adequately effective in view of the obvious probability that South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique would ignore them. But we felt that they should have some effect, e.g., in limiting the borrowing capacity of the illegal regime over the years, and that if they could be made mandatory it would lessen the danger that non-Commonwealth countries might recognize the Rhodesian Front government. So Commonwealth Heads of Government at their special meeting in Lagos in January 1966 established a Sanctions Committee (later its name was changed to the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa) to keep the situation under review and make recommendations. It was largely through the initiative of its Commonwealth members, acting on recommendations of this committee, that the United Nations Security Council imposed mandatory sanctions, the first invocation of the coercive machinery of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. It is a sorry tale

that these were not adequately enforced by the UN or by its member governments, Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth. In 1977-78, the Commonwealth took the initiative to expose how oil sanctions were being deliberately circumvented.

A second decision of Commonwealth heads of government in January 1966 was to establish a program to give tertiary and technical training to African refugees from Rhodesia. Later this was extended to include correspondence courses for "A-level" education inside Rhodesia. Several thousand Africans benefited from this program between UDI and independence, and they made an important contribution to Zimbabwe's resources of skilled manpower.

A real turning point in the strategic situation in Southern Africa, and therefore in the move toward a democratic Zimbabwe, came in 1974 with the democratic revolution in Portugal, stimulated in significant part by the war-weariness of the Portuguese army after years of fighting the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau. Portugal's Mario Soares and FRELIMO's Samora Machel were offered significant Commonwealth help (chiefly Tanzanian and Zambian) in negotiating a "Commonwealth-type" peaceful transition to Mozambique independence. In July 1974 Samora Machel promised me that he would close the Mozambique-Rhodesia border within a year of getting independence and would support pressures on the illegal minority regime in Salisbury if the Commonwealth would provide technical and economic assistance to help his new country bear some of the severe losses this would entail for the Mozambique economy, which was largely dependent on Rhodesian supplies for food and on transit payments for foreign exchange. These commitments were honored on both sides. Mozambique's support for sanctions and for Robert Mugabe's liberation fighters played a major role in bringing Ian Smith to recognize at last that minority rule was simply not viable.

In 1979 the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa was in the forefront in mobilizing international opinion against the so-called "internal settlement" and the fraudulently anti-democratic constitution on which it was based.

Against this background Commonwealth leaders met in Lusaka with my successor Shridath Ramphal in August 1979 and worked out the courageous plan which led to the Lancaster House Agreement, followed by a cease fire and elections for the independence to Zimbabwe. The Lusaka Accord of 1979 envisaged a process founded on the principles which the Commonwealth had always insisted should form the basis of a settlement of the Rhodesian issue. By providing troops from a representative group of member countries for a unique experiment in peacekeeping, and a team of qualified civilian observers for the election, the Commonwealth provided confidence at potentially critical stages. This helped insure that the settlement would be acceptable both to the people of Zimbabwe and to the international community.

The whole exercise illustrates the capacity of the Commonwealth to contribute to the resolution of issues of global significance.

As Chairman of the Board of the International Peace Academy, which undertakes studies and training in the fields of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, it gives me particular pleasure to write a Foreword to this report of an Academy-sponsored study in which the authors cogently present and analyze the events of the dramatic final months of the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.

ARNOLD CANTWELL SMITH
JULY 1981

Acknowledgments

The pleasure of seeing our manuscript in print is a forceful reminder of all those who have so generously given of their time, knowledge, and skills to bring this study to its final completion. We alone are responsible for the content and therefore any errors of fact or judgment. Nonetheless, we are very grateful for all the care and assistance received from so many persons who were directly helpful in New York, London, and Rhodesia, and in the several capitals who graciously took the time to respond to our inquiries and provide other materials and documentation. Their considerations have enabled us to gather information which years hence would be difficult to trace or acquire.

It is therefore with deep appreciation that we thank the International Peace Academy and its President, General Indar Jit Rikhye, for the enormous support in enabling us to meet and receive the cooperation of so many in the international diplomatic and military community, for the time and resources of the Academy, and the personal encouragement of General Rikhye. Other members of the Academy were also supportive. It is hence with equal gratitude that we offer thanks to Florence Musaffi for her skills, diligence, and patience in the collation of materials, the typing of several versions of the manuscript, and her recognition of errors and redundancies before its completion; to Hugh Hanning who provided a stream of material from London, arranged for interviews at Whitehall, and gave us the benefit of his judgment of the entire manuscript, as did Arnold Cantwell Smith and John W. Kunstadter.

Our deep appreciation is also extended to the Ford Foundation which within weeks of our decision to undertake this study, willingly offered funding; to the Donner Foundation of Canada which funded the position of Director of Peacekeeping Programs occupied by Henry Wiseman; to Sir Anthony Parsons, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations, for pro-

viding Henry Wiseman with credentials as an Accredited Observer; to Election Commission for the travel facilities in Rhodesia; to Moni Malhoutra, Director and Head, Commonwealth Observer Group, who provided much information and cogent opinion; to Brigadier Adam Gurdon for his generosity of time, candor, and information when under great pressure of events and responsibilities; to Professor Hasu H. Patel of the University of Rhodesia for granting us the use of the facilities and resources of the University and for giving us the benefit of his knowledge of the situation and introducing us to members of the various parties contesting the election; to him and Professor D.S. Sieger for their expert guidance in the preparation of the Opinion Survey; to Miss Louise Koepfler for the computer programing and to C.T. Hadwen for his expertise in the interpretation of the data, and to Mr. Eldred Masunungure for collection and collation of newspapers and documents in Rhodesia.

There are many, many others of the diplomatic community in New York, Washington, and Salisbury who from various political and at times contradictory points of view (for us a valuable commodity) were very generous in time and information. They were critical to our search for a balanced judgment of the process of political transformation from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.

We also extend our thanks to the numerous observers and journalists who openly shared their experiences and observations of events in Rhodesia. Finally, we offer our most profound appreciation to the people of what is now Zimbabwe, both black and white, for their kind and considerate hospitality, and for selflessly sharing their feelings, views, and knowledge, all at a time when years of struggle and bloodshed were culminating the democratic decision on the future of their country.

Introduction

As the act concluding the Conference held in 1945 at San Francisco to establish the United Nations, the Charter was signed by 51 sovereign states. Of that number only four were situated in Africa – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa, with the last-named governed by a white minority. By 1981, in contrast, the membership of the world organization had tripled, while Africa, from being the least represented continent, had in the space of little more than a third of a century increased its numbers to 51 Member states. And because of the events examined in this case study, they now include the Republic of Zimbabwe.

These numbers attest to what may well be the most far-reaching phenomenon in this century's social and political evolution; namely, the redressing of a global disequilibrium that began five centuries ago. Acquisition of the compass, gunpowder, and a maritime technology that enabled Europeans to venture across the oceans resulted in their political and economic subjugation of peoples in every continent. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, Africa had been carved up by four major colonial powers, reducing the vast majority of its inhabitants to a status of political and economic dependence, and cultural contempt. But since World War II, at a pace never envisaged when the Charter was signed, the principle of self-determination has triumphed over colonial claims of domestic jurisdiction resulting in the existence today of more independent states in the world than ever before in history. As a consequence, the transfer of sovereignty to Zimbabwe in 1981 represents the elimination of all but the final vestiges of political colonialism in Africa.

In this context of historical rebalance, the subtitle of the case study, the politics of transition, assumes particular relevance. In its most obvious aspect, such a transition is from the colonial dependence-cum-abortive UDI of "Rhodesia" to the independence of a sovereign "Zimbabwe." But this political development necessitated yet another

form of change. In order to regain their precolonial stature and become masters in their own house, the indigenous inhabitants also had to cope with new modes of socio-political thinking and practice which were imported only a few decades earlier. These took the form of the institutional structure and practices of a nation state, with its unique attributes and manifold functions. Consequently, we have to appreciate the occurrence of an act of transition that involved equally a change of "status" of a "state of mind," and of "behaviour." Hence Zimbabwe's recent societal reconstruction must be seen as both a political and a psychological challenge. As we shall see, the Zimbabweans responded to this dual transitional challenge (in the democratic birth of the independent nation state of Zimbabwe) with widely-applauded poise and maturity.

The purpose of this case study is not to provide a capsulated history of the genesis of a new nation-state in central Africa, but to focus on the interaction of the modalities of a ceasefire and an electoral process under the authority of a British governor so as to achieve, with all deliberate speed, a democratic black majority government in Zimbabwe. More specifically, this is a field study of a unique development in the practice of peacekeeping outside the aegis of the United Nations, and in particular of the functioning of a monitoring force and observer groups with special reference to the group recruited from eleven widely scattered countries in the Commonwealth.

At this point we might draw attention to a number of dominant elements and themes which run through the various chapters. If we employ the metaphor of a drama, we find the dramatis personae comprising the following actors: the colonial power; the Rhodesian and other African protagonists; and the international community. The drama has three acts which are staged in the following sequence:

1. Negotiations at Lusaka and Lancaster House in London
2. Transition period negotiations involving: a ceasefire; establishment of an interim government; and the holding of elections for a new national government
3. Transfer of sovereignty to the new State and the installation of its government.

What were the roles of the dramatis personae through these three acts? All parties agreed to the need to bring the drama to a successful conclusion. But obviously they had different perceptions of what constituted "success." And their perceptions of one another's intentions and behavior were no less dissimilar. Hence one of the recurring themes relates to the roles played by the parties at each stage, in adherence to the terms of the Lancaster Agreement and in pursuit of their own objectives, the one not always compatible with the other. And this in turn involves two other connected themes – the degree of intimidation practiced by several actors, and the question of impartiality in the implementation of the means employed to effect a transfer of power and political status.

If beauty is in the eye of the beholder, intimidation and lack of impartiality can be equally subjective concepts – yet no less real for the parties concerned. For example, in the all-important negotiations comprising the "first act," the United Kingdom at the outset stated that the terms of the settlement must be "comparable to those on which Britain has granted independence to other former dependent territories" to be acceptable. It was thus obviously partial to a particular course of action which, inter alia, had the effect of excluding the international community, including the United Nations, from participating in the negotiations themselves. Was the British government perceived by the competing African negotiatiors at Lancaster House to be even-handed in its dealings with them? And did the choice of Lancaster House itself with all its historic associations have any intimidating effect or, again, what was regarded by the Patriotic Front as pressure tactics by Lord Carrington at critical points of the Conference?

When we move to the "second act" in the field, the twin issues of partiality and intimidation become much more pervasive and potentially ruinous. They make their presence felt in such crucial areas as the role of the Governor; the use to which he puts the military forces at his disposal; the presence of South African troops; and the activities and behaviour of the rival parties in the country to advantageously affect the results of the national election. Such activities, if not contained, could destroy the ceasefire and plunge the country once more into civil war – hence the indispensable role played by the Monitoring Force in the peacekeeping sphere, and by the observer groups in helping to ensure that the election was, and was perceived to be democratic and legitimate, and therefore acceptable in turn to the international community.

In an endeavor to do justice to the many-faceted aspects of this important event in contemporary history, and in so doing try to minimize any tendencies of their own to be partial or impressionistic, the authors utilized every available resource to corroborate evidence and to discover and present contrary opinion on the contentious issues, of which there were many. This involved prior researching of the subject from official documents and secondary sources; discussions with numerous national missions and the various representatives of the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Government at United Nations Headquarters and in Washington prior to Wiseman's proceeding to the United Kingdom and Rhodesia Zimbabwe; the development of a comprehensive questionnaire to solicit responses in depth from a broad cross section of international observers in the field; the collation of all available documentation; and a variety of interviews with officials, observers and journalists who were directly conversant with conditions, attitudes, and issues throughout the territory. Wiseman's activities in the field were in turn re-evaluated and amplified upon his return to New York by further interviews, the gathering of reports, and additional research at United Nations Headquarters and national mission offices.

Apart from the key documents produced at Lancaster House, and the reports of the Election Commissioner and that of the Commonwealth, the greater part of the materials gathered were ephemera; mimeographed handouts from the parties contesting the elections, observer reports, "in house" papers and documents made available to the authors, numerous press releases from diverse sources, local newspapers, and notes of interviews, etc. For this reason, no bibliography is appended to this study. However, wherever possible, sources have been cited in the notes, and an extensive appendix of pertinent documents and ephemera has been added.

At best, our efforts can do but incomplete justice to a subject as important as the creation of a new and viable state in a continent undergoing profound transformation in such a short period of time. But, hopefully this case-study can also make a modest contribution in several additional ways. The last major African territory yet to be decolonized is Namibia, originally German Southwest Africa, and subsequently reconstituted as a League of Nations mandate (under the administration of the Union of South Africa, an authority now revoked by the United Nations). Though many roadblocks continue to be placed in the way of the Namibian people in their struggle for independence and sovereignty in their own right, it can only be a matter of time before they are achieved. While this development will occur under a different constitutional aegis than in the case of Zimbabwe, and in all probability intimately involve the United Nations, the politics of transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe provides experiences and precedents that can be assessed to advantage in assisting the political transformation of Namibia. These include: the establishment of appropriate peacekeeping modalities prior to the announcement of a ceasefire and stand-fast (should guerrilla fighting against South African forces be in progress); the maintenance of security before, during, and after the holding of national elections; recognition of the factors of partiality and intimidation and means for counteracting them; the feasibility of employing a monitoring force to assist in the military sphere and an observer group to optimize the holding of elections and to help legitimize the results for the sake of both the domestic and international communities; and, finally, the need to be on hand for the critical period between the announcement of election results and the establishment of a constituent assembly and/or the installation of a new government in an internationally recognized sovereign Namibia.

A related contribution of this case study is to our growing understanding and literature of conflict resolution, of peacekeeping and peacemaking. As the concluding chapter points out, for example, the outcome of the Zimbabwean experience owed much of its success to two basic factors: elaborate prior planning by the parties for each stage of the exercise; and the generation and maintenance of a powerful momentum throughout the process. The structure and functions of the Monitoring Force adopted in Rhodesia, though not under United Nations mandate and authority, nonetheless bears strong resemblance to the practices of United Nations peacekeeping and are

generically akin. But there are also sharp contrasts. The United Nations has had to rely primarily upon ad hoc and temporary measures by which to react to crises and threats to international peace and security, making the rapid and effective deployment of forces in the field and the coordination of the administrative headquarters difficult. Nor, in too many cases, has a United Nations peacekeeping operation been followed by the swift, and most importantly, the successful implementation of the process of peacemaking. It may be argued that this failure is largely due to an emphasis upon the pacific perpetuation rather than resolution of disputes, as evidenced by the continued presence of United Nations peacekeepers in the decades-old dispute in Cyprus. However, in general, the United Nations failure of the political resolution of such conflicts should not be attributed to the process of peacekeeping itself, which practice is, and will undoubtedly continue to be, an area of fundamental achievement by the United Nations.

The major difference in the Zimbabwe situation was that the ceasefire and the application of a Monitoring Force was not an end in itself, but rather an indispensable condition to move from a military truce to a political solution – in other words, peacekeeping was in effect viewed as part of the larger and more permanent process of peacemaking. Moreover, in yet other ways does the concluding chapter employ the Zimbabwean experience to suggest how United Nations practice in this indispensable area of conflict management and resolution in an interdependent family of societies and nations can be improved and strengthened.*

The entire field of peacekeeping and associated modalities of peacemaking is being examined for potential application to various forms of conflict at the regional level by the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States, as well as by the Commonwealth and the United Nations. Peacekeeping, begun by and attendant to the process of decolonization has now demonstrated its utility in the management of other forms of interstate and intrastate conflict. The lessons of Zimbabwe may be fruitfully cast far afield.

*For a detailed in-depth assessment of international peacekeeping and its prospects, including its relationship with peacemaking modalities, see Henry Wiseman et al., Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).

1

From Lusaka to Lancaster

"The most dangerous way to cross a chasm is one step at a time."
– Clarence K. Streit

INTRODUCTION

For some eight hundred years, beginning about 700 A.D., Islam was the most important outside influence in Africa and the principal agency of communication with the external world. Its impact was felt especially along the East African coast. Arab traders established entrepôts and a number of small Muslim states. During the period of this active coastal trade – in ivory, gold, and slaves – there emerged a prosperous African state in the region to be known much later as Rhodesia. The rulers of this important kingdom built the imposing stone city of Zimbabwe over a period that lasted until the early eighteenth century. Constructed of granite blocks without mortar or cement, the massive walls of its temple ruins measure upwards of 15 feet thick and 30 feet high. The remains of the acropolis, built as an impregnable fortress, can be seen on a nearby hill. Close by is the Valley of the Ruins, probably once the site of a flourishing center.

With the coming of Europeans to Africa in the fifteenth century, the pattern of outside contact was revolutionized. Their arrival marked the beginning of European hegemony in African history, which was to last for some five hundred years. The opening of Africa began in earnest late in the eighteenth century and within the next hundred years the "Great African Colony Hunt" resulted in the takeover by European powers of almost all the world's second largest continent. Thus, while Germany was acquiring colonies on both coasts (including German East Africa, later called Tanganyika), Great Britain's influence expanded northward from Cape Colony to German East Africa. The main impetus in this drive came from Cecil Rhodes, who dreamed of an uninterrupted corridor of British territory from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo. He secured extensive settlement and mining rights to the high and fertile

plateau through which flowed the great Zambezi River. In 1890 the capital, Salisbury, was founded and the region was named Rhodesia.

Encouraged by Rhodes, white immigrants entered the region to exploit its rich mineral and agricultural resources. Self-government was granted by London in 1923, but the British government retained various powers, especially those relating to the rights of the African majority. From a population of some 50,000 whites and one million Africans in 1931, Rhodesia quintupled its numbers after World War II. The 1950s saw the creation of a federation comprising Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, while the following decade witnessed the granting of new constitutions to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and their subsequent attainment of independence under African governments as Zambia and Malawi. On December 31, 1963, the federation offically came to an end (and the following year Southern Rhodesia was termed simply "Rhodesia"). In November 1965, Prime Minister Ian Smith's government, acting on behalf of the white minority, unilaterally declared its independence from Great Britain which, for its part, had insisted that such action could not be countenanced without the prior granting of full political rights to the African majority. Despite a trade embargo imposed by London and economic sanctions levied by the United Nations, Rhodesia refused to accept British conditions (labeled as NIBMAR, no independence before majority rule). In the fall of 1968, the British and Rhodesian prime ministers held a conference to find a compromise solution (such as on the basis of "unimpeded progress toward majority rule"). No settlement was reached, however, and in 1970 the final ties with Great Britain appeared to be severed when Rhodesia assumed the status of a republic.(1)

The 1970s witnessed an acceleration of political and military activities, and Rhodesia's movement to center stage in the international theater. Black nationalist guerrillas stepped up their campaigns from bases in neighboring Zambia and Mozambique. In the latter months of 1976, a conference was held at Geneva based on Dr. Kissinger's proposals for majority rule in two years, conditional on the lifting of sanctions and an end to guerrilla warfare. These talks failed, as did a later British proposal to reopen the Geneva conference. In 1977 a new Anglo-American initiative appeared backed by the Front Line states, calling for a six-month transition period leading to general elections on the basis of one person, one vote. In January 1978, a meeting was held in Malta between Anglo-American representatives and Patriotic Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. In March, Prime Minister Smith and three internal nationalist leaders – Abel Muzorewa, Ndabanigi Sithole, and Jeremiah Chirau – signed the Salisbury Agreement, calling for the establishment of a transitional government, leading to black rule. A general election was held in April 1979, and on May 29 Bishop Muzorewa was sworn in as the prime minister of Zimbawbe Rhodesia, with a new constitution going into effect the following day. In succeeding weeks, the prime minister visited South Africa, the United States, and Great Britain to confer with their leaders.

COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE AND THE LUSAKA COMMUNIQUÉ

The Commonwealth heads of government met in Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, from August 1 - 7, 1979. Of the 39 countries attending, 27 were represented by their presidents or prime ministers. The Queen was present as head of the Commonwealth, and Dr. Kaunda presided. As the final communique stated, the conclave afforded an opportunity "for consultations aimed at forging a consensus on some of the major issues facing the world."

The conferees came to Lusaka well aware of specific problems relating to the Rhodesian question. Thus, whereas Muzorewa's government sought recognition and the lifting of sanctions, these objectives were uncompromisingly opposed by the heads of the Front Line states. In opening the conference, President Kaunda stated that so far as Africa was concerned, Rhodesia was still a British colony and the April elections had only resulted in the emergence of "an illegal and puppet government." Since the elections had been illegal, Muzorewa had "succeeded rebel leader Ian Smith in office, but did not succeed him in power." Majority rule should mean a total transfer of power from the minority, but, instead, what now existed in Salisbury was "white power clad in black habilments." Kaunda pledged support for the Patriotic Front which was leading "an escalating liberation war" to end the present rebellion.(2)

Australia's Prime Minister Fraser was concerned that majority rule should be reflected "not only in elections but in the underlying structure of power and authority" – which observers interpreted as a reference to the continuing white control of the military and civil service in Salisbury and consequently to the need for substantial changes in the existing constitution.(3) For her part, British Prime Minister Thatcher wanted to make it clear that "the British government is wholly committed to genuine black majority rule in Rhodesia," and sought "to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole will find acceptable, and which offers the prospect of peace for the people of Rhodesia and her neighbours."(4)

Before the conference concluded, and after "a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community," the heads of government had unanimously agreed upon a future course of action to resolve the Rhodesian situation. In their Lusaka communique, they:

a. confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
b. recognized, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
c. fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
d. recognized that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;

e. were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbors;
f. accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
g. acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
h. welcomed the British government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to which all the parties would be invited; and
i. consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement.(5)

This agreement had a number of significant implications for what was to follow. Thus, recognition that Zimbabwe must be granted "legal independence" on the basis of "genuine black majority rule" was coupled with full acceptance that it was the "constitutional responsibility" of the British government to grant such independence. This wording would be interpreted later by British negotiators to preclude any sharing of responsibility with third parties (such as the United Nations). The heads of government had recognized that there could be no "lasting settlement" unless "all parties to the dispute" were involved – which meant that the leaders of the parties comprising the Patriotic Front would be asked to participate in the "constitutional conference" which the British government had now committed itself to convene. On the basis, too, of the proposals adopted at Lusaka, this conference would be concerned with (i) adopting a "democratic constitution" (with safeguards for Zimbabwe's minorities); (ii) working out the modalities for holding "free and fair elections" (a phrase which was to be often quoted and which raised questions as to its ramifications) under British supervision and with Commonwealth observers; and (iii) bringing about a cease-fire in the field prior to holding elections and subsequently lifting existing sanctions against Rhodesia. As we shall see, activities under (i), (ii), and (iii) would comprise the major aspects of the constitutional conference. What the Lusaka communiqué neglected to mention was any reference to the question of the administration of Zimbabwe Rhodesia during the preindependence period.

CONVENING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AT LANCASTER HOUSE

The Lusaka plan, which was reportedly drawn up by a six-country task force comprised of Great Britain, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Australia, and Jamaica, won qualified approval. President Carter called it "a significant step forward" and promised United States support for what

could serve as the basis for "a just and lasting settlement in Zimbabwe Rhodesia."(6) Prime Minister Muzorewa interpreted the results of the conference as acknowledging "the new reality of a black majority government in Zimbabwe Rhodesia," and said it was "an insult to the electorate and to the Government of this country to suggest that the elections (held in April 1979) meant absolutely nothing and that we have to start all over again."(7) President Nyerere feared that the new peace initiative could be rejected by Ian Smith and cautioned that before the next Commonwealth meeting in 1981, Rhodesia would be either independent through the agreement reached in Lusaka or there would be no possibility of talking any more.(8) In his closing address as conference chairman, President Kaunda warned that the proposals could be torpedoed by the racist regimes in southern Africa, as they had torpedoed the Geneva and Anglo-American initiatives before, and he urged Britain to act swiftly to end the war in the rebel colony.(9)

Broadcasting on August 8 on the 16th anniversary of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Robert Mugabe refused to be persuaded that the Thatcher government meant well for the Zimbabwe people "after it had pronounced itself in alliance with the illegitimate and wholly unrepresentative Smith-Muzorewa regime." To be acceptable to ZANU, any settlement plan must recognize the following principles: (1) that the Zimbabwe people become sovereign through Britain's transfer of total and unfettered power to them; (2) that the present Smith-Muzorewa regime be completely disbanded; and (3) that the illegal regime's armed forces be dismantled and the liberation forces constitute Zimbabwe's national army.(10) For his part, Joshua Nkomo rejected the proposal that the British government supervise elections in Rhodesia, as it could not be both judge and foe at the same time. He added that the concessions reached had resulted from the struggle waged by the Patriotic Front for many years.(11)

On August 14, the British government announced that a constitutional conference would convene in London in September. Invitations were sent to the Zimbabwe Rhodesia government and the Patriotic Front, along with a draft outline for a new constitution. Although the delegations would be free to make suggestions, in the British view the terms of settlement must be "comparable to those on which Britain has granted independence to other former dependent territories."

The draft outline contained 11 proposals for the constitution of what was unequivocally called "Zimbabwe," and these concentrated on the most acute issues of controversy in reaching a settlement. Two chambers of parliament were envisaged, with the Senate given power to delay but not to block legislation. "For a specified minimum period after independence the House of Assembly will contain a minority of seats reserved for representatives of the European community. The proportion of these seats to the total number of seats in the House will be a matter for discussion between the British government and the Rhodesian parties." Parliament would have the power to amend the constitution (with the implication that the whites would not possess a blocking mechanism by which they alone could prevent fundamental

changes). The judiciary's independence would be protected. Public servants were to carry out the instructions of ministers and their pension rights would be protected. The commanders of the police and defense forces would act in accordance with general policy directives given by the prime minister or another responsible minister. Both the Public Service Commission and the commissions for the police and defense forces would be required to "take due account of the need to preserve a high standard of efficiency and . . . also recognize the legitimate claims of the majority of the population to increasing representation in all forms of public office." After consulting with the appropriate commission, the prime minister would have the power to make "certain senior appointments" in the services. The outline also provided for a head of state and an executive prime minister to be drawn from the majority party in the lower house.(12)

On September 10, the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, opened the constitutional conference at Lancaster House. He reminded the delegates that "a great many former dependent territories . . . have successfully made the transition to independent statehood on the basis of constitutions agreed here." The conference should bear in mind throughout its discussions the framework set out in the Lusaka communiqué because it incorporated the views of the British government and marked the approach which the Commonwealth would support and also gain international acceptance. The constitution was "the fundamental problem" which must be addressed; once agreement was achieved, arrangements would have to be reached to implement it. Regarding his government's constitutional proposals, Lord Carrington made three "general points." (1) They gave effect to principles accepted by successive British governments as the proper basis for independence – majority rule; guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution; immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; the unacceptability of racial discrimination; no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority; and what was agreed must be acceptable to Rhodesia's people. (2) They were comparable to the basis on which the United Kingdom had granted independence to other former dependent territories, in particular those in Africa. (3) They represented in outline the kind of constitution on which basis the government would be prepared to grant legal independence.

The above-mentioned principles (which had been set forth by the British government in 1965 - 1966) were in turn discussed by Bishop Muzorewa, who stated that his government had already accepted them. He now wanted to know "clearly and categorically" what more the British government required "from us before you will remove sanctions and grant recognition to our government. . . . we are not prepared to see any negation of what has so far been achieved in our country on behalf of our people."

Speaking for the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo stated that it had come to the conference because "we will leave no stone unturned in our struggle for the total liquidation of colonialism in Zimbabwe." The situation's "unique reality" was that a major war of liberation had been

raging for many years. Ninety percent of the country was covered by this war; the regime had abandoned the "liberated areas"; in other areas it could only achieve a temporary presence with punitive raids on the villages, the "semi-liberated areas." The Patriotic Front was now poised to conquer the remaining contested areas which included the towns and the regime's citadels. The conference was unique because for the first time two decolonizing forces had to cooperate in achieving peace as well as a future constitution. "The Patriotic Front representing the people of Zimbabwe are here as the effective decolonizing factor, while Britain is here asserting her diminished legal authority." The Patriotic Front's presence at Lancaster House demonstrated its will to "work together with Britain" to achieve genuine independence. Zimbabwe must be a sovereign republic unshackled by any fetters; its safety and survival must be the sacred trust of the Zimbabwean nation and not the pawn of mercenaries and other alien adventurers. Justice and the socioeconomic system must conform to the people's sense of justice and democracy. At this juncture, the Patriotic Front found the British proposals "too vague" to judge whether they were adequate, and it was essential that the British government "take us into their confidence and show us what their real proposals are." "Essential questions" which should be placed on the conference agenda included: Would the Zimbabwe people be "really sovereign" and able to exercise their sovereign authority? Whose army would defend Zimbabwe? Whose police force? What type of administration and judiciary would serve the country? Would any ethnic, tribal, or other group be able to hold the rest of the people hostage? How to create the situation for holding free and fair elections, and whose laws would govern such elections? Apart from British supervisors and Commonwealth observers, who would administer the elections and ensure the safety of the voters and candidates? What would be the future of the people's land?(13)

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE: ISSUES AND RESULTS

Functioning under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, the conference held 47 plenary sessions and concluded on December 15. Its work dealt with three interconnected issues: agreement on the independence constitution; arrangements for the preindependence period (including the establishment of an interim government and the holding of elections); and acceptance of a ceasefire agreement. Each of these areas generated its share of contentious problems, and their eventual resolution brought the constitutional conference to a successful conclusion.

The Independence Constitution

The greater part of the first six weeks was given over to constitutional proposals and problems. The British proposals made provision for:

citizenship; a declaration of rights; the executive headed by a constitutional president as head of state and including an executive council composed of the prime minister and other ministers appointed on the advice of the prime minister; the public service and police force; the parliament comprised of a senate and house of assembly (with provision for special minority representation); the judicature; the defense forces; and finance. Certain provisions would be entrenched; their amendment would require 70 percent of the votes in the House of Assembly and a two-thirds majority of the Senate membership or, after a specified period, presidential assent.

The Patriotic Front's proposals called for an executive president who would also be head of state and commander-in chief of the armed forces. He would have direct executive functions, working through a cabinet. Parliament was to be comprised of the president, a senate (with strictly limited delaying powers), and an assembly elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage, but with no reserved seats. Constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority of both houses sitting separately. The proposals also provided for a judicature; service commissions; a justiciable bill of rights; and they invalidated all deprivations of citizenship since UDI, as well as any grant of citizenship under the Citizenship of Rhodesia Act (1970), except those which could have been made under the Citizenship of Southern Rhodesia and British Nationality Act (1963).

Bishop Muzorewa's delegation had submitted the existing (1979) constitution, but the British government found certain aspects unacceptable, such as the blocking power given to the minority over a wide range of legislation. The major problem, however, concerned the differences between the British and Patriotic Front's constitutional proposals. No plenary sessions were held between September 19 and October 1; instead, the chairman held bilateral discussions with the two other delegations, during which time the Salisbury delegation accepted the British outline proposals, and the Patriotic Front agreed that 20 percent of seats in the new parliament should be reserved for whites.

Plenary sessions resumed on October 2, and three days later Bishop Muzorewa announced his delegation's acceptance of the independence constitution which the British government was prepared to commend to Parliament; it was also willing to participate in elections held under British supervision. Meanwhile, however, important constitutional differences continued to separate British and Patriotic Front delegations. One of the points at issue related to Britain's proposal to grant automatic citizenship to all persons who were citizens before independence; the Patriotic Front regarded this as an attempt to force it to accept as citizens people who had come after UDI to support Rhodesia's rebellion. It also objected to the principle of dual citizenship, since in its view a person could not be loyal both to Zimbabwe and to South Africa or any other hostile state. As to the nature of the executive, the Patriotic Front preferred to the British constitutional head of state its executive president who would be elected directly by the people and fully accountable to Parliament. As to the operational command of the defense forces, the Patriotic Front objected to

transferring it from the hands of the elected government to those of the commanders; such a proposal was "highly dangerous; it is a recipe for a coup." But the chief sticking point was over land rights and compensation. Under the British proposal, private property would be protected from compulsory acquisition (except for specified reasons); lawful acquisition called for prompt payment of adequate compensation which in turn would be remittable to any country outside Zimbabwe. The Patriotic Front argued that a basic objective of the Zimbabwean struggle was to recover the land of which the people were dispossessed, and that such dispossession had been "always without compensation." The new government must have the right to acquire any land in the public interest, "compensation being in the discretion of the Government." Moreover, to encourage the expatriation of capital was "quite iniquitous; far from encouraging a spirit of reconciliation, it accords to the wealthy a privilege which is normally accorded only to foreigners. It could also have disastrous consequences for the economy."(14)

The conference adjourned on October 11, and five days later the chairman announced that failing acceptance by the Patriotic Front of the draft constitution, discussions about the transitional period would take place without its participation. This led to considerable press speculation about the conference's prospects. To criticisms that he had been subjecting the Patriotic Front to pressure tactics, Lord Carrington answered that his guiding principle had been to be fair to both sides. The British government had kept closely in touch with the Front Line presidents who, while having reservations about some items of the proposed constitution, had indicated that it was fair. As for the "emotive issue" of land compensation, the British and United States governments had now stated that they would help out with aid for agricultural development and settlement.(15)

On October 19, the Patriotic Front returned to the conference with the announcement that it had been assured about a "multi-national financial donor effort to assist in land, agricultural, and economic development programmes." These assurances went far to allay the Front's concern arising from the Zimbabwean people's great need for land and its commitment to satisfy that need. The Patriotic Front now accepted the draft constitutional proposals, subject to subsequent agreement on the "vital issues of the transitional arrangements."(16)

The Preindependence (Transitional) Period

The second stage in the conference had now been reached. On October 22, the chairman introduced the British government's thirteen point program for the preindependence period. It called for the appointment of a British governor with executive and legislative authority; the holding of elections under the supervision of a British election commissioner and staff and witnessed by Commonwealth observers; and an election council on which all participating parties were to be represented. It would be Britain's responsibility, as recognized in the

Lusaka communique, to ensure that the conditions laid down for the conduct of free and fair elections were met. The governor would assume authority over the civil police and the security forces. These proposals also called for agreement between the opposing forces regarding a ceasefire and disengagement of their respective forces. As soon as the election results had been declared and a government formed, Zimbabwe would become independent.

On October 25, the Salisbury delegation sought clarification of some aspects of the preindependence proposals and asked when sanctions would be lifted. The chairman replied that sanctions would be removed as soon as there had been a return to legality. The next day the Patriotic Front tabled papers criticizing the British proposals and introducing its own. They envisaged the integration of the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury regime's army and police forces to operate alongside a United Nations peacekeeping force and a United Nations civilian police force; an electoral commission on which all the participating parties would be represented; supervision by the United Nations of the ceasefire and elections; a power-sharing interim governing council with equal representation from both parties; an equal allocation of ministers; and the transitional period to have a minimum time of six months.

The chairman recalled that it had been agreed at Lusaka that the British government was alone responsible for bringing Rhodesia to legal independence and that elections would be held under its authority. It was not prepared to accept arrangements which went beyond what was agreed at Lusaka. If agreement were reached on the political framework for the interim period, his government would be ready to arrange discussions between the military experts of both sides to arrange the ceasefire. The British proposals did not exclude the Patriotic Front's forces from being answerable to the governor for their part in maintaining the ceasefire. There could not be an interim governing council because it was not the task of political leaders during that period to try to conduct the country's administration but to explain their future policies to the people. As for the position of the present government in Salisbury, Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues had agreed that the governor would exercise executive and legislative powers and conduct the day-to-day administration. It would be for the Rhodesian people to decide who should be their future prime minister and ministers.

On October 27, the conference began discussion of arrangements for holding the elections, and in the following days questions were raised about arrangements for maintaining law and order, the role of the security forces, whether voters should be registered, and the appointment of the governor. On November 7, the British government introduced in Parliament the Southern Rhodesia Bill, authorizing it to write an independence constitution and arrange for its implementation; five days later the bill was passed by the House of Commons and subsequently received royal assent. On November 14, the British government proposed the establishment of a ceasefire commission on which military commanders from both sides would be represented.

Tabling proposals (originally presented by President Kaunda during his visit to London), the Patriotic Front accepted direct administrative control by a British governor, with a British supporting staff; an election council and British election commissioner; and elections conducted on a party list system. Following bilateral meetings, during which it was agreed that Patriotic Front forces would be required to comply with the governor's directives, agreement on transitional arrangements was reached on November 15.

Ceasefire Agreement

The last remaining stage of the conference began the following day when the chairman introduced his delegation's ceasefire proposals. The ceasefire was to be implemented as quickly as possible; both sides were to have facilities to convey the ceasefire message to their troops; the movement of all forces was to cease; military operations would be limited to self-defense; commanders of the forces involved were to be responsible to the governor, who would be assisted by a British military adviser and a team of British military liaison officers. The proposals also called for a joint ceasefire commission, no cross-border activity by either side, and the establishment of a ceasefire monitoring group to which certain Commonwealth governments would contribute.

Alternative ceasefire proposals were tabled by the Patriotic Front. They called for a substantial Commonwealth peacekeeping force; the ceasefire was to be regarded as the completion of a process and not fixed arbitrarily in advance. Nor were the Patriotic Front forces to surrender areas presently under their control. For their part, specialized units of the security forces were to be disbanded, civilians disarmed, a civil police force established, and South African and other foreign military personnel to be withdrawn.

Reacting to these proposals, the British delegation opposed any attempt to demarcate areas of control dominated by one side or the other. To have an effective ceasefire, all the national territory must be under the governor's control. With a de facto partition of the country, it was impossible to conceive how a free and fair election could be held. Nor could the British government accept that it was practicable to envisage a peacekeeping force which would actually enforce the ceasefire. The ceasefire commission, on which the commanders on both sides would be represented, assured that alleged breaches of the ceasefire would be investigated and appropriate measures devised to stop any recurrence of such breaches. It was not conceivable that other countries would be willing to commit forces whose task would be to intervene to compel the opposing forces to observe the ceasefire.(17)

In his statement on November 22, Lord Carrington stressed that the conference had now been in progress ten weeks, and his fears about the consequences of delay in quickly reaching agreement on a ceasefire had been realized with a sharp increase in tension between Rhodesia and Zambia. The only solution was "rapid agreement" and "acceptance by all the forces of the authority of the British Governor." To this end, his

government was tabling full proposals for implementing a ceasefire and requested a reply from the parties in four days. There was to be a ceasefire commission, comprised of an equal number of military representatives from both sides, chaired by the governor's military adviser, and which would function independently of existing command structures. The British government would establish a monitoring force "to assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the ceasefire by the forces and assist the ceasefire commission in its tasks." Operating in turn under the governor's authority and his military adviser's command, the Monitoring Force would be organized under British auspices and the majority of its personnel would be British. The Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, and Fiji governments had agreed to participate in the force, whose members would carry weapons for their personal protection only and would be provided with vehicles and helicopters. The activities of the security forces and their maintenance of the ceasefire would be monitored from their existing bases. The Patriotic Front forces were to assemble at 15 predetermined places to be similarly monitored and so that arrangements could be made for their security, accommodation, and other agreed-upon requirements. The assembly process was to be completed within seven days from ceasefire day. During the ceasefire, responsibility for law and order would rest with the police, acting under the governor's authority and supervision.(18)

On November 26, the Salisbury delegation accepted the ceasefire proposals, but the following days witnessed intensive bilateral meetings between the British negotiators and the Patriotic Front delegation. The latter sought to establish de facto equality between the opposing forces during the ceasefire and the grounding of the Rhodesian air force. There should be a Commonwealth peacekeeping force composed of states acceptable to both sides and capable of deterring foreign intervention, as well as a Commonwealth ceasefire supervisory commission, in addition to the joint ceasefire supervisory machinery. The Patriotic Front also called for a two-month period to establish a ceasefire; unacceptable elements in the security forces were to be disbanded; civilians were to be disarmed; and there should be a demarcation of the areas controlled by both sides; establishment of a civil police force; and combined police patrols with a Commonwealth element in the areas controlled by either side.

In a full statement of the British position, delivered on November 28, Lord Carrington replied that there could be no allocation of zones to each army; the air force would not be grounded but would be placed under the governor's authority and subject to monitoring; the proposed two-month period to establish a ceasefire was excessive; disbandment of units on either side was not envisaged; no outside force could enforce a ceasefire, nor was a Commonwealth supervisory commission necessary; while a new combined police force with a Commonwealth element was impracticable.

His delegation did not accept that the ceasefire monitoring force would not be impartial; it could, however, be larger than was originally contemplated. The ceasefire commission would continue in operation until an independent government had been formed; and the monitoring

force would remain until the government's authority had been accepted and independence granted. The monitoring arrangements were to extend throughout the command structure of the security forces down to company level. As to the disposition and assembly of forces, there was no question of one party's surrender to the other, or of one side being asked to disarm. A general integration of the forces of both sides was not practicable before the elections. It was not possible to envisage circumstances in which any foreign country would be likely to intervene militarily or to invade once the country had returned to its legal status under a British governor.(19)

Two days later, the Patriotic Front proposed that the security forces should withdraw to bases followed by the assembling of Patriotic Front forces at company level, and it again called for grounding the Rhodesian air force. It wanted the Commonwealth ceasefire monitoring force expanded to include units from Nigeria, India, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guyana, and Jamaica, and to have it report to the Commonwealth secretary-general as well as to the governor. In response, Lord Carrington further explained his government's proposals on the disposition of forces, and asked Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe to reconsider their position.

On December 5, the Patriotic Front accepted the British ceasefire proposals and discussion began the following day on practical details of implementation of the ceasefire. Among the questions to be settled were the date of the ceasefire; arrangements for assembly of the Patriotic Front forces; and deployment of the monitoring force. The chairman asked both sides to give the British delegation, in confidence, details of their force levels in Rhodesia. Meanwhile, the British government introduced the Zimbabwe Bill in Parliament so as to enable Rhodesia to be brought to independence on a date to be decided, and to make consequential provision in the law of the United Kingdom.

Lord Soames was appointed on December 7 as governor of Rhodesia during the interim period, and with his arrival in Salisbury on December 12 legality was restored and sanctions lifted. On December 15, the Constitutional Conference Report was initialed by the chairman and Dr. Mundawarara of the Salisbury delegation; two days later, Mr. Mugabe, Mr. Nkomo, and the Lord Privy Seal initialed the report and the ceasefire agreement. The Zimbabwe Bill received royal assent on December 18. Three days later, the conference report and the ceasefire agreement were signed by the chairman, the Lord Privy Seal, Bishop Muzorewa, Dr. Mundawarara, Mr. Mugabe, and Mr. Nkomo at a ceremony at Lancaster House attended by the prime minister of the United Kingdom.

NOTES

(1) This brief historical introduction is based on materials found in T. Walter Wallbank, Alastair M. Taylor, and Nels M. Bailkey, Civilization, Past and Present, seventh edition, vol. 1, ch. 19; vol. 2, chs. 11, 13 (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1976).

(2) The Weekly Review, August 3, 1979, pp. 10-11.

(3) The Guardian, August 2, 1979, p. 1.

(4) Ibid.

(5) Commonwealth Heads of Government, Meeting in Lusaka, 1-7 August 1979: Final Communique (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979), pp. 5-6.

(6) Washington, August 6, 1979; reported in The New York Times, August 7, 1979.

(7) Salisbury Home Service in English, 1600 GMT, August 6, 1979.

(8) Dar es Salaam Radio in English, 0400 GMT, August 7, 1979.

(9) Lusaka Home Service in English, 0500 GMT, August 8, 1979.

(10) Maputo Radio in English for Rhodesia: "Voice of Zimbabwe," 1800 GMT, August 8, 1979.

(11) Cairo Home Service, 0600 GMT, August 9, 1979.

(12) For the text of the proposals, see The Guardian, August 15, 1979, p. 4; also the article by Geoffrey Taylor, "Charter to cut white power in Zimbabwe" in the same issue.

(13) The statements made by Lord Carrington, Bishop Muzorewa, and Joshua Nkomo are published in Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979, Cmnd. 7802, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1980, pp. 3-16.

(14) "Patriotic Front: Response to British Constitutional Proposals for Zimbabwe," submitted to the Conference, October 8, 1979.

(15) Interview of Lord Carrington with Gordon Martin of the BBC Overseas Service, October 15, 1979.

(16) "Patriotic Front: Further Reply to Chairman's Statement of 9th October, 1979," submitted to the conference, October 19, 1979.

(17) Statement by the Lord Privy Seal in the Plenary Session, Tuesday morning, November 20, 1979.

(18) Statement by Lord Carrington at the Plenary Session of November 22, 1979; paper tabled by the chairman on the same date.

(19) Statement by Lord Carrington at a bilateral meeting with the Patriotic Front, November 28, 1979.

2

Implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement: Governance and the Governed

With the agreement signed and the parties committed to its implementation, the grounds of the struggle for power shifted from the field of diplomatic bargaining and infighting at Lancaster House to the military and electoral arenas in Southern Rhodesia (hereafter referred to as Rhodesia until the new government is formed and independence granted). Indeed, the protagonists in the struggle to end the civil war and form the new government of Zimbabwe provided themselves with precious little time to effect the ceasefire and to prepare their electoral campaigns.

Signed on December 21, 1979, the Cease-Fire Agreement provided that from 2400 hours all movement by personnel of the "Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces will cease . . . on a basis of strict reciprocity" and that "from 2400 hours on 28 December 1979, all hostilities in Rhodesia will cease."(1) A further seven days, to January 4, 1980, were then allotted for the movement of the Patriotic Front forces from their strategic operational staging areas to the predetermined assembly places in Rhodesia. Thereafter, with political authority firmly in the hands of the governor, Lord Soames, the parties would be free to conduct their electoral campaigns. Polling was set for February 27, 28, and 29, 1980.

The three fundamental elements of the transition process, the assumption of colonial power by the British sovereign, the ceasefire, and the elections, were all put into effect in the shortest possible time with approximately 54 days allowed for the campaign itself. There was no official opening day for the campaign. Registration of parties was set for December 31 with two additional days provided for the submission of further information, and nomination day was set on January 21. Although, as already noted, there were differences of opinion on the desired length of time to implement an orderly transfer of power to a black majority government of a new independent Zimbabwe, the decision prevailed to complete the process

in the shortest possible time. This meant that plans and events that would otherwise take place over a period of six months, as originally demanded by the Patriotic Front, were now confined to a period of less than two months. Such concentration was bound to intensify political and military activities of all kinds under severe timetable restraints. In these conditions, especially under the investigatory presence of approximately 223 accredited international observers and 780 journalists from 40 countries reporting to the world, the tension was sure to be aggravated, with the attendant danger of heightened anxiety, excessive zeal, random behavior, acts of violence in violation of the ceasefire or as intimidation in the electoral campaign, uncontrolled escalation of incidents, and consequent misinterpretation of events, accusations, and counteraccusations.

An era of formative history with its people and events was confined to a miniscule time capsule with an open window to the world to witness and hence to judge the gamble of an orderly "free and fair" electoral struggle for political power and legitimacy. Many observers and journalists believed that order would break down and that hostilities would be renewed. Political leaders frequently fanned the flames with threats of dire consequences if one party or another did not cease committing acts of violence and intimidation. In the weeks preceding the balloting, there were prognostications of Mugabe resorting once again to war if his party were not elected to power.

Such, in brief, is the general setting. It is our main task to analyze those aspects of the process which, in our view, generically fall into the realm of peacekeeping, namely, the functioning of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and the Commonwealth Observer Group, the latter in conjunction with the investigation of all the accredited governmental and independent observers. It is necessary first, however, to offer some details of key institutional structures that were put in place or integrated into the process by virtue of the Lancaster agreements. Foremost were the governor and his advisory and administrative entourage, brought from the United Kingdom, who were responsible directly to him. He also inherited the entire machinery and personnel of government that had served Prime Minister Bishop A.T. Muzorewa and Prime Minister Ian Smith.

There were 19 ministries and an equal number of departments comprising an establishment in excess of 50,000 persons for 1973-74 (the period for which figures are available). Of these, the civilian component of defense was 1,446; internal affairs, 3,815; and law and order, 146. The greatest number, 10,804, were in education, of which 3,487 were listed under African Education.(2) Closely identified with the Rhodesian Front and covering so many fields of activity touching the lives of all the populace, they were in a position to influence electoral events. No evidence of gross malfeasance was uncovered during the elections, though the civil servants were themselves gravely concerned about their future in the postelection period.(3)

The Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, appointed by the British government and responsible to the governor, was charged with

responsibility for the supervision and conduct of the elections. He was dependent on the National Election Directorate of Rhodesia for their implementation. In addition, he chaired the Election Council composed of representatives of the contending parties. This body's functions were generally consultative in nature, having no power to make decisions or to conduct inquiries on its own.(4) The election process is discussed more fully later in this chapter.

On the military side, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, responsible directly to the governor, was charged with monitoring and observing the maintenance of the ceasefire. A Cease-Fire Commission was also established, composed of representatives of the Rhodesian and Patriotic Front forces. Its function was to "provide a forum in which each side can seek assurance that the Cease-Fire Agreement is being complied with. [It could call] for reports on breaches of the ceasefire and discuss measures to contain them and to prevent their recurrence, [but would] not give directions to the forces on either side," that being a matter solely for the Governor to undertake.(5) On a separate level from the official institution were the observer groups whose task was to observe the overall transitional process and to offer judgment as to whether the elections were free and fair.

The role of the governor, the transitional process, and events are treated chronologically in this chapter to give the reader as full a picture as possible of what took place, as well as some sense of the anxiety and expectations felt by everyone in Rhodesia (depending, of course, on individual hopes and fears of the outcome). As noted in the introduction, a number of the dominant themes introduced in this chapter will reappear in subsequent chapters as analysis shifts emphasis from the role of the governor to an examination of the roles and functions of the Monitoring Force and of the observers in response to events as affected by the actions of the parties and the military elements.

THE FIRST STAGE OF BRITISH GOVERNANCE

With the achievement of significant progress because of British and Patriotic Front agreement on the principles of the ceasefire (in the first days of December), and on the assumption that further agreements would soon be concluded, the British government took the position that action was now warranted. On December 7, Lord Soames was appointed governor of Rhodesia. As leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Lords and an increasingly close adviser to Margaret Thatcher, he had been forewarned of the impending appointment which permitted considerable advance preparation. But the Labour opposition attacked his appointment as a precipitous and potentially dangerous act taken before agreement on a ceasefire.(6) Presidents Machel of Mozambique, Kaunda of Zambia, and Nyerere of Tanzania also objected to the appointment of Lord Soames.(7) On December 12, notwithstanding, he arrived in Salisbury to assume sovereign authority on behalf of the

United Kingdom, though the ceasefire was not yet in force. With him were Sir John Boynton, the Election Commissioner, and an entourage of 45 political advisers and administrative officials. Others had preceded the governor to initiate arrangements. As Lord Carrington had argued, "It is essential to maintain the momentum if we are to achieve a settlement involving all the parties. Delay could risk prejudicing what has been achieved at the conference."(8) Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was ended and the transition stage had begun.

On arrival, Lord Soames commented that he expected the task to be "taunting, challenging and exciting."(9) A rather modest characterization of the difficult and hazardous days which followed, but also suggestive of a sense of humor which would better enable him to cope with them.

His ceremonial arrival in Salisbury was low-key and without incident. His powers, however, were on a grand scale:

> The Governor will be established under an Order in Council which will confer on him executive and legislative authority. He will act according to the instructions given to him, for the fulfillment of his tasks, by the British Government. The Governor will have powers to make laws by Ordinance for the peace, order and good governance of the country. Legislative authority will be vested in the Governor and all public officers and authorities in Rhodesia, including the civil service, the police and the defence forces, will be required to comply with the Governor's directions. The Patriotic Front's forces will also be required to comply with the directions of the Governor.(10)

With such extensive powers, he was "required to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections."(11) The Lancaster House Agreement cited six conditions under which the elections should be held:

- the administration of the elections will be fair and impartial as between all the political parties taking part;
- peaceful political activity will be freely conducted by all the parties to the election;
- there will be freedom of movement, assembly and expression during the election campaign;
- all parties will conduct their political activities within the law;
- all the parties will have free and uncensored access to the public media to put their case to the people of Rhodesia, and there will be freedom to advertise and to publish political views in the press;
- appropriate measures will be taken to ensure the security of all parties taking part in the election campaign.(12)

The cooperation of all the parties, as well as of the governor, would be necessary if these conditions were to be met. Great as the powers of the governor to fulfill his obligations are, power itself is vested in the office. Its effective utilization depends on the ability to command, to influence, and to cause instructions be carried out, in this case with limited resources. Between the word and the deed there were the governor's own administrative staff and the full weight of the governmental administrative structure inherited from the Muzorewa government and its Smith predecessor as well as the Rhodesian military establishment so recently at war with the Patriotic Front, both of which were now "required to comply with the direction of the Governor." Lord Soames has written:

> Although in law I was an autocrat, vested with full executive and legislative authority, in practice I was also the representative of only one of the parties to an agreement to which the two other parties had subscribed as free agents. Both of those two parties, although accepting my legal authority, disposed of forces far larger than any at my disposal . . . my responsibility was all embracing – my real power was negligible.(13)

Yet he was expected to act decisively, and in many instances he did so.

On December 9, just three days before Lord Soames arrived in Salisbury, the Rhodesian forces carried out air strikes against Patriotic Front bases in Zambia and Mozambique. Regardless of military provocation by the Patriotic Front forces or last minute action to secure strategic advantage before the ceasefire, the air attack underscored the difficulties that Lord Soames would face in exerting his constitutional authority over Rhodesia's civil and military apparatus which was, to that moment, psychologically and functionally committed to the defeat of the Patriotic Front.

At Lancaster House, the Patriotic Front had argued against the continued utilization of the Rhodesian government and military infrastructure, proposing instead a power-sharing interim governing council with equal representation from both parties and an equal allocation of ministers as a way of avoiding inherent bias and providing for the mutual control of the civilian apparatus. The British government, however, convinced that such was a recipe for discord, insisted on an undiluted homogeneous governmental authority. The experience of the transition period justifies that decision. But it was nonetheless the source of many problems, particularly as between the Monitoring Force and the Rhodesian Security Forces, and the source of heavy criticism from the parties, press, and observers. It is also evident that ultimate success was highly dependent on the fundamental trust and good will of the parties, the skill and tact of the governor and his associates, and, among other matters, considerable political good fortune.

Under the transitional arrangements, Muzorewa and his ministers held on to the trappings of office, including salaries, but were rendered powerless. Nonetheless they strove to retain the electoral advantage of

incumbency. But such legitimacy was almost totally denuded under the general situation and the assertive governance of Lord Soames. Commensurate with his extensive powers, Lord Soames' actions were instantaneous and sweeping. By government decree, he lifted the ban on the political parties led by Robert Mugabe, ZANU PF, and by Joshua Nkomo, ZANU, as well as on their newspapers, and granted amnesty to those who would otherwise be tried for "offenses" during the war. He also "made it clear that the Salisbury administration must cease military raids into the neighboring black countries,"(14) and in fulfillment of an undertaking Britain made to President Kaunda during the Lancaster negotiations, November 8 to 11, he removed the maize embargo to Zambia (the rail link had been cut by Rhodesian forces on November 5), and, among other matters, declared December 31 as registration day for all political parties. The "irreversible process" had begun.(15)

CEASEFIRE AND MONITORING FORCE

When the Cease-Fire Agreement was finally signed in London on December 21, the full focus of attention shifted to Rhodesia. Advance elements of the Monitoring Force under the command of Major-General John Acland had already arrived the day before. Beginning on December 23, a week-long airlift was required to transport the balance of the force and its equipment, bringing both in place barely five days before the Patriotic Front forces were supposed to have completed their assembly to the designated places, and when the ceasefire was due to go into effect.

General Acland, whose long and distinguished military career included service in Northern Ireland, command of the British forces with the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and extensive experience in Africa, proceeded immediately on arrival to assist and supervise the movement of 15,000 to 20,000 Patriotic Front forces from the rendez-vous or collection places to the Assembly Points (APs). The whole process was to have been completed by January 4. A mass movement of that size proved impossible to accomplish in so short a time. It was hard to tell who and how many arrived in the camps. Allegations were rife that women and youths assembled in the camps in place of the guerillas who remained in the bush. A wave of violent incidents broke out. In response, the governor authorized the deployment of the Rhodesian security forces to assist the police(16) in maintaining law and order, an act which in itself became controversial. For his part, Mugabe argued that it was impossible to organize such a mass movement of Patriotic Front forces in so short a time, and that they were in constant jeopardy from Rhodesian forces.(17)

The first major crisis occurred and was averted when 450 guerrillas, who had been surrounded by Rhodesian police and army units, surrendered their arms on the instructions of General Rex Nhongo, the

commander of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the ZANU PF military forces.(18) But not all guerrilla forces entered the camps. It was reported that some 4,000 guerrillas remained in the bush; the Mujibas, the young scouts and runners for the ZANLA forces continued at large; Rhodesian forces were not confined to their bases; and acts of violence, breaches of the ceasefire continued to take place. A state of crisis marked the first days of the ceasefire and of British transitional rule in Rhodesia.

But this anticipates what will be dealt with in the section on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force. Suffice it to say here that the ceasefire became fundamentally effective on December 28, as prescribed, and remained so, but there were many breaches of the peace, nonimplementation of elements of the agreement itself, and the constant danger, or claims thereof, of a major breakdown and renewal of hostilities. That did not occur – but the expectation, and hence the threat, prevailed.

THE START OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN

Registration of political parties did not take place as initially required by December 31. The transformation from a condition of war to a peaceful political campaign could not be accomplished in such short order. The deadline was subsequently postponed to January 14, 1980 by which time nine parties entered the field (see Table C.1 for list) with the subsequent registration of 900 candidates. The most spectacular political events in the first weeks of the campaign were the rallies that Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe held on Rhodesian soil.

Nkomo returned home on January 13 to receive a tumultuous welcome by a crowd of 100,000 to 150,000(19) in Highfields, a black township outside Salisbury. It was his first appearance in Rhodesia since he left to carry on the struggle for self-determination by building his insurgent army. His central message to the joyous and admiring throng was an appeal to end the bitterness of war: "It is a tragedy that we had to fight, but having fought, let us say to each other 'it is all over.' Let every man and woman of every color and creed say, 'This is the opportunity we must seize. This is the opportunity for us to regard each other as people, in our own country.'" At the same time, he condemned Lord Soames for deploying the Rhodesian army against guerrillas holding out against the ceasefire. He called it a breach of the Cease-Fire Agreement and appealed for an increase in the Commonwealth Monitoring Force to 5,000.(20)

Mugabe, in detention or exile for the previous 15 years from where he had carried on the political and military struggle, finally returned to Rhodesia from Mozambique on January 27 to be greeted by a fiercely exuberant crowd of 200,000 at Highfields. It was described by The Times as "by far the largest crowd to attend a rally given by any of the black political parties . . . according to some observers, it was the biggest political meeting ever held in the country."(21) There, while speaking to his socialist convictions, Mugabe also sought to assure all

Rhodesians that there would be no more injustice based on race and color, and he called on all to unite to form a "true democracy based on equality." He appealed to the whites to remain and work in harmony to rebuild the country.(22) Mugabe reserved his harshest criticisms for Muzorewa, whom he accused of being the primary cause of the violations of the ceasefire through the utilization of the auxiliary forces to intimidate people against the parties of the Patriotic Front by violence and other means. Even though the auxiliaries were annexed to and under the control of the Rhodesian forces since Muzorewa's victory in the election of April 1979,(23) they had been Muzorewa's private army and many believed that they still served his purposes. Mugabe also expressed suspicion of conspiracy: "We begin to suspect the British are being used by Muzorewa or else they are in collusion with Muzorewa."(24) As we shall note later, the suspicion of collusion to prevent Mugabe from achieving power hung like a storm cloud. From the opposite side, Muzorewa claimed that politically motivated violence by the Patriotic Front was so excessive and widespread that he threatened to pull out of the ceasefire and "be forced to restore law and order" if the governor did not rectify the situation.(25)

On the campaign front, until the ban was lifted on the arrival of Lord Soames, the Patriotic Front was legally prohibited from any overt political activity, its press was banned, and it was totally excluded from the media except in pejorative accusations by its opponents as the cause of violence and terror. Nonetheless, its cadres carried on political activity of all forms throughout the considerable parts of the country under its control, and we assume in other areas as well. By contrast, Bishop Muzorewa's campaign had already begun in November while the Lancaster negotiations were still in progress. As prime minister with the evident backing of the white community, he had access to the media and the full force of the bureaucracy. Muzorewa based his campaign on the "choice between democracy and a one-party Marxist state."(26) He offered the continued stability and growth which his government professed to represent, the only other alternative being "chaos."

The politics of the election campaign had begun as early as the beginnings of the challenge to UDI. How people cast their ballot was only partly the consequence of the election campaign itself. Nonetheless, when Nkomo and Mugabe finally launched their overt electoral campaigns, Rhodesia became a mayhem of political activity, uncertainty, and violence which persisted until the polling results were announced.

INTIMIDATION

These were the conditions under which Lord Soames was charged with ensuring free and fair elections. Almost every event that occurred during the campaign focused on one question. "Intimidation" was the catchword; where, how, and by whom? There was no doubt but that

intimidation was a constant feature of the elections. Its occurrence was acknowledged by all concerned; the observers, the media, all the parties, and the civil and military authorities seemed to be constantly engaged in investigation, attribution, or accusation of unlawful political pressure or acts of violence. The differences between such acts of violence and breaches of the ceasefire were, in the circumstances, blurred. Always on center stage was the figure of the governor. Was he fully aware of it and what was he doing or not doing to curtail it?

What constituted intimidation? In the areas of Mashonaland East, Manicaland, and Victoria dominated by ZANU PF, other parties found it extremely difficult if not impossible to hold rallies or conduct their campaign by open solicitation of support. This was true for Nkomo and ZANU as it was for Muzorewa and the United African National Council (UANC). The lesser parties faired even more poorly. In these and contiguous areas where the PF had penetrated during the war, particularly in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTL), ZANU PF held sway. Young people, Mujibas, acting as agents and scouts for the PF and guerillas who had remained outside the APs, were accused of intimidation and direct violence or threats of violence to individuals, groups, and entire communities. It was reported by the British team of election supervisors that ZANLA forces had taken advantage of the ceasefire and extended their infiltration in the Southern areas previously occupied by Nkomo's guerilla forces, Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army (ZIPRA).(27) On the other side, the auxiliaries were accused by Mugabe and Nkomo of moving about the countryside with apparent freedom, terrorizing the populace into voting for the UANC and herding people to UANC rallies. On their part, the governor and his aides claimed that the auxiliaries were essential in maintaining law and order.(28)

Daily newspaper reports carried stories of intimidation, violence, and death. Some of the major incidents were attempts at Mugabe's life, one of which occurred at his house on February 6. Three persons were arrested, but their identity or political allegiance was never made public. A second attempt on the life of Mugabe was by the explosion of a remote-control land mine on February 10. As reported in the Guardian Weekly, "Mr. Robert Mugabe blamed the Rhodesian Security Forces for the second attempt on his life. Mr. Mugabe said the British Governor, Lord Soames, was implicated because he had refused to confine the Rhodesian Forces to their bases. Lord Soames, who this week called up police and army reservists, had earlier delivered a stern warning to Mr. Mugabe whose ZANLA guerillas he accused of large-scale intimidation of voters."(29)

On February 14, a bomb exploded in Salisbury damaging the church adjacent to the Monomotopa Hotel. Again there were countervailing accusations but no convictions (one or more white persons who presumably had placed the bomb were killed in the explosion). Just a week earlier, 16 people were killed when a bus was ambushed by rocket fire when traveling from Umtali to Salisbury, "the attackers were using communist made weapons similar to those used by the Mugabe forces."(30)

Determined to curtail the violence, the governor armed himself with powers to take action against the guilty parties. Where "disruptive activities have been persistently committed by the supporters of a political party," he enacted an ordinance on February 5 to prohibit or restrict that party from the holding of public meetings, to suspend individual candidates from contesting the election, and to disqualify in any administrative district that party which he determined as responsible for persistent disruptive activities.(31) Mugabe and ZANU PF impugned the ordinance as a direct threat and decried the action as "outrageously unconstitutional" and designed to ensure the election of Bishop Muzorewa.(32) The latter in turn was reported to have said that "no sane person could expect his group to accept a Mugabe victory at the polls if political violence in the troubled areas continues." As a demonstration of firmness, the governor took action against Enos Nkala, a candidate for ZANU PF. He was disqualified because he had publicly stated that "the war would resume unless ZANU PF won the elections."(33) It was a clear warning to Mugabe that harsher action might be taken unless his supporters refrained from violence and intimidation. The threat was partially borne out when ZANU PF was prohibited from holding any public meetings in the Triangle Hippo Valley area at Chiredzi "on evidence that parties other than ZANU PF cannot campaign there."(34)

A second ordinance of February 12 enabled the governor to abrogate the election in any particular district where "disruptive activities had taken place to such an extent as to render impossible the holding of free and fair elections in that district or in . . . part thereof."(35) As with other statements and actions of the governor, these ordinances confirmed the views of those who held ZANLA responsible for widespread intimidation in areas under its control and inflamed those who believed that the greater culprits of intimidation were the auxiliaries and other militia elements. On January 19, Bishop Muzorewa again warned that if the governor continued to do nothing but appease the undisciplined, defiant, and rebellious ZANLA and ZIPRA terrorists, "we are heading for a bloody conflagration in Zimbabwe."(36)

Mr. Sidney Sekeramai, speaking on behalf of Mugabe at a rally (variously claimed to be somewhere between 30,000 and 100,000 people) in Bulawayo, complained about the arrest of "thousands of party members" on "trumped up" charges and stated that the current campaign was aimed at destroying the party. However, he continued, "even if they eliminate each and everyone of our leaders, we will succeed."(37) Little was said of the fact that most whites were usually armed, probably because it had been the normal state of affairs for so many years, though to a foreign observer it did seem threatening. There were complaints, however, that certain parties, implying ZANU and ZANU PF, were unable to campaign among workers on white-owned farms, mines, and some protected villages,(38) though the group of independent British observers "found no serious inhibition of the electoral campaign" in these areas.(39)

If we appear to belabor the matter of intimidation, this is because of its prevalence and because it occupied center stage. The governor, however, on January 7, in response to the critical situation, "approved the deployment of security forces to assist the police in suppressing the wave of lawlessness sweeping the country following the withdrawal of security forces under the Cease-Fire Agreement."(40) By then, the seven-day period allowed for the Patriotic Front forces to assemble under the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement had expired. But 18,500 Patriotic Front forces had already moved into the APs. Exactly who were in and who or how many were not was the subject of some speculation. The matter settled into an uneasy quiet, discussed more fully in the following chapter.

SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IN RHODESIA

With regard to another contentious issue, the governor was called upon to rid the country of South African troops. In the last days of December, "in a broadcast on Radio Maputo from his headquarters in Mozambique, Mugabe avowed trickery" and charged that Britain had failed to expel South African troops from Rhodesia, claiming that some 1,000 South African ground troops and pilots were operating clandestinely. He threatened to reconsider the movement of Patriotic Front forces to the APs if there was no satisfactory resolution of the matter. "The Pretoria Government . . . repeatedly denied such allegations and [British] officials refuse to answer the question directly, saying only that they are confident there will be no foreign troops on Rhodesian soil when the cease-fire goes into effect at midnight [December 28]."(41)

The issue continued to simmer until specific attention was directed to the presence of a South African battalion of some three to six hundred men stationed at the Beit Bridge. It was the major road link between Rhodesia and South Africa, being therefore an exit route for whites from Rhodesia or an entry for South African troops. The issue was seized upon by the Patriotic Front, the Front Line states, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for constant attack on the complicity of the British government. This culminated in a Security Council meeting requested by the African group "to consider the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia arising from the gross violation of the Lancaster House Agreement on Southern Rhodesia by the United Kingdom, which is the administering colonial power."(42)

African delegates also used the occasion to accuse the British government of misuse of the auxiliary forces "armed and at large" in maintaining law and order, and among other matters, of restricting the return of refugees to Rhodesia.(43) Kenya went so far as to threaten to withdraw its 50 man contingent from the Commonwealth Monitoring Force. "I do not see," said President Moi, "how I can allow Kenyan troops to share Rhodesian soil with South African troops."(44)

To the specific charge about the South African troops, Sir Anthony Parsons (United Kingdom) acknowledged that "there was a small number of troops used to protect a vital lifeline. There was no question of their intervening in the internal affairs of Rhodesia. It was inconceivable that that small detachment could in any way have affected the course of the election. Their activities were in any case, strictly monitored by the monitoring teams."(45) He added that in any event a joint statement by the South African and British governments had been released the previous week confirming the decision to withdraw the troops as soon as substitute arrangements could be made.

They were withdrawn from Beit Bridge. Numerous South Africans (the exact number is unknown), however, served as members of the Rhodesian forces – a fact that, according to the British, was acknowledged on several occasions. Many held dual Rhodesian and South African citizenship. But it was never the British intention to purge the Rhodesian forces of South Africans or other foreigners. Yet on March 5, the day after the election results were announced, reports were still circulating that "hundreds of South African troops and airmen were covertly deployed in Rhodesia and remained there through the election."(46) Prime Minister P.W. Botha, in a statement in Capetown on March 12 also confirmed their presence in Rhodesia throughout the transition period: "The British authorities were aware of the presence of South African men and equipment with the Rhodesian forces, particularly with a view to facilitating the arrangements for holding of orderly elections. Immediately after the elections, I announced that this assistance was being withdrawn."(47) The reference to equipment included some 90 mine-protected vehicles for use by the national Election Directorate and the Election Commission and which were frequently employed in the transport of foreign-accredited observers on "facility trips" throughout Rhodesia.

At the time of the Security Council debate on South African troops, however, the Patriotic Front seemingly had the last say by taking heated objection to a joint announcement by the United Kingdom and South Africa and arguing that the South Africans should have been ordered out rather than allowed to be a party to a mutual decision. The entire affair strained relations between the United Kingdom and many African states and was one of the contributory reasons for the restrictive conditions imposed on the OAU observer delegation to the elections.

On February 1, the Security Council concluded its debate with a resolution calling on the United Kingdom "to ensure the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops" and among other matters, strict compliance with the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement.(48) In Rhodesia, however, where the actual events that would determine the future of Rhodesia were taking place, acts of violence and intimidation which threatened the elections continued unabated. Charge and countercharge were part of the daily media diet. On the same day that the Security Council concluded its debate in New York, in Salisbury Kieran Prendergast, spokesman for the

governor, responded to continued accusations of the use of the auxiliary forces: "If we are critical of ZANU PF and ZANLA, it is because of the weight of evidence against them. If there is a problem with the Security Force auxiliaries, it pales into insignificance beside the activities of the renegade ZANLA personnel roaming throughout the TTLs for purposes of intimidation."(49) To continuous allegations against the auxiliaries, he added that "little evidence was forthcoming."

COUNTERCHARGES ON THE CAUSES OF INTIMIDATION

The Cease-Fire Commission reported early in February that since its first meeting of January 2, "220 allegations of breaches had been submitted for investigation, and of these 128 had been considered. Three were agreed as incitements to break the ceasefire by the security forces and 84 other cases attributed as follows: ZANLA, 37 breaches; ZANLA area of operations, 20; ZIPRA, 9 breaches; ZIPRA area of operations, 3; Auxiliaries, 1; Bandits armed with PF-type weapons, 5; unattributable, 9."(50)

Counterclaims, however, were also abundant. A group of non-governmental observers from Canada and the United States expressed their deep concern about "the one-sided campaign" on the subject of intimidation made both in the media and in various official briefings: "If we had to rely only on those sources, we would have to believe that the ZANU PF and, to a lesser exent, the PF, are the only parties responsible for acts of intimidation. We have witnessed ourselves, despite official denials, that auxiliary forces are intimidating people in various parts of the country."(51) The group found verification for its claims by interviewing victims of violence in several hospitals who claimed that they had been wounded by security forces, police, and or auxiliaries. In late February, the Commonwealth Observer Group had occasion to issue an official denial that, as announced by Zimbabwe Rhodesia Radio Station (ZRBC), the Herald (Salisbury), and then South African Radio quoting ZRBC, it had attributed an ambush on a security vehicle during the polling to ZANLA forces. The Group did not know who had made the attack and made no claims to that effect.(52) The view that Rhodesian security elements, particularly the auxiliaries, were largely responsible for intimidation was voiced outside the country by Julius Nyerere, who condemned the governor's use of "political thugs" to maintain law and order.(53) Peter Onu, reporting on an OAU Council of Ministers meeting, accused the governor of applying double standards.(54)

The crucial question of the transitional period was whether the level of intimidation and violence would erode the ceasefire and/or nullify the elections. It may be some time before historians or political analysts determine on which party the greater burden of responsibility lay. In retrospect, however, the electoral struggle for power seemed like an all-pervasive propaganda war with no-holds barred, partisan claims to the truth, and with the governor himself acting as the

ultimate arbiter of the situation. Yet the pronouncements of the governor and of his aides were scrutinized and judged in turn by all concerned regardless of whether they were observers, members of the press, or party adherents. Was Lord Soames, as implicitly required by the Lancaster Agreement, acting with the requisite impartiality?

The observers as well as the press considered their specific task to report events as they saw them, and to attribute responsiblity for conduct that undermined free and fair elections, no matter from what quarter. The governor therefore came in for his share of criticism and abuse because it was his duty to act with impartiality and to rectify as much as possible the pernicious behavior of those whose struggle for electoral victory could wreck the election itself and plunge the country once again into civil war.

In the survey of the observers conducted in Rhodesia during the elections (see Appendix A), we asked, "In your opinion, have any of the parties and/or their supporters been intimidated?" Forty-five or an adjusted frequency (a.f.) of 81.8 percent responded in the affirmative; only 3 in the negative and the balance, 7 (a.f. 12.8 percent) either "no opinion" or "no response." Those who answered in the affirmative were asked to indicate the level of intimidation on a scale of one (minimal) to ten (excessive). The mean response was 5.9. Asked whether military elements were responsible for acts of intimidation, 43 with an a.f. of 79.6 percent responded in the affirmative; 5 in the negative (a.f. 9.1 percent) with 6 "no opinion" and 1 no response. The survey also asked, "Which parties have been most responsible for intimidation?" In the survey responses, ZANU PF (Mugabe's party) was ranked most responsible by 24 respondents; UANC (Muzorewa's party) by 22 respondents; and PF (Nkomo's party) by only 2 respondents. As we shall note later, however, accusations by the parties and media reports tended to extremes in assessing one or the other side as the main perpetrator of intimidation. They and some of the observers accused the governor of bias in his attribution of intimidation and violence mainly to ZANU PF and of being too ready to employ the auxiliaries to maintain law and order when they themselves were the source of so much of the intimidation.

Because the conduct of the governor was a controversial issue, and noting that "The Governor's instructions will require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections,"(55) we cited the above and put the following question to the observers: "Recognizing the extreme difficulties under which the Governor is called upon to perform his task, are you of the opinion that the Governor has acted (is acting) with impartiality?" Twenty-five, with an adjusted frequency of 46.3 percent responded in the affirmative, 23 (a.f. 42.6 percent) replied in the negative, 6 offered no opinion, and 1 did not respond. The large negative response, indicating a perception of bias, shows how deep was the division between those who believed the governor was acting with impartiality and those who believed otherwise. The same division appears in the subsequent question, "Are you of the opinion that the Governor has done all things

necessary to secure compliance with the conditions of free and fair elections?" Twenty-seven (a.f. 49.1 percent) responded in the affirmative, 23 (a.f. 41.8 percent) in the negative, with 5 offering no opinion. Because he was at the fulcrum of political power, many believed that the governor could have done more to curtail the intimidation, or as the matter of impartiality suggests, that he failed to perceive sufficiently the acts of intimidation caused by the auxiliaries and overly accused ZANLA. As we note in Chapter 4, the observers had several occasions to voice their views directly in meetings with the governor and more often in the public forum of the press conferences, where the issue of intimidation, whether or not mentioned by the governor's information spokesman, was raised by the observers or journalists.

Under the conditions where a political campaign being carried on when the civil war was constrained but not overcome by the ceasefire, and where the drive for power was pursued within the habitual pattern of war psychosis, what was intimidation, what could be considered a level of normal aberration, particularly in an African colonial context? There were no explicit criteria. "Free and fair," defined in the Lancaster House Agreement Pre-Independence Arrangements, Article 24, and clarified in advance by only some of the observers, acquired its own meaning as the campaign progressed. Ultimately the actual balloting process and the electoral results confirmed the view of most observers that intimidation, though excessive, did not warrant renunciation or disqualification of the voting results.

APPOINTMENT OF A PRIME MINISTER – LIMITS TO THE GOVERNOR'S DISCRETION

As the time of polling drew closer, there developed a growing confidence that the elections would take place and that the arrangements for the poll itself would ensure the secrecy of the vote. During that period, speculative attention turned to the possible distribution of the 80 black seats of the Common Voters Poll contested by the parties. Apart from the percipience of a few observers and those in the Mugabe camp who sensed a Mugabe victory, the general expectation was that no party would win the more than 50 seats necessary to form an absolute majority in the House of Assembly of 100 seats, composed of the 80 black seats and the 20 white seats elected earlier by the voters on the White Voters Poll. But many expected that Zanu PF would probably gain a plurality. Under such indecisive electoral results, would the governor be bound in the first instance to call upon the leader of the party with the largest number of seats to form the government, in this instance Mugabe, or could he call upon another party which in his judgment could form a viable coalition majority government? Of the many issues, whether of rumor or substance which characterized the campaign, this was an issue which drew much attention. There were those who claimed that as far back

as the Lancaster negotiations, the intent as well as the hope by the British delegation had been that the Patriotic Front could be denied an overwhelming victory, or better still, that Muzorewa could retain some elements of power in a coalition government, including the whites, if such were possible.(56) That was a clear impression gained by one of the authors during discussions with prominent members of the white community in Salisbury in the first weeks of February. Though a subject of increasing speculation and suspicion as the polling days drew nearer, it is also one upon which little actual evidence can be brought to bear.

Legally, the matter hinged on the article of the Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979, Article 69, which reads:

> 9. (1) The President (initially the Governor) who (a) acting in his own discretion, shall appoint a Prime Minister from among the members of the Senate and the House of Assembly and in so doing shall appoint the person who, in his opinion, is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly;

and

> (2) Notwithstanding any other provision of the Constitution, any party which is represented in the House of Assembly by a majority of the members referred to in section 38(1)(b) shall not, for the purpose of forming a government, form a coalition with any single party other than the party represented in the House of Assembly by a greater number of members referred to in section 38(1)(a) than the number of such members representing any other single party or, if there are two parties so represented by an equal number of such members, either such party.

(For purposes of clarification, Article 38(1)(a) designates that 80 members shall be elected on the common role constituencies and 38(1)(b) 20 shall be selected on the white poll constituencies.)

Essentially, it would be the task of the president, himself elected by the members of the Senate and the House of Assembly meeting as an electoral college (Art. 28) to designate the prime minister. The exigencies of the transitional government, however, made it clear that it would be the governor who would in fact if not in law designate the party leader who could command the confidence of the assembly to form the government, and hence become prime minister. All the Lancaster House Agreement had to say on this matter was:

> 4. The question of majority rule, which gave rise to the war, has therefore been resolved. The question now at issue is who is to form the future independence government. The British

> Government's position is that this must be decided by the people of Zimbabwe, in free and fair elections in which all parties will be able to take part on equal terms. The British Government will transfer power to whatever leaders are chosen by the people of Rhodesia in elections held under these conditions and supervised under the British Government's authority. The British Government will not be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it in election.(57)

A strict reading of Article 69, paragraph 2, would imply that the party and hence party leader with a plurality of the 80 common roll constituents should be called upon to form the government.

In a reference to the postelection period, Lord Soames stated:

> After the results are known, it will be for the parties themselves to decide about the future government of Zimbabwe. My purpose is to bring about an orderly transfer of power to a stable government. Together with the party leaders, I will, therefore, be working for a broadly-based government capable of achieving reconciliation and overcoming the divisions of the past.(58)

The question of whom the governor would call upon should the electoral results be indecisive was raised repeatedly at the press conferences and became the subject of wide speculation. Lord Soames maintained that, as governor with sweeping powers, he had full discretion in arriving at a choice to form the new government. The Rhodesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively speculated on a white/Muzorewa/Nkomo alliance.

> Rumours increasingly have it that Nkomo may come to some accommodation with Muzorewa. In that event, since the whites are likely to support Muzorewa rather than Nkomo or Mugabe, and would go along with a Muzorewa/Nkomo combination, the resulting UANC/PF/white understanding would produce a formidable unit in Parliament (hence Mugabe's attempt to placate the whites and prevent such a scenario). If such were the outcome of the poll, the question then arises as to what extent Mugabe would accept it, and if he refused to and returned to the bush, what support he would then have both internally and externally.(59)

As the governor kept his council to himself and took the course of refusing to limit his options, the door was left open for accusations of intended collusion. The OAU clung tenaciously to that view. At a meeting of its Liberation Committee of January 24, it passed a resolution on Rhodesia, which among other matters "condemns the British Government for its violations of the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement, and for its maneuvers to ensure the continuance in power of the Smith/Muzorewa Group in the territory." Since in the

event Mugabe and the ZANU PF won an absolute majority, there could be no doubt as to who must be called upon to form a government. Until that moment, however, doubt as to how the governor would proceed gave rise to the suspicion and criticism of the governor's alleged partiality, which in turn fueled the general uncertainty and predictions that the civil war would be renewed.

THE ELECTION COMMISSION AND THE POLL

During the latter days of February, attention was focused on the preparations for the polling on February 27, 28, and 29. There was no preregistration of voters. That would have been time-consuming, cumbersome, and subject to too many hazards. Election was by proportional representation by party. The central matter was to ensure secrecy of the ballot. A secret ballot could overcome some of the effects of intimidation. A secret ballot was crucial to the legitimacy of the outcome.

Under the direction of Sir John Boynton, the Election Commissioner, preparations therefore had to assure free access to the polls, secrecy of the ballot, and guarantees against any manipulation or rigging of the results. Above all, the populace had to be convinced that these assurances and guarantees would be acquitted; they had to feel confident that theirs would be a free expression of electoral decision. A new element was in consequence added to the politics of the campaign. The careful planning and organization of the balloting process had to be supplemented with a massive publicity campaign to inform the populace of how and where balloting would take place, and to remove fears of being exposed to unseen eyes, or to some hidden form of manipulation, or subsequent retribution. Even though most had once before cast ballots in the nominal internal settlement election of April 1980, the ballot itself was novel. Everybody knew that their future, peace or war, black majority rule, and their own personal aspirations and ambitions were delicately linked to the tens of thousands of pieces of paper that could render a decisive decision or, through chicanery, bring everything crashing down on their heads.

As noted, the responsibility for the supervision of the elections, "to the full extent necessary to ensure that they are free and fair,"(60) was placed in the hands of the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, who had been appointed by the British government. (What were generally considered by the observers as the criteria of free and fair are discussed in Chapter 4.) The specific responsibilities of the election commissioner were:

- To supervise the elections, directly or through members of his staff;
- To receive any complaint concerning the conduct of the elections . . . and to investigate and take action on any such complaint;
- To ensure the efficient functioning of the Election Council;
- To cooperate and consult with the Council, to have regard to its views and advice, and to receive and consider its representations and suggestions;
- To report from time to time to the governor on the discharge of the foregoing duties;

- To arrange the provision of facilities for Commonwealth and other official observers.

The British staff of the Election Commissioner, numbering approximately 89, were chosen for their special expertise. About 70 percent had experience in African affairs, while the others were members of the legal profession or had executive and political experience.(61) But they and the commissioner were largely dependent on the National Election Directorate of the Rhodesian administration which was charged directly with key elements of the 1980 elections, specifically administration, public information, and security. This body had planned and coordinated the election of 1979 which, apart from the constitutional factors and the fact that all parties did not participate, it had judged to be free and fair.(62) In 1980, therefore, as before, "The Ministry of Home Affairs was responsible for directing the Provincial and District Commissioners through whom the elections were administered on the ground. The Ministry of Information was responsible for the massive publicity campaign about the election to ensure that all voters were now aware of how and where to vote and of the secrecy of the ballot." This, as stated by Sir John, necessitated "a good working relationship with officials of the Rhodesian Administration through whom the whole electoral process had to be maintained. The potential for misunderstanding and resentment was very great."(63) Nevertheless, goodwill and a cooperative working relationship were established, as amply demonstrated in the performance of the elections.

During visits to Manicaland and Matabeleland North in the company of other observers, Wiseman met with both British supervisors and Rhodesian officials of the National Election Directorate and found them to be highly competent, perceptive, and extremely well organized. Among the Rhodesian personnel, did prejudice play a part? A chance meeting with one of them at the bar in the Jameson Hotel was very revealing. Frank, friendly, and forthcoming on all questions put to him, he finally offered the opinion that "the conduct of the polling will be the most efficient and fair ever held, and after that we will kick the hell out of them."

A new body, the Election Council, was established as a consultative forum. It comprised one representative or an alternate (in practice both often served and a majority were candidates for election) of each of the political parties contesting the election and was chaired by the election commissioner or his deputy. Being purely consultative, it was without administrative or investigatory powers of its own. Its first meeting, formally opened by Lord Soames, was held on January 15, and met ten times thereafter. The agenda ranged, together with a host of procedural and political matters, from the roles and duties of the polling agents to the secrecy of the ballot and the continuous problem of intimidation. (See Appendix E for a list of agenda items and a summary of main decisions made by the election council.) By virtue of the Election Commissioner's mandate and Election Council Ordinance, he and the Council were required, without prejudice, to receive complaints and to investigate and take action on any such complaints. Though there were many public charges of one kind or another, it is

most noteworthy that "throughout the meetings of the Election Council [only] a total of 19 complaints were received" from the political parties.(64) (See Appendix G for origin of these complaints.) Many more complaints were made at large from various individuals to the election commissioner. As staff was limited, not all complaints were fully investigated, but according to the election commissioner, "most of the complaints received were dealt with to the satisfaction of the complainants."(65)

The press were not permitted to attend meetings of the Election Council, but the main items were reported at the evening press briefings at the Miekles Hotel in Salisbury. On two occasions, members of the Commonwealth and British Observer Groups attended the meetings, causing political discussion to turn to political declamation.

Probably for the reason that the journalists were not permitted to attend the meetings, the Council was not treated very often in the local or international press. With everything and everyone else under the lens of the press and hence an issue of controversy, the council functioned better out of view of the press. It proved a very useful medium of communication between the parties and played a constructive role in the performance of the elections. It is most noteworthy that with intimidation rife throughout the country and the air filled with accusations and denials from all quarters, "none of the party representatives exercised their right to call a special session of the Council."(66) A sharp contrast existed between the privacy of party councils where the determination to win was coupled with the determination that the elections would take place and the public propaganda and overt intimidation that threatened to wreck the self-same elections. Those on the outside of the process were buffeted between these two realities, never sure which of them would prove dominant.

During the polling, every care was taken to prevent ballot stuffing, multiple voting, replacement or theft of ballot boxes, and other possible attempts at rigging the election.(67) Secrecy was further ensured by the counting of the ballots at the eight provinces instead of in the 55 districts, thus preventing anyone from knowing how any particular district had voted; by sending all the marked ballots to Britain, there to be destroyed after a prescribed period of time; by a massive publicity campaign on the secrecy of the vote, and the personal undertaking of the governor and the joint statement of the leaders of all nine parties to that effect; and by permitting the parties to appoint polling agents who, in rural areas, were required to stay outside the polling stations because of the possibilities of intimidation.

The most ingenious of all measures was the decision taken in mid-February to bring unarmed British "Bobbies" to Rhodesia as assistant election supervisors, so that at each polling station a symbol of British fairness and authority would be visibly present. They would be an "extra pair of eyes and ears" to watch out for attempts at intimidation and rigging. But they were not to act as policemen. Some consideration was given to using members of the Monitoring Force but this idea was

discarded as impractical. A call for volunteers by the Home Office in London produced an overwhelming response. Between February 23 and 25, the Election Commission was faced with the task of providing food and accommodation for 565 bobbies; within hours of their arrival from London, they were briefed on their electoral tasks and dispersed to 50 polling stations "throughout the length and breadth of Rhodesia." It is worth quoting directly from Sir John Boynton's Report the fact that everything was done "without a hitch, and in time for commencement of the poll at 0700 hours on Wednesday, 27 February was due entirely to the efficiency and wholehearted cooperation which the Commission received from the British South African Police, the Royal Air Force and the Rhodesian Air Force."(68) Their presence added immeasurably to the authority and legitimacy of the atmosphere at the polling stations.

The most dramatic aspect, however, was the manifest dignity and determination of the thousands upon thousands of citizens who waited patiently in line to cast their ballots. It was an event unsurpassed in any democratic country. It was an occasion to be admired. No form of pomp or ceremony or staged celebration could match the colorful procession to the polling booths and the singing and dancing, in rain and shine, that took place within 100 yards of the polling booths.

The observer assessment of the general administration of the election was, on the whole, very positive and laudatory of the election commissioner and his staff, and of the Election Directorate and of the Election Council, though there were some misgivings. The press in Rhodesia did not pay much attention to the functions of the separate components of the electoral machinery. They concentrated, as did the observers, on the adequacy of the various procedures, particularly on the information campaign to acquaint the populace of the location of the polls, the manner of marking and casting ballots, on the secrecy of the ballot, and on the dangers of multiple voting, the security for counting the ballots, and other forms of chicanery that could falsify the true results. There were also claims by the press and observers that the utilization of the Rhodesian-manned administration to conduct the elections was a source of prejudice which could, deliberately or otherwise, tamper with the voting process or results. Such suspicions were reflected in the following from the Independent American Group:

> The British authorities depended almost entirely on Rhodesian civil servants for the administration of the election. Given the bias of most white Rhodesians to equate ZANU PF and the Patriotic Front with terrorism and Marxism, this calls into question the objectivity with which the elections might have been administered.(69)

And from the Canadian Non-Governmental Observer Team:

> The actual running of the election and vigilance of the polling is carried out by civil servants and members of the Security Forces. Every polling supervisor we've seen has been a white

> person. We observed frequent hostility by a large number of these officials toward the two wings of the Patriotic Front.(70)

To our knowledge, this was the only claim that the security forces were running the elections. By contrast the Commonwealth Observer Group said

> The officials, including returning officers, polling officers and counting officers, were in the main civil servants, black and white, who have been charged by law for many years not to be involved in political activity. . . . The Election Council proved a most useful forum; [and in its conclusion]. . . We are completely satisfied with the integrity of the conduct of the poll in all its aspects.(71)

And the Danish Observer Group reported:

> The Governor and his staff have made every conceivable effort to ensure that polling was secret and that fraud and other irregularities could not take place. . . . The Danish Observers are satisfied that (the) polling itself has to the highest extent possible fulfilled the standards of a democratic election.(72)

As well as the Dutch Observer Group:

> There has been no evidence of gross irregularities. The complaints which have been made seem to be mainly of marginal importance and hardly of consequence for the election results. The technical organization of the elections can be qualified as close to perfect.(73)

Before the ballot results were known, and because doubt and suspicion characterized the period of the campaign, in our survey we asked the observers, "In your opinion has the Election Commission acted with impartiality?" Forty-two with an adjusted frequency of 79.2 percent replied in the affirmative, 10 (a.f. 18.9 percent) in the negative with 1 no opinion and 2 no response. We asked the same question with regard to the Election Directorate. The response was slightly less favorable, with 35 (a.f. 66 percent) replies in the affirmative, 14 (a.f. 26.4 percent) in the negative, 4 no opinion, and 2 no response, indicating some distrust, as expressed in some of the observer reports, in the utilization of the predominantly white Rhodesian Election Directorate.

With regard to the Election Council, in whose membership all the parties were represented, the following question was asked, "In your opinion, has the Election Council acted effectively?" Thirty-eight (a.f. 73.1 percent) replied in the affirmative, 5 (a.f. 9.6 percent) in the negative and 9 no opinion and 3 no response.

In all, these results parallel the assessments of the observer reports and demonstrate confidence in the electoral procedures and their implementation.

THE SECURITY SITUATION

While the extensive preparations for the balloting were being implemented, general excitement and uncertainty of the outcome prevailed. "The news from Rhodesia is causing increased distress and apprehension in Britain, both inside and outside the Government. . . . There are growing fears that what had been regarded as a diplomatic triumph might turn into disaster."(74) Similar expressions, concern, and doubt abounded.

Actions were therefore taken to avoid such an eventuality. Within two weeks of the poll, a full mobilization was ordered of the greater part of the 58,000 territorials. The Rhodesian police (known since its inception under the British colonial period as the British South African Police), normally numbering 8,000, was greatly augmented by calling up the bulk of the 38,000 reservists. Rhodesian military and paramilitary elements, including about 26,000 auxiliaries, were in evidence throughout the country. During the days of polling and until after the election results were announced, armored cars with machine guns at the ready patrolled the streets of Salisbury. Armored cars with cannons were placed near the University of Salisbury campus where the headquarters of ZANLA and ZIPRA were located and many of their men billeted. Tanks were seen in the area of the Zimbabwe Rhodesia Radio Station. It would appear that the message was clear and unequivocal; no incidents or attempts of whatever kind to disrupt the elections or threaten the ceasefire would be tolerated. Yet, ironically, Sir John Boynton reported that the purpose of the armored vehicles in evidence during the poll "was not clear,"(75) raising the question as to why precisely they were there.

It is a reasonable assumption that Lord Soames, on the advice of his military advisers, agreed that the increased security measures were necessary during the polling period "so that people can go to the polling stations and cast their secret ballots."(76) Yet here the full weight of the Rhodesian armed forces held sway throughout the country while the Patriotic Front forces were confined to the APs. The Rhodesian forces were responsive to their own officers, General Peter Walls and Lt. General Sandy Maclean; all were subject to the ultimate command of General Acland. But could they be trusted to carry out the commands and the policies of General Acland and not to act independently according to their self-perceived interests? This doubt in the minds of the Patriotic Front forces, of many observers, and others, was a constant source of apprehension.

In an address to the nation of February 26, Lord Soames affirmed that "peace is our main purpose. . . . There has been much violence and a great deal of intimidation, but I believe that you, the people of this country, are wise enough and determined enough to vote for the party of your choice and that you will form your own judgments about those who have talked about retaliation if the results of the poll should not be to their liking. . . . It is essential, if we are to succeed in forming a

stable government, that the three forces should maintain the strictest discipline and self-restraint over the days ahead. The Commanders of all these forces have given orders to this effect. I expect them to be obeyed. No one should be in fear of attack after the election."(77)

THE LAST DAYS

Yet still other events added to the already plentiful store of speculation as well as significant elements of reassurance that the election would take place and that the results would be accepted by the contending parties. At one of the last press conferences, Nicholas Fenn was asked about a personal telephone call that General Walls had made to Prime Minister Thatcher. "Was he authorized to make such a call; was it appropriate for him to do so, and what was discussed?" The reply was that the prime minister had asked the participants of the Lancaster Conference to communicate with her as necessary. When prodded further on the content of the call, he replied that no information was available.

Following the elections and the assumption of power by Mugabe, General Walls was invited to stay on as commander to oversee the process of integration of the armed forces. Months later, a sequel to the assumption of command was his revelation in a BBC interview that he had "pressed the British to declare null and void the elections that swept Prime Minister Mugabe to power." He made the request to Prime Minister Thatcher after the election but before the result was announced.(78) The world was finally informed of the nature of General Walls' telephone call to Thatcher. Though weeks earlier Walls had declared his intention to resign, he was dismissed from office by Prime Minister Mugabe on September 17, 1980.

Developments of a positive nature had also taken place in the last days of the campaign. Robert Mugabe and Lord Soames had a conciliatory meeting on February 26, after which the governor was reported to have discarded any plans to disenfranchise districts subject to excessive intimidation, obviously in ZANU PF territory. Mobilization and deployment of Rhodesian forces throughout the country must have been discussed. Whatever protest Mugabe made on this matter, he evidentally accepted the situation. But consideration of keeping on the monitoring force beyond the election made no headway. Mugabe's request received a cool response; the monitoring force was already in the advance stages of their plans to pull out.(79) Mugabe also asked Lord Soames to remain as governor during the interim between the ballot and formal independence, to which the governor agreed. On the 26th, the day before the balloting, evidently unaware of what had taken place, Mugabe was reported to have met secretly with General Walls to head off a possible white-led coup. Presumably such assurances were given. Later in a public statement, Mugabe said he would accept the results of the elections regardless of who won, and emphasized that he expected to form a coalition with his compatriot, Joshua Nkomo. Reflecting the mood prevalent at the time, ZANU PF

appeared certain of victory. The question was by how large a margin it would win and whether it would constitute an absolute majority.

Anticipating the new situation, Zambia purchased for 350,000 Rhodesian dollars the large and stately Ivory House in downtown Salisbury as their new embassy. Renovation proceeded immediately during the third week of February. "A spokesman for the owners said that the Zambian Embassy staff was anxious to move in as soon as possible."(80)

Contributing to the general sense of optimism was a shift from the dangerous levels of hostility which marked the campaign to indications of cooperation among the parties. Reporting at the press conference of February 25 on the security situation, Fenn announced that the day before, there had been thirteen incidents, including nine contacts between opposing military elements and eight fatalities, and on the 25th, eleven contacts, four incidents, and again eight fatalities – figures slightly down from the previous few days. On a positive note, he continued, "Patriotic Front forces have accepted an offer made as Rhodesian initiative to move a group of ZIPRA forces from the Assembly Place Lima to a training camp at Essex Bay (the first step in the integration of all forces). The move took place today. At this camp, which is under the auspices of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, training is being organized with the participation of the Rhodesian army. It is expected that this initiative will help foster the spirit of reconciliation and it would lead to closer understanding and make a positive contribution to the future of this nation." Finally, "over the past four days, the Cease-Fire Commission has been jointly touring the Assembly Places and discussed with the Patriotic Front commanders arrangements for closer cooperation between the Rhodesian Security forces, ZANLA and ZIPRA. They have everywhere been well received and arrangements are going forward for the introduction of a Rhodesian military and police presence into the Assembly places over the next few days. . . . We find these arrangements encouraging and we greatly welcome them."(81)

During the night of February 26, people began gathering by the thousands, some traveling on foot for many miles, to present themselves at the polling booths on the morning of February 27. Separate lines of men and women, in some places a mile long, stood pertinaciously to individually and collectively make their choice of party to lead Zimbabwe into independence. This alone was an overwhelming demonstration that the people were determined to make their voice heard. There were reports of scattered violence. But on that day, as on the two balloting days that followed, the political landscape across the land was marked by the peaceful march to the polls. On February 27, 1,375,468 people voted; on the 28th, 2,281,146 and on the 29th, 2,699,450. As the polling was taking place, the elaborate military precautions that were put into place by the mobilization were even more in evidence. Patrols on the ready were everywhere. The secret ballot had been taken. The relative calm that took hold as "Zimbabweans" everywhere patiently waited to cast their ballots in

record numbers now gave way to anxiety and speculation of the outcome. There were three full days of counting before the results were made known to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and the world on the morning of March 2.

Everyone waited for the news of the outcome, everyone except those leaders whose information networks provided an advance estimate of the results, or received the results before they were made public. The tremendous vote in areas dominated by ZANU PF and leaks of the results in Salisbury were tangible indications of a Mugabe victory. Nkomo still expected a sizeable number of seats and a leading position in the new government. Muzorewa and the leaders of the smaller parties had forebodings of rejection by the electorate that, without the participation of the Patriotic Front, gave the Bishop an overwhelming victory of 51 of the 72 black seats in the election of April 1979.

While the balloting was being conducted, Mugabe traveled to Maputo for yet another secret meeting, arranged by Mozambique's President Machel on Mugabe's initiative, this time with the foreign minister of South Africa, Roelof Botha. As with the meeting with General Walls, he sought to head off a possible South African-engineered coup on behalf of Bishop Muzorewa. "South African officials familiar with the exchange, have said that the South Africans present were impressed with Mr. Mugabe's intelligence and his 'appreciation of the realities' facing a black government in Salisbury. In addition to offering assurances against the possibility that Zimbabwe might be used as a springboard for guerrilla attacks, Mr. Mugabe used the meeting to outline the moderate policies toward whites and private enterprise that he announced on the day his victory was confirmed."(82) From Maputo, Mugabe traveled to Dar es Salaam to acquaint President Nyerere with events and to gain support for his policies. British representatives were not party to Mugabe's meetings in Maputo and Dar es Salaam between February 27 and March 2, and were not aware of their content.

It was also reported in Salisbury that about the same time, General Walls and Ken Flower, head of intelligence, had held secret talks in Maputo with senior members of President Machel's government. For four years General Walls' forces had raided Mozambique almost at will. Now he and his counterparts in Mozambique were discussing mutual willingness to accept the results of the election, whatever its imperfections, and conditions for relations between the two countries in the postelection period.(83) It was assumed at the time that Machel wanted assurance that there would be no attempt at a military coup if Mugabe was elected to power. Presumably such assurances were given. Since so much occurred in Maputo at the same time, it is a reasonable conjecture that General Walls also met with Roelof Botha.

With the handwriting on the wall, the leadership of the white community was forced to reassess its position. Members of the Rhodesian Promotion Council, who earlier in February had sought a coalition that would freeze out or diminish the role of Mugabe and ZANU PF in the new government, now made overtures of accommodation. Meetings were hastily arranged betwen Mugabe and key figures in

the cabinet, Rhodesian forces, intelligence, and treasury. Mugabe, speaking from strength, reminded them – as if they were not already amply and unhappily aware – that he knew how to fight and win a military campaign, that he knew how to conduct and win an electoral campaign, but that he had no experience running a government. They did. He needed their help. If they would fully accept his leadership, would they carry on in the government of Zimbabwe? They answered "yes" and the agreement was struck.

On the morning of March 2, in a crisp voice, the results were announced on the ZRBC:

Party	Total Valid Votes Cast	% of Valid Votes	Seats
ZANU PF (Mugabe)	1,668,992	62.992	57
PF (Nkomo)	638,879	24.113	20
UANC (Muzorewa)	219,307	8.277	3

The unexpected: ZANU PF won an overwhelming majority. All parties other than the PF and UANC failed to elect a single member. PF elected a respectable number of seats, but if invited to form a coalition by Mugabe, was not in a position to bargain the terms. The UANC, the victor in April 1978, was ignominiously reduced to three seats. Moreover, the number of valid votes cast in 1979 were 1,802,750; in 1980, 2,649,529. (For complete results, see Appendix C.)

Jubilation swept the streets. With unrestrained emotion, people leapt into the air with cries of joy. Throngs swirled about in celebration of the ZANU PF victory. The somber, sometimes defiant faces of those who were vanquished were seen huddled on the sidelines. A surprised and bewildered little white girl, about ten years of age, stood leaning against a storefront window crying. Asked what had happened, she replied in dismay, "It's not fair, it's not fair." The world she had known was at an end. The future she expected was no more. Overhead the armed helicopters continued to fly.

NOTES

(1) "Rhodesia: Cease-Fire Agreement," Southern Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, Cmnd. 7802, p. 40.

(2) Rhodesian Civil Service, Establishment Tables, General Abstract, 1973-74.
(3) For evidence of "closed meetings" between the civil service and the Rhodesian Front, see Southern Rhodesia Elections, February 1980, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, p. 21.
(4) "The Pre-Independence Arrangements," Southern Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 38.
(5) "Attachment to Cease-Fire Agreement," Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 47-48.
(6) Financial Times, December 12, 1979.
(7) The Economist, December 12, 1979.
(8) New York Times, December 12, 1979, p. A6.
(9) New York Times, December 12, 1979.
(10) Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 35, article 13.
(11) Ibid. (emphasis added).
(12) Ibid., p. 37.
(13) "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe," International Affairs, 56, no. 3, (Summer 1980): 412-13.
(14) New York Times, December 16, 1979.
(15) Financial Times, December 13, 1979.
(16) The Herald, January 7, 1980.
(17) The Herald, January 6, 1980.
(18) The New York Times, January 8, 1980.
(19) New York Times, January 14, 1980; also, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated the crowd as 150,000 (many of whom were coerced into attending). Briefing Paper No. 2, February 1, 1980.
(20) New York Times, February 14, 1980.
(21) The Times (London), January 25, 1980.
(22) Zimbabwe Times, January 29, 1980.
(23) Fireforce Exposed, Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, November 1979, pp. 33-34.
(24) The Times (London), January 28, 1980.
(25) The Herald, January 26, 1980.
(26) The Washington Post, November 30, 1979.
(27) Guardian Weekly, February 17, 1980.
(28) The Herald, February 25, 1980.
(29) Guardian Weekly, February 17, 1980.
(30) New York Times, February 6, 1980.
(31) Southern Rhodesia, The Elections (Prevention of Disruptive Activities), Ordinance 1980 (Ordinance No. 7 of 1980).
(32) New York Times, February 13, 1980.
(33) The Herald, February 11, 1980.
(34) The Herald, February 15, 1980.
(35) Southern Rhodesia, The Election Ordinance No. 8 of 1980, article 4.
(36) Sunday Mail, January 20, 1980.
(37) The Herald, February 18, 1980.
(38) Southern Rhodesia Elections, The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, p. 79.

(39) Report by the Group of Independent British Observers, appointed by the United Kingdom Government, para. 26.
(40) The Herald, January 8, 1980.
(41) Washington Star, December 28, 1979.
(42) U.N. Document S/13764, letter dated January 25, 1980.
(43) S/PV.2192, January 30, 1980.
(44) The Herald, January 15, 1980.
(45) S/PV. 2192, January 30, 1980, p. 26.
(46) New York Times, March 31, 1980.
(47) The Herald, March 13, 1980.
(48) Press release, U.N. document, SC/4166, February 2, 1980.
(49) The Herald, February 2, 1980.
(50) Ibid.
(51) Ibid., February 26, 1980.
(52) "The Mobile Ambush in Charter District," Commonwealth Observer Group, ICOG 7, February 28, 1980.
(53) Sunday Mail, February 12, 1980.
(54) The Herald, February 9, 1980.
(55) Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 35.
(56) New York Times, March 5, 1980.
(57) "Pre-Independence Arrangements," Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 34, art. 4.
(58) The Herald, February 2, 1980.
(59) Briefing Paper No. 2, February 1, 1980.
(60) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, Report of the Election Commissioner, Salisbury, March 1980, Cmnd. 7935, p. 1.
(61) Southern Rhodesia Elections, p. 54; for a "Summary of Duties of British Election Supervisors," see Annex 37.
(62) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 3.
(63) Ibid., p. 3.
(64) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 58.
(65) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 59.
(66) Ibid., p. 51.
(67) See Appendix-1980 Common Roll Election; Equipment, Facilities, Staff and Security; Voting, Counting, and Security.
(68) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 66.
(69) Report of the Delegation Composed of Representatives of the American Committee on Africa, Trans Africa, the NAACP and the Washington Office on Africa.
(70) Interim Statement from the Canadian Non-Governmental Observer Team, March 1, 1980.
(71) The Commonwealth Observer Group.
(72) Report of the Danish Observer Group, March 25, 1980.
(73) Dutch Observer Group to Rhodesia.
(74) New York Times, February 22, 1980.

(75) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections, 1980, Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 74.
(76) Guardian Weekly, as reported from Salisbury, February 26, 1980.
(77) Press Statement, Department of Information, Salisbury, 123/80/GD, February 25, 1980.
(78) New York Times, August 12, 1980.
(79) Zimbabwe Times, February 29, 1980.
(80) Sunday Mail, February 24, 1980.
(81) Verbatim from tape of press conference recorded by H. Wiseman.
(82) New York Times, March 31, 1980.
(83) Guardian Weekly, February 27, 1980. The theme of the article by James MacManus in Salisbury was "hopes grow of a viable coalition after elections; Walls talks in Mozambique cheer British."

3
The Monitoring Force

The terms of reference for the Commonwealth Monitoring Force were laid down in the Rhodesia: Cease-Fire Agreement, Appendix and Attachment of December 21, 1979 (see Appendix K). They called for the force to "assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces [Patriotic Front and Rhodesian Security Forces] and assist the Cease-Fire Commission in its tasks. The Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces undertake to cooperate fully with the Monitoring Force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions."(1) The Monitoring Force was placed under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser, Major-General John Acland. In the chain of command, it is well to note that the governor performed his duties according to the guidelines and instructions of the British government.(2)

All military forces accepting the ceasefire were, according to the agreement "to accept the Governor's authority . . . and comply with his directions; and forces which do not accept the Governor's authority are unlawful." To enhance the process and provide an effective medium of consultation, the Cease-Fire Commission was established, "in which each side can seek assurance that the Cease-Fire Agreement is being complied with." In addition, it could "call for reports on breaches of the Cease-Fire" and "discuss measures to prevent their recurrence." The commission was not, however, to give directions to the forces on either side – that could be a matter for the governor – while it was free to make recommendations to the latter.(3)

The concluding statement of the chairman, Lord Carrington, on December 11, 1979 to the Lancaster negotiations made it clear "that there can be no question of surrender by either side," and that proposals of that date, subsequently reified in the agreement, "are designed to bring about a reciprocal disengagement."(4) In light of the absolute insistence by the Patriotic Front that despite the disparity in numbers

between the Rhodesian forces and its own forces, the strategic position of the Patriotic Front forces must not be disadvantaged or placed in jeopardy, it is reasonable to assume that the chairman's remarks of "no question of surrender" and "reciprocity" were meant to assure the equitable implementation of the ceasefire.

Intentions, agreements, and good-will notwithstanding, the Monitoring Force had no coercive powers and was not called upon to enforce the ceasefire. Responsibility for the maintenance of the ceasefire and control of their forces lay with the parties to the agreement. As noted earlier, the size and commensurate military power of the Monitoring Force were matters of forceful contention by the parties. In the early days of Lancaster House, Lord Carrington had proposed "the provision of unspecified numbers of British policemen to go to Rhodesia for the duration of the British-run transition to independence."(5) The Patriotic Front, on the other hand, wanted a very "substantial Commonwealth peacekeeping force (army and police) capable of enforcing the cease-fire,"(6) sometimes suggested as large as 10,000 and under United Nations auspices.

British insistence won agreement on a small force that could monitor but not enforce. (Images of Ireland were a constant reminder of efforts at enforcement.) Yet it was acknowledged in private that a force of five to seven thousand could have better managed the APs and averted breaches of the ceasefire, but with added costs and administration. It was clearly stated by Brigadier John Learmont to the press in Salisbury on December 24: "We are here purely to monitor the activities of the Rhodesian Security Forces and the Patriotic Front forces. There is no way we can be committed as an enforcement agency." And, he added, "It will be the Rhodesian Police who will be the Governor's peacekeeping force during the election period."(7)

The last proved to be a troublesome matter. The precise definition and functions of "peacekeeping" are also matters of some contention. In vigorous determination to avoid identification with United Nations peacekeeping, which they categorically rejected for use in Rhodesia, the British authorities studiously avoided or denied application of the term. The impression gained is that they somehow viewed peacekeeping as enforcement action, which it is not, and feared other aspects of United Nations peacekeeping practice, such as persistent renewal of mandates and nonresolution of conflict. So sensitive was this issue that Thatcher and her military advisers opposed the inclusion of the word "force" in the naming of the monitoring unit, but somehow it "slipped into" the agreement. The view adopted here is that the Monitoring Force, however unique, represents peacekeeping in the generic sense – that is, a third-party nonenforcement military presence to monitor a ceasefire between belligerents. In retrospect, the Monitoring Force in Rhodesia comprised peacekeeping of a most successful kind.

In keeping with the above-mentioned tenets, the size of the Monitoring Force was set at 1,300 and subsequently increased to 1,548. The predominant number – 1,250 – were British, augmented by 150 Australians, 74 New Zealanders, 50 Kenyans, and 24 Fijians. The

inclusion of these latter states gave it the character of a Commonwealth force. But it was the British government which determined and invited the other Commonwealth members. The headquarters was largely British and the command unequivocally so.(8) The Patriotic Front, as noted in the discussion of the Cease-Fire Agreement in Chapter 1, had demanded the inclusion of contingents from other Commonwealth African states. For the Patriotic Front, Kenya by itself was representative of neither the Commonwealth nor of Africa. The Rhodesian government, however, had as early as November rejected outright the proposal for a peacekeeping force mandated by the Commonwealth.(9) Determined to keep matters in its own hands, the United Kingdom also rejected the proposal. But both the British and Rhodesian governments finally agreed to the inclusion of some Commonwealth members. Australians and New Zealanders were evident compatible choices and the Fijians were British-trained, some having served in the British Army and also having had United Nations peacekeeping experience. Balanced composition was also achieved in the dark color of their skin. Kenya was acceptable because of its pro-Western political posture. In Rhodesia, response to the composition of the Monitoring Force carried reminders of racial antagonism. "We've prided ourselves on our bloody superiority," a businessman said. "Now we've got the Fijians coming here to monitor our cease-fire – that is the crowning insult."(10)

The Monitoring Force – at one and the same time the independent neutral third party agent in the ceasefire and yet responsive to the authority of the governor and of Whitehall – was very sensitive to acts or appearance of bias. A high level of political acumen together with military skills were therefore essential qualifications. Armed only with personal weapons for self-defense, its members' task was not to enforce but to persuade those they were monitoring to desist from actions that might lead to a breach of the ceasefire. Personnel were selected individually for their particular skills, military experience, and suitability for the special tasks required by a small monitoring force in a volatile situation which demanded great capacity for restraint under severe provocation. British officers and men came from a broad range of military units, principally from units of the United Kingdom Land Forces.(11) Many of them had served in Ireland. The Fijians, many of whom had served in Lebanon, were also handpicked. As Colonel Thorpe, Commander of the Royal Fiji Military Forces put it, "The Lebanese experience was a very great advantage – where we had some trouble settling in – we had to overcome the tendency to react militarily to provocation." Fijians are very proud of their self-control.(12) Like the British and Fijians, the Kenyans were also selected from various units of their army.

The functions of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force as assigned in the Cease-Fire Agreement were:

a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia;

b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.(13)

In more specific terms, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force had to set up its own headquarters in Salisbury, provide for its own logistics and deployment, place teams at the rendez-vous points (RVs) to meet the incoming Patriotic Front forces, greet them and escort them to the APs, provide teams for each of the APs throughout the ceasefire, maintain teams at the bases of the Rhodesian forces, man the border-crossing points, maintain liaison groups in Zambia and Mozambique, maintain constant and effective communication from headquarters to all units, assure safe transport throughout the country as required, discern breaches of the ceasefire, and conduct investigations on its own or in conjunction with ZANLA and ZIPRA personnel on behalf of the Cease-Fire Commission.

As the situation developed, other responsibilities were assumed, such as provision of supplies to the Patriotic Front forces in the APs as an immediate requirement, and later the initiation of the process of integration. Above all, a constant task was the politics of the ceasefire to allay suspicion and, in the broadest sense, to maintain the confidence of the parties. As General Acland said on arrival, "The key to the whole operation is a dependence on goodwill and if there is a lack . . . on either side, then it can't work."(14) The counterpoint had to be the confidence of the parties in the integrity, impartiality, and effectiveness of the Monitoring Force.

The politics of the exercise was crucial. For though the prime function of the Monitoring Force was to monitor, and in that specific sense, to assure the ceasefire, it had always to contend with acts of intimidation in violation of free and fair elections as well as breaches of the ceasefire itself, a distinction that was difficult to assess. And where the Patriotic Front elements or Rhodesian force elements, such as the auxiliaries, conducted or were accused of conducting intimidation, the Monitoring Force was caught in the political crossfire. Intimidation ranged so broadly from verbal threat to direct physical abuse, injury, and death that it was difficult to determine what was a matter for the Election Commission or for the Cease-Fire Commission, and hence, of the Monitoring Force. As noted, incidents (i.e., acts of violence) came before the Cease-Fire Commission. But as acts of intimidation, they were also of concern to the Election Commission. Political crossfire in Rhodesia in that hectic and volatile period was always bait for the press. News was always in the making, but fact was more difficult to come by.

As previously noted, advanced elements of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force arrived in Rhodesia on December 20, followed by a week-long airlift to transport the full force. More than 50 aircraft, including 21 C-141 Starlifters and 12 C5-A Galaxies of the United

States Air Force,(15) were used for the operation. As was the case in many previous United Nations peacekeeping operations, the United States assisted with logistics and transport. Some 5,300 tons of equipment was moved, including specially mine-proofed Land Rovers, together with 11 British military helicopters and large amounts of communications equipment,(16) the vital nervous system of the operation. The flight route was via Cyprus, the British base being a convenient staging area, and Nairobi. Just in case some African states may have been ill disposed to the Lancaster Agreement and deny flight over their sovereign territory, an alternative contingency route was planned by way of Ascension Island and Namibia, the latter requiring the permission of South Africa, which would have caused political embarrassment and possible repercussions by the very same states denying overflight permission.

Aircraft landed at Salisbury airport at the rate of one every 40 minutes, where before only one flight a day arrived. All personnel had to complete immigration requirements. Then a major problem arose because there was accommodation for only 700 personnel at any one time in Salisbury. A plan was contrived whereby people were rotated into and then out of Salisbury to half-way staging points every 24 hours as preparations were made to deploy them immediately to the hazardous first meetings with the Patriotic Front guerilla forces at the RVs.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT

About half the force was directly engaged in monitoring activities. The rest were involved in advisory functions, headquarters, communications, and other support tasks, including the operation of eighteen Puma, Gazelle, and Scout helicopters and up to seven Hercules aircraft (numbers varied during the operation). The staff in Salisbury worked from three headquarters. The Commander Monitoring Force, the Chief of Staff, and four staff officers were based alongside the governor and the staff at Government House. They were responsible for advising the governor on military matters, for liaison with the headquarters of the Patriotic Front, and for the conduct of the Cease-Fire Commission. The planning and day-to-day running of the operation was carried out at the Monitoring Force's main headquarters at Morgan High School, just outside Salisbury, which housed the Deputy Commander Monitoring Force, the Commonwealth Commanders, the operations room, the air-tasking cell, the communications center, and the administrative, quartering, and public relations staff. Logistic Support Units were based at the Airhead Maintenance Area at Salisbury Airport, and a small detachment was at Bulawayo.

The Monitoring Force itself, divided into teams of varying size, was deployed throughout the country with the Rhodesian force commanders at their command headquarters and company bases; with the Partriotic Front at APs and, during the assembly phase, at RV points; with the


RHODESIA
PRESS BRIEFING MAP
ELECTION 1980
Main Roads
Secondary Roads
Railways
International Boundary
City
Town
Small Town, Village
SALISBURY
Sinoia
Macheke
LUSAKA
ZAMBIA
BOTSWANA
SOUTH WEST AFRICA
(CAPRIVI STRIP)
Livingstone
Victoria Falls
Wankie
Pandamatenga
Dett
Gokwe
Gatooma
Que Que
Redcliff
GWELO
Selukwe
MASHONALAND
8
MATABELELAND NORTH
10
BULAWAYO
MATABELELAND
SOUTH
6
Gwanda
Plumtree
Francistown
Selibe Phikwe
REPUBLIC OF
REFERENCE
1. ASSEMBLY POINTS
2. CROSSING POINTS / BORDER POSTS
3. ELECTION DISTRICTS AND NAMES WITH NUMBER OF SEATS
VICTORIA
11


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Zomba
BLANTYRE
Limbe
MALAWI
MASHONALAND
CENTRAL
6
Mt Darwin
LAND WEST
8
SALISBURY
MASHONALAND EAST
16
Marandellas
Rusape
Inyanga
Vila de Manica
MIDLANDS
12
UMTALI
MANICALAND
11
BEIRA
Fort Victoria
VICTORIA
11
Chiredzi
Rutenga
Vila Salazar
Beitbridge
Messina
SOUTH AFRICA
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Rhodesian Air Force at the Salisbury and Bulawayo airfields; points on the borders with neighboring states and with liaison teams in Zambia and Mozambique. As agreed at Lancaster House, the separate arrangements for monitoring the Rhodesia Security Forces and Patriotic Front forces were, as far as possible, parallel. As regards the RSF, teams were deployed together with the five Joint Operational Commands, the Sub-Joint Operational Commands and 40 to 50 company bases. The teams were thus in a position where they could monitor and observe Rhodesian Security force activities at all levels, although keeping track of the auxiliaries proved difficult. Similarly, monitoring teams were attached to the ZIPRA and ZANLA liaison officers in each of the five operational areas as well as to the Patriotic Front assembled at the APs and RVs. These organizational arrangements were largely set out in the attachment to the Cease-Fire Agreement.(17) The initial deployment of the Monitoring Force and its transport is shown in Appendix D. When the assembly phase was complete, the RVs and also two APs where the Patriotic Front Forces had assembled were closed and the teams redeployed, as necessary, to the remaining 14 APs. All in all, the Monitoring Force was required to monitor or conduct liaison to upwards of 100 locations, indicating how thinly they were spread over a multitude of tasks.

To prepare the troops for various assignments, general operating procedures, and the perils and pitfalls they were to face, there was about one week's briefing in the United Kingdom followed by short intense sessions after arrival in Rhodesia. They were briefed for five hours by members of the Rhodesian Security forces and the Patriotic Front Forces in order to provide them more explicit information on what they might expect and how to conduct themselves with the fighting forces of both sides. Then, for approximately an hour, the game park people and the police advised them on the particulars of the territory to which they were assigned. This was followed by a subsequent short final briefing prior to "moving into the bush." The Fijians had already benefited from discussions in Fiji with "Zimbabwean" students attending the University of the South Pacific. The general nature of the country and the people, with special attention to culture, norms, and behavioral patterns, was the major topic. It helped them greatly in appreciating the culture of the people and nuances of social behavior. On arrival at their assigned APs, the Fijians served initially at Gulf and Fox Trot, where they were quick to adapt and befriend the ZANLA who were stationed there.

On December 21, the Patriotic Front officers who were assigned to accompany the Monitoring Force teams to the RV points arrived at Salisbury airport. Forty-eight members of ZIPRA, led by their Commander Lookout Masuku were flown in from Lusaka, and 43 members of the ZANLA, led by Deputy Commander Rex Nhongo, from Maputo. They were met by Patriotic Front representatives and British officers of the Monitoring Force. As was true for the Monitoring Force, the members of ZIPRA and ZANLA had to go through Rhodesian immigration formalities. A tumultuous crowd, estimated at 30,000, rushed against the airport gates in enthusiastic welcome of their political heroes.(18)

At dawn, the Monitoring Force teams, each accompanied by a ZIPRA or ZANLA liaison officer, set out for the fateful meetings. Where land routes were too hazardous, some traveled entirely by air. Roads and tracks had for months been riddled with guerilla mines and ambushes. One Royal Air Force Puma helicopter crashed when it apparently struck a power line 100 miles northeast of Salisbury, killing three members of the Monitoring Force.(19) There were 23 teams assigned to the RVs(20) and 16 teams assigned to the APs. The teams were incredibly small, approximately 17 to 20 members each, compared to the thousands of guerillas they were to meet, escort to, and monitor at the APs.

It was a venture into uncertainty. As the monitoring teams deployed to the RVs, the Patriotic Front forces, on orders from their commanders, left secure military bases of operation for a prolonged period of circumscribed and exposed passivity in the APs to await the outcome of the elections. Both sides were apprehensive. The Monitoring Force went into unfamiliar territory in the company of the Patriotic Front liaison officers as recognizable encouragement to their colleagues that they were not being drawn into a trap. Generally arriving first on the scene, the Monitoring Force hoisted its distinctive flag and stood quietly with their white arm bands prominently displayed. When the rendezvous occurred at night, an incredibly poor choice of time, the Monitoring Force flood-lit the area. Upon assessing the situation (frequently mujibas were sent out to do the initial reconnaissance), the guerrilla units slowly emerged from the surrounding hiding places. After a few anxious moments face to face with the Monitoring Force, tensions eased and trust was established.

Each meeting was a unique and remarkable event. As most often happened, after the first arrivals were satisfied with the situation, they returned to the bush to convince their comrades, and thereafter hundreds more arrived. Confidence-building was a slow procedure and at times dangerous. One story was told of a young Monitoring Force officer awakened at dawn at a RV to find a battalion of Patriotic Front forces moving stealthily through the bush toward him with their rifles cocked, who then had to walk nervously through the half-light to greet them, hand outstretched in welcome. On another occasion, five monitoring force officers were held at gunpoint for an hour.

But both sides knew that if there were incidents or if a single member of the Monitoring Force were killed, particularly in the first days of the operation, the whole agreement could dissolve into chaos. Based on that judgment, Monitoring Force teams went into areas where they knew they were vastly outnumbered, but confident that the ceasefire would hold. It did. It was remarkable that there were no violent incidents in those crucial days. Only one escort vehicle went off on a land mine and one person was hurt.

The Patriotic Front forces, having crossed the first threshold from war to peace, still anticipated the worst in the APs. They were in unknown vulnerable country. What would happen when they got there and how would they cope with their exposure and isolation? They were allowed to keep their arms, but would they be surrounded or subject to

air attack? It is well to recall that at Lancaster House, Mugabe and Nkomo had insisted that the Rhodesian Air Force be grounded. But to this, London refused to accede, claiming that it would be required to provide much-needed mobility for the Monitoring Force and related tasks, and that it would be monitored by the Monitoring Force and placed under the authority of the governor.

All the Patriotic Front guerrilla forces, however, did not comply with the agreement to gather in the APs. It was widely reported that between 4,000 to 6,000 guerrillas were told by their commanders to remain in secure areas outside the camps so as to maintain political and military control in areas dominated by the Patriotic Front, and to face any unexpected eventualities, particularly that of a breakdown of the ceasefire and the renewal of hostilities, of which they themselves could be a direct cause. Some stayed out because, as stated by Mugabe in Maputo, they "are not eager to get to the APs because of the presence of the auxiliaries. The understanding was always that the Rhodesian Forces, including the auxiliaries, must first disengage and only after that will our forces move to the APs. This had not happened so why should the British expect our forces will move?"(21) ZANLA sources claimed some of their men were killed on the way to the RVs and others refused to follow. The governor's press spokesman, Nicholas Fenn, held the opposite view, namely, that ZANLA forces stayed to engage in electioneering with whatever means at their disposal, and that many who did enter were not genuine combatants.(22) At an interview, Brigadier General Adam Gurdon commented that "if all guerrilla forces had entered the AP's then the need to deploy Rhodesian forces would have been virtually nil."

Within the first five of the seven days allotted for the assembly, only about 4,100 guerrillas of the 16,000 expected checked into the APs.(23) At AP Bravo, 60 miles northeast of Salisbury, manned by a team of seventeen Australians, five days elapsed before one hundred ZANLA reported. In the interim they had occupied a protected village and were forced to leave when "threatened with annihilation by Rhodesian security forces." They were in fact convinced to leave by ZANLA liaison officers attached to the Australian team.(24) However, with good reason, ZANLA and ZIPRA commanders complained that there was not enough time to communicate orders to their men who were widely dispersed, for them to move to the designated places. They called for an extension of the deadline of January 2. At first, Lord Soames refused, nonetheless the guerrillas flooded into the camps. By January 7, the numbers in the APs rose to 18,500. Of those, 5,000 were reported to be surrogates, young boys and women who took the place of fighting men who remained at large. The British authorities held firmly to the view, as overwhelmingly confirmed by their intelligence, that the numbers of ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas did not exceed 15,000.

The guerrillas were assigned to separate APs: six to ZIPRA and ten to ZANLA. They were subsequently reduced to 15 when too few were assembled in Gulf, then monitored by the Kenyans, and these were

transferred to Fox Trot. But separation prevailed. ZANLA and ZIPRA fought separately and would remain separate, reflecting a profound cleavage between Mugabe and Nkomo which had existed for some time, and which was the cause for the failure of secret negotiations with Ian Smith in Maputo in 1978. Nkomo had met privately with Smith and had made some headway toward a negotiated settlement. It was then that Mugabe was invited to join the talks, but only after he had been advised to defer to the leadership of Nkomo in a new government. Mugabe, in the company of General Tongogora and Edgar Z. Tekere, angrily refused. The three pulled out even before the talks began and the whole effort collapsed in failure. According to one observer in a private interview at Lancaster House, Ian Smith and General Walls had tried to exploit the cleavage between the two leaders by encouraging their separate political campaigns in the forthcoming elections to the ultimate purpose of drawing Nkomo into a coalition from which Mugabe would be excluded.

In the tenuous days of early January, however, that was not a concern of the Monitoring Force. They were faced with more pressing problems. As may be expected, even with the best of planning, not all contingencies are provided for. A glaring example was the support provision for the movement of Patriotic Front forces into the APs and their care and support in the days and weeks that followed.

No adequate arrangements were made during the ceasefire negotiations and the need had not been fully anticipated. Suddenly, as the assemblage at RVs increased, there were 6,000 ZANLA and ZIPRA soldiers, and the Monitoring Force had no transport to move them, so it was forced to improvise. They had come from bases in Zambia and Mozambique and almost every quarter of the Rhodesian countryside. As Nkomo stated in his opening speech to the Lancaster House Conference, "ninety percent of the country is covered by this war."(25) Now all the Patriotic Front troops had to be notified, convinced, and transported into 16 designated places. After the first stage of apprehension was over, the ingathering swelled from 6,000 to 20,000.

Everything had to be organized – the provision of food, tents and blankets, pots, pans, latrines, sanitary and cooking facilities, clothes and uniforms, and medical care. A call went out to Walls and the "Rhodesian" government. The answer was a firm refusal. General Walls said "No, we don't have anything available." The Monitoring Force was compelled to manage the enormous task on its own.

One hundred logistical personnel and four staff officers were required to do the work of 500. Supplies and transport were received from great distances. The United States flew in tents, uniforms were purchased and flown in from Hong Kong, and dishes and cutlery were brought in from South Africa. By December 29, there was a massive requirement for stoves. With bad weather and damaged roads, much of the material was delivered by air drop and parachute; helicopters and Hercules aircraft had over 1,000 hours of flying time. Two and three-quarter million pounds of material were delivered. Within two to three weeks, roads were back to normal so that trucks could be used. All was

accomplished without major incident. The gravity of the situation can best be appreciated by what could have happened if food and other supplies had not been available. An outflow of armed guerrillas (they retained their weapons in the APs) would have roamed about or headed back to the bush in search of their traditional sources of supply. The Monitoring Force logistic staff performed exceptionally well under the circumstances. Yet operations of this kind were seldom if ever ideal. Frequently in the United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Field Operations Division is under great pressure to provide logistic support in extremely short order, sometimes for contingents numbering as many as 5,000, and it usually has to do so under considerable financial restraint.

The accomplishment of the Monitoring Force was nonetheless remarkable, particularly since the press was kept unaware of what happened. It also explains why press and observers were so unwelcome in the first stage of the ceasefire. News of these difficulties would have caused embarrassment and possible disruption. Resources were stretched to the limit and there was a shortage of supplies and transport. These conditions suggest why the flow of refugees was curtailed, particularly since within three weeks of the outset of the operation the needs for the APs were entirely supplied from local resources.

In addition to the "normal" provision of supplies for the Patriotic Front, health care had to be provided. This was a large and demanding task, the more so because the doctors soon found themselves caring for thousands of people in areas close by some of the APs where the local health clinics had closed down because of the war. At Fox Trot, only one in four patients belonged to the Patriotic Front. There in the first weeks, among other diseases common in the area, the medical team had to deal with 50 cases of malaria a day. Fortunately, cholera was avoided in the APs by assiduous purification of the water. It was all a great strain on the limited medical resources of the Monitoring Force. Relief came in early February when the International Red Cross assumed responsibility for the health care of the Patriotic Front with the help of helicopter-borne medical teams. Regretably, however, in some instances when the Monitoring Force medical teams were withdrawn, so was the health care to the indigenous population.

When the ingathering was complete, about 22,100 had reported to the APs, considerably in excess of the 15,000-16,000 which the British authorities insisted were the extent of the Patriotic Front forces. But all was not well; violence and intimidation and breaches of the ceasefire occurred with mounting frequency. As previously noted, the Patriotic Front forces, particularly ZANLA and the auxiliaries were both accused. Incidents ranged from the accusation that "terrorists" had commandeered food, cigarettes, and drink, stolen a vehicle in Sipolilo which subsequently crashed into a cow, kidnapped a woman who was taken aboard a bus of ZANLA soldiers, stolen 200 head of cattle, and stashed weapons for use after the election,(26) to threats of death unless persons voted as instructed, and again to "unprovoked attack on

Rhodesian Security forces" in which three civilians, one ZIPRA, and one ZANLA were killed.(27)

THE CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION

The Cease-Fire Commission was the body to which such claims of breaches of the ceasefire were brought for discussion, investigation, and attribution, and the commission was to "discuss measures to contain them and prevent their occurrence." Specifically, its functions included:

(a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
(b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the ceasefire; and
(c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.(28)

The commission was not empowered to give direction to the forces of either side; that was a matter reserved for the governor. But the commission was free to make recommendations to him. The proceedings of the commission were held in camera; neither observers nor the press were allowed to attend.

One can readily imagine the potential of commission meetings for rancorous accusation and argument. We understand, however, that the chairman held the meetings strictly to the agenda and the military representatives strictly to account. When accusations, unfounded by available evidence, were made by one of the parties, the chairman required that the accusation be withdrawn, allowing only for an appeal that such activities cease. Communiqués were terse and to the point, citing the number of breaches to the ceasefire and, where evidence warranted, which party had committed them.

On January 7, just 12 days after the ceasefire officially went into effect, Lord Soames authorized the deployment of Rhodesian Security forces to maintain law and order. By then, violence was rampant and the air thick with charge and countercharge. It must be assumed that the governor took the action on the advice of his Chief Military Adviser and Commander of the Monitoring Force, General Acland. Depending on perspective, the governor's actions may have moderated the situation. But violations continued to occur. When on January 18 the Cease-Fire Commission met for the first time to consider breaches of the ceasefire, there were 40 cases on the agenda. According to sources, this meeting of Patriotic Front, Rhodesian force, and Monitoring Force commanders agreed that 11 cases were committed by ZANLA, two by ZIPRA, 13 occurred in former ZANLA areas of operation, five were attributed to individuals armed with Patriotic Front "communist-made" weapons, seven were unattributable, and two

were not accepted as violations.(29) At least it was much less than the 70 incidents a day that were occurring when the ceasefire was signed on December 21.(30)

Within about a week, ZANU castigated Brigadier Gurdon for a statement he had made to the effect that the auxiliaries were needed to maintain the peace,(31) and Kenya threatened to withdraw from the Monitoring Force unless the auxiliaries were not contained. Contrarily, the UANC accused the Monitoring Force of laxity in curtailing acts of violence by Patriotic Front forces,(32) and Lord Soames lashed out at ZANLA for "substantial border crossings, failing to gather in the APs, and substituting border crossings, failing to gather in the APs, and substituting civilians for guerrillas among those who did." In response to the question of deploying Patriotic Front forces as well as auxiliaries to maintain law and order, the governor flatly refused. It would simply increase the number of clashes, not reduce or curtail them.(33)

Another alternative was to increase the size of the Monitoring Force to enable it to deal with the widespread violence. Nkomo pressed the matter with Lord Soames at their meeting of January 16 (as he had during the negotiations at Lancaster House). Shridath Ramphal, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, also called for an increase in the size of the Monitoring Force,(34) believing it to be the best course of action to overcome the problem. These proposals were never seriously entertained; they clearly implied that the Monitoring Force itself should keep the peace. Did that connote the use of force? At the time, the question did not appear to be publicly considered. But it was fundamental. The condition sine qua non of nonenforcement by the Monitoring Force was either ignored or set aside. Whether an enlarged force could have accomplished the task is an open question. But it could have essentially altered the role of the Monitoring Force by bringing it physically into partisan confrontation with the military arms of the protagonists. Such proved to be the case with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon where, but because of the several nongovernmental partisan forces in the United Nations' area of deployment, it was (is) constantly faced with breaches of the ceasefire and itself subjected to hostilities, suffering numerous casualties.

In the case of the Monitoring Force, had its numbers been enlarged to 5,000, it might have become similarly embroiled, jeopardizing whatever influence it did have over the military forces of the parties. Further, the arrangements as agreed at Lancaster House would have been radically transformed. That was one thing the British government had absolutely refused to do and it was not about to reconsider the matter. "Peacekeeping" as practiced by the United Nations, not being conducted under Chapter VII of the Charter, is inherently a nonenforcement measure. This is a matter inadequately appreciated when third parties or parties to a conflict seek stronger measures to prevent or control hostilities.

REFUGEES

One of the conditions of the Lancaster Agreement dealt with the problem of refugees. Numbers, depending on sources, were approximately 238,000 of which 160,000(35) were in Mozambique, 45,000 in Zambia, and 23,000 in Botswana.(36)

Article 19 of the Agreement reads:

> Many thousands of Rhodesian citizens are at present living outside the country. Most of them wish to return and it will be desirable that as many as possible should do so in order to vote in the election. The return of all refugees will be a task requiring careful organisation. But a start should be made in enabling the refugees to return to their homes as soon as possible; and the British Government will be ready to assist with the process. The task of effecting the return of all refugees will need to be completed by the independence government in co-operation with the governments of the neighbouring countries.(37)

Evidently, the intent was to return as many persons as possible and as quickly as possible, but the full process was expected to be completed by the incoming independence government. A preliminary meeting held in London on January 4, 1980 discussed the refugee operation and was attended by representatives of the British government, the Front Line states, the Patriotic Front, the Rhodesian government, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It was decided there that the UNHCR would coordinate the operation.(38) The Red Cross was also called upon to assist with the operation, largely financed by the United Kingdom.(39)

It was late January when the movement actually began. All refugees had to present themselves at designated border crossing points where they were screened by teams of the Monitoring Force to ensure that no military personnel were among them, as such would have constituted a violation of the ceasefire. Men of military age were considered military personnel.

The Rhodesian government officials also screened and regulated the flow. The first refugees crossed from Botswana on January 21, and this operation was completed by February 15 with the return of some 18,200 persons.(40) All were screened and issued with temporary registration permits. The flow from Zambia and Mozambique, however, was on a reduced scale. By mid-February, only about 4,200 had been allowed from Zambia and 7,300 from Mozambique. After that, the flow was virtually stopped. Many hundreds had been turned back. Rhodesian Social Services Department officials argued that they were powerless to augment the process "as the local police controlled the number to be admitted on instructions from Salisbury." According to the Commonwealth Observer Group, an arbitrary daily limit was set for men of military age returning from Mozambique. The Commonwealth Observer Group protested to the Deputy Governor, Sir Anthony

Duff, that the limit of 400 a day was wrongly determined by the "security situation" and that the Mozambique authorities and the UNHCR were asked "to arrange for the balance of the daily intake to be made up of women and children" as had been done with Botswana.(41)

Further repatriation of refugees was, however, suspended on February 25, by which time approximately 35,000 had returned to Rhodesia. While no official figure was set at Lancaster House, it was anticipated that some 50,000 to 60,000 would be repatriated. The reasons for the curtailment were the fear that too many men of military age would add to the numbers who had decided not to enter the APs and because the capacity of the country to absorb them was limited.

The greater number of 35,000 who did return found their families and places of refuge, but many found their dwellings destroyed by the war and went back to transit stations manned by various churches and voluntary organizations.(42) The Monitoring Force had had a great deal of trouble providing supplies to the 22,000 already in the APs and could not accept any further burden. Too many refugees with no haven to go to would become a destabilizing factor when violence and tension were already at a high pitch with only days remaining before actual balloting was to begin. In addition, Muzorewa charged that hundreds of foreigners who spoke neither Shona, Ndebele, nor English were being infiltrated by Nkomo's Patriotic Front to defraud the election.(43)

The capacity of the country to absorb a further 30,000 or more refugees in January and February was undoubtedly a limiting factor. Corroborating evidence is that many organizations – the UNCHR, the Red Cross, Oxfam (Canada) and the Salvation Army (Canada), among others – were necessary to provide emergency assistance when the flow of refugees was resumed. Nevertheless criticism persisted. The observer group from Denmark said that "the repatriation of refugees had been somewhat delayed – a fact for which the Rhodesian authorities bear the main responsibility. The refugees outside the country cannot vote . . . tens of thousands of refugees have been disenfranchised."(44) An American Observer Delegation offered the view that both sections of the Patriotic Front "lost in the neighborhood of 10,000 votes."(45)

THE SITUATION IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS

In response to the continuing violence, on January 19 Lord Soames renewed the State of Emergency, which was due to expire on January 25, for a further six months to July 26, by which time a new government would have been established. Yet from mid-January and continuing to the actual election, violence was perpetrated by ZANLA and ZIPRA forces at large, and by the auxiliaries. By contrast, the situation in the APs had been relatively stabilized, though always potentially dangerous. A minor outbreak of rifle fire occurred between

ZANLA and ZIPRA elements stationed within 500 meters of each other at AP Kilo, but there were no casualties.(46) There were occasional groups of armed ZANLA or ZIPRA who left the APs for short periods of time, particularly at night when comings and goings could not be observed.

The Monitoring Force teams at the APs, which held from 1,000 to 2,000 Patriotic Front forces, were too few in number, at times less than 20, to do more than maintain a commanding presence, ensure the flow of supplies, observe movements as best they could, mediate issues and resolve problems that were within their capability, and keep headquarters fully informed. The teams did not live with the Patriotic Front inside the APs but just at the edge, most often with a Patriotic Front liaison officer in their midst. If a serious incident arose, enforcement was out of the question. The maintenance of a balance between an authoritative presence and good personal relations was the key. In some camps the Monitoring Force played football against the Patriotic Front, who temporarily put aside their AK 47 rifles on the touchlines.(47) A positive note was the establishment of four joint patrols composed of the Patriotic Front and Rhodesian police, in the vicinity of the camps. In all but one of the cases, they were joined by the Monitoring Force, but placed under the command of the Rhodesian police, which under the Lancaster Agreement, were responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

Within the APs, there were daily counts of the Patriotic Front. These were, however, for the most part conducted by the commanders of the Patriotic Front forces. Actual physical counts in the presence of Monitoring Force officers were seldom taken. Nor was it possible to monitor all movement in and out of the APs, particularly at night. The camps were makeshift arrangements near sources of water. Spread over several square miles, they were an extraordinary sight, bounded by a perimeter hacked out of the bush under British supervision. The Patriotic Front forces were extremely sensitive to their exposed military situation and made their own arrangements for defense. At every corner were groups of heavily armed men with AK assault rifles or Chinese submachine guns. At Papa, the ZIPRA had four antiaircraft guns and mortars trained on the access roads.(48) They carried on reconnaissance, fearful of enroachments by Rhodesian forces. They had good reason. Rhodesian forces carried out independent reconnaissance of the APs and moved ever closer to set up observer points. On one occasion, those inside decided to attack one of these observation points, causing a serious infraction of the ceasefire. The Monitoring Force firmly prevailed on both sides to withdraw and to agree to maintain three- to five-mile buffer zones around each AP. The fact, however, that elements of the Rhodesian forces were able to enroach upon the APs demonstrates that numbers of Rhodesian Force and auxiliaries were so large that the Monitoring Force could not keep track of their movements. It was extremely difficult to monitor all activity.

Operationally, the Monitoring Force headquarters received daily reports by radio from all APs and Rhodesian forces bases. Together

with information gathered from other sources, these were collated into a daily situation report. In turn, General Acland, also on a daily basis, reported to the Ministry of Defence in London, to Lord Soames, and to the Commonwealth office in London as requested by the Patriotic Front at Lancaster House. The three reports were not necessarily the same but, according to sources, were entirely compatible.

Contact with the parties was maintained on an ongoing basis on several levels, between their headquarters in Salisbury, at each of the five regional operations centers, and also at the battalion and company levels. Where the Patriotic Front command structure did not have equivalent ranks as the Monitoring Force and/or the Rhodesian Forces at each level, these were created. Several members of the Patriotic Front were promoted to "notional" brigadiers. Equivalency of rank was important to maximize cooperation and, to the extent possible, to avoid procrastination or delays in communication.

The Lancaster Agreement called upon the Patriotic Front and Rhodesian Force to accept the command of the Monitoring Force; in practice both maintained their independence. The Monitoring Force operated through diplomacy and the art of the possible rather than direct assertion of authority. The main problem was to keep the contending forces separate, and to avoid clashes. For the most part, there was good cooperation with ZIPRA elements. They were quite well disciplined and responsive to the commands of their officers. The greater problem was with the ZANLA, especially with some 6,000 who were constantly at large. They were less well disciplined and less willing to take orders to curtail their activities, on the assumption that such orders were issued by Mugabe and his ZANLA commanders. Relations between the Monitoring Force and ZANLA were difficult and at times acrimonious. The Rhodesian Force was also intractable. There was no way that General Acland could have issued orders to its members and expect them to be carried out. Relations between General Acland and General Walls were, to put it mildly, testy.

Until the third week in February, the Monitoring Force operated on a bilateral basis with each of three other forces. Commanders jointly met at meetings of the Cease-Fire Commission which had begun on January 2. These issues and charges were laid before them, as well as, at a later stage, plans for joint tours of the APs and the critical plans for the integration of the forces. From limited accounts, the meetings were short and to the point. Whatever the claims or allegations made, only those that could be substantiated were ascribed. General Acland firmly prevented the Cease-Fire Commission from turning into a forum of unproductive dispute and acrimony.

The communiqués were brief and to the point, as for example, that of February 19:

CEASE-FIRE COMMISSION COMMUNIQUÉ 19-2-80

The Cease-Fire Commission met this afternoon to discuss 25 allegations of breaches of the ceasefire. It was agreed that all

but 3 were breaches, one case was deferred for further evidence. The attributions were:

By ZIPRA – 2 breaches.
In ZIPRA old area of operations – 2 breaches.
By ZANLA – 10 breaches.
In ZANLA old area of operations – 3 breaches.
By bandits armed with PF weapons – 2 breaches.
Unattributable – 2 breaches.

There was one case of incitement to a breach of the ceasefire by ZIPRA.

Gradually, despite the continuance of violence, a sense of trust began to develop. A breakthrough finally occurred when the bilateral discussions between the Monitoring Force and each of the others became multilateral. The first fruits of this evolving trust was the establishment of joint tours to the APs by the commanding officers of the Monitoring Force, ZANLA, ZIPRA, and the Rhodesian Force, preparing the way for the arrival of the police and the Rhodesian forces. Until that time, there had been no meetings of Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front at the camp levels. At the outset, the main problem was to keep the forces apart, not to bring them toether. The plan was now to develop political support for the unification of all forces. The basic philosophy was that soldiers have much in common and that if they could be brought together at the troop level under proper circumstances, they would overcome mutual suspicion, and for the Patriotic Front, their sense of extreme vulnerability. The process began to take hold with the creation of party committees composed of the Monitoring Force, Patriotic Front (ZANLA and ZIPRA), Rhodesian forces, and the police.

Referring to the critical joint patrols, Fenn at the press conference of February 25 said, "They have everywhere been well received and (furthermore) arrangements are going forward for the introduction of a Rhodesian military and police presence into the APs over the next few days." Everything proceeded in orderly fashion. By the following day, Rhodesian troops moved into all but five of the remaining APs, without incident, to work with the Monitoring Force and for the creation of a new relationship with the Patriotic Front.(49) And, as Fenn also announced at this press conference, plans were implemented for handing over arrangements for supplying the APs from the Monitoring Force to the Rhodesian civilian authority.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, another event of significance occurred at that time, namely, the first steps toward integration of the military forces. ZIPRA accepted an offer of the Rhodesian forces to move a group of their forces, approximately 650, from AP Lima to the Rhodesian training camp at Essex Bay under the auspices of the Monitoring Force. Training was then organized with the participation of the Rhodesian forces. A similar offer was made to Mugabe, but all

that could be learned at the time was that arrangements were being discussed. Nonetheless, as expressed by Fenn, "It is expected that this initiative will help foster the spirit of reconciliation and that it would lead to closer understanding and make a positive contribution to the future of this nation." The time had come to weld opposing forces into a single army. In the words of Brigadier Gurdon, "A peaceful country can only be run with one army." The beginning of integration was a major step forward in the process of reconciliation. Gurdon continued, "By election time, the parties were talking turkey to one another. Day after day there were meetings of the leaders and the whole lot, had they not done so then mistrust would have persisted and suspicion led to unanticipated and dangerous events. That was why major efforts were made to get conciliation started before the election. We created a situation which allowed for a peaceful election and peace in the military situation made it much easier for the political process to function."(50)

The Cease-Fire Commission Communiqué of February 27 reflected the optimism:

> The Commission met at 2 P.M. to discuss a long agenda which included a number of alleged breaches of the ceasefire.
>
> At the start of proceedings the Rhodesian Security Forces representatives proposed that, as there was so much business to be discussed concerning positive measures on reconciliation and the creation of permanent peace in the country, it would be nugatory to spend time seeking to attribute allegations of breaches of the ceasefire, many of which related to incidents which took place a considerable time before and which were in some cases of a comparatively minor nature.
>
> The Commission agreed unanimously with this proposal but equally decided that any serious future breaches would still be investigated with the Commission themselves, where necessary and appropriate, carrying out their own investigations on the ground.
>
> The Commission then went on to deal with various outstanding problems and their solutions and to discuss the continuance of the positive initiatives of the last two weeks in order to ensure that the ceasefire will become totally effective and that it will endure.

After restless idleness for almost two months, the 22,000 Patriotic Front forces in the APs were ready to cast their ballots. There was some anxiety about how the poll would be conducted and over potential disagreements or incidents. It was suggested that British presiding

officers and staff be used, but this was rejected as departing from the normal practice. There were also differences of view on whether the polling stations should be located inside or just outside the camps; the latter was finally agreed upon in most cases. The matter of most serious concern was the number of Patriotic Front members who were under 18 years of age and therefore ineligible to vote. This was satisfactorily resolved upon agreement by the camp commanders to provide estimates of only those eligible to vote. Few who were under age attempted to vote, and rejection of those that did passed without incident.(51) With the exception of Fox Trot, the largest of the APs, where elections took place on February 28, all the rest cast their ballots on the last day of voting, February 29. After years of warfare, an electoral decision was at hand. But where would these 22,000 go; what would they do when the election results were announced? At large, they would become at the very least a dangerous destabilizing factor.

Lord Soames, in anticipation of the postelectoral stage, on February 22 called upon the leaders of both ZANLA and ZIPRA "to give unmistakable orders to their forces [in the APs] to stay there."(52) Such orders were subsequently given and carried out. But despite a growing mood of optimism, doomsayers abounded. James Chikerema, leader of the Zimbabwe Democratic Party, one of the minor parties, was concerned about the impending departure of the Monitoring Force. He visited Lord Soames on February 19 and afterwards stated, "The British have no solution to the violence and intimidation going on right now before the voting. The Governor told me he was bewildered when I asked him who would protect us afterwards. He had no answer."(53)

Several appeals, from both Mugabe and Nkomo among others, were made for the Monitoring Force to carry on in the postelectoral period. The question was fully discussed in London and Salisbury. Yet, as during the transitional period of British sovereignty, there was no way for the Monitoring Force to guarantee the maintenance of law and order in the postelectoral period. Indeed, concerned both with the general situation and its own security during the ceasefire and after, the Monitoring Force had drawn up full-scale contingency plans in the event of a major disruption of the ceasefire, or a disruption of medium intensity, and for a complete withdrawal. These plans involved complete information on the disposition of airfields and transport facilities, but as one might expect under the circumstances, detailed information of contingency plans was not made available.

Fortunately, neither contingency plan for a major or medium disruption had to be implemented. But now that the election was about to conclude, the question of an ordered withdrawal was at hand. Commonwealth members of the Monitoring Force were consulted about remaining for the interregnum between the elections and the formation of a new government. It was reported that both Kenya and Fiji had agreed; Australia and New Zealand were less disposed to remain. As it happened, Australian preparations for departure included the Fijian contingent which was annoyed at being spoken for and wanted to keep its options open.

Though advance preparations for departure had been ready for sometime, the ultimate decision to leave was made several days before the election results were made public. The governor had agreed to stay on until the independence and the machinery of the office was fully transferred to the new government of Zimbabwe. But in anticipation of the Mugabe victory, and based on the interparty negotiations in Salisbury and their continuance in Maputo where the meeting with the Southern Africans also took place, it was decided that the Monitoring Force should withdraw. It was never the force's intention to stay on beyond the elections. The force would have been in no position to counter any major outbreak of civil strife or incursion from outside the borders of Rhodesia and could have found itself in an awkward situation of having to defend its independent third-party position against the wishes of the prime minister-elect, Robert Mugabe. At the time, the major problem was the future disposition of the armed Patriotic Forces in the APs and the reorganization of the armed forces. The greatest danger would arise from the failure of an adequate program for demobilization of the thousands of armed men, failure to reorganize the armed forces to reflect the new political situation, and the need to maintain a cohesive, effective, and stable military force. Apparently little if any consideration had been given to the retraining of the insurgents for civilian life. A study on this serious question was started in Salisbury only in the last weeks of February.

To carry on, however, with the tasks of military training and integration of forces into a new army of Zimbabwe, arrangements were made for a special group of 70 to 80 officers of the British Military Advisory and Training Team of Rhodesia to assist in the process. These were men of the special branch of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence which had provided similar military training in third-world countries, such as Lebanon in 1969, and subsequently, among others, Botswana, Belize, Lesotho, and Swaziland. A committee of reconciliation and integration was also created, chaired by General Walls, Commander of Combined Operations, Rhodesian Forces, General Rex Nhongo of ZANLA, General Lookout Masuku of ZIPRA, and a general from the United Kingdom. It was swiftly put in place, with actual work scheduled to begin on March 8. In addition to training and integration, this committee was charged with the tasks of determining the size and kind of force structure that would be required, based on the perceptions of threat from beyond the borders of Zimbabwe, particularly from South Africa, on internal needs for law and order and on such assistance as could be offered to support the economic base of the country. Having fulfilled its mandate, the withdrawal of the Monitoring Force was set in motion and to a large extent accomplished on or about March 9.

The Monitoring Force was in the field a little over ten weeks. Its tasks were numerous and complex. It functioned under conditions where, fearing the worst, all military forces were on constant alert, and where continued violence and threats to renew warfare were a constant menace to the ceasefire. Yet it performed all of its complex tasks with

efficiency and without casualties, except for those sustained by accident. Detailed advance planning, careful recruitment, tight organization, proficient internal communications, firm command, and the ability to meet and overcome unanticipated or unresolved problems were the essential elements of its success. Where difficult or unresolved problems may have occurred, they did not become public knowledge or the subject of political controversy.

The major exceptions were the role of the Monitoring Force in monitoring the activities of the auxiliary forces, and its inability to ensure that they and the Rhodesian forces, in the performance of duties assigned by the governor in the maintenance of law and order or when either acted unlawfully on their own initiative, did not commit acts of violence or intimidation, try to pressure the electorate in favor of Muzorewa and the UANC, enroach on the APs, or in any other ways endanger the ceasefire.

In assessing these issues, factors taken into account were the inability of the Monitoring Force to command compliance with the terms of the Lancaster Agreement, the size of, and above all the recommendations of General Acland to Lord Soames on the use of the auxiliaries for the maintenance of law and order. On these questions, the Monitoring Force acted in concert with the governor and London. The governor bore the brunt of the accusations with regard to the actions and disposition of the auxiliaries. The Monitoring Force displayed a much lower political profile which, regardless of whatever responsibility it bore for the governor's policies, was certainly the wisest course to follow. As long as the accusations and debate among the parties, the press, observers, and the raging controversy in the local media were concentrated at the political level and not at the Monitoring Force itself, they did not affect the fundamental posture of the ceasefire, which was the force's primary responsibility, whereas the holding of free and fair elections was the primary responsiblity of the governor and the parties.

Above all, the Monitoring Force had to be directed with great skill, firmness, tact, and diplomacy. It had to conduct its actions with such expertise and efficiency that it would not be publicly questioned, and with a sensitivity toward what could and could not be accomplished. To have attempted to overreach its capability would have jeopardized the force's credibility and the entire operation.

As with everything else that went on in Rhodesia in the period of transition, the activities of the Monitoring Force also came under the critical inspection of the accredited observers and the world press. In the conduct of our own inquiry and, in particular the survey conducted among the observers to which we have referred in assessing the conduct of the governor, we also inquired about the Monitoring Force.

Because the observers were primarily concerned with the electoral process while the Monitoring Force was not as politically prominent during the period of transition, we first asked: "Do you have sufficient information to judge the performance of the Monitoring Force?" Twenty-nine answered in the affirmative with an adjusted frequency of

52.7 percent, 18 in the negative (a.f. 32.7 percent), and 8 had no opinion (a.f. 14.5 percent). Given these results, perhaps less weight than might otherwise be the case should be given to the results of the next three questions on the performance of the Monitoring Force.

In your opinion, is the Monitoring Force fulfilling its assignments:

- To maintain contact with the Rhodesian Security Forces and Patriotic Forces Command structures throughout Rhodesia?

  33 answered in the affirmative (a.f. 64.7 percent), 7 in the negative (a.f. 13.7 percent), 11 no opinion (a.f. 21.6 percent), and 4 no response.

- To monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces?

  29 answered in the affirmative (a.f. 56.9 percent), 13 in the negative (a.f. 25.2 percent), 9 no opinion (a.f. 17.6 percent), and 4 no response.

- To monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed upon in the context of the cease-fire?

  21 answered in the affirmative (a.f. 42.9 percent), 9 in the negative (a.f. 18.4 percent), 19 no opinion (a.f. 34.5 percent), and 6 no response.

Knowing of no particular event or situation at the border-crossing points other than the restrictions on the flow of the refugees, we find no explanation for the variance between the affirmative responses to the first two tasks, a.f. 64.7 percent and a.f. 56.9 percent, and only a.f. 42.9 percent to the third in regard to the border crossing points.

The next question was:

In your opinion, is the Monitoring Force acting with impartiality?

- 35 answered in the affirmative (a.f. 63.6 percent), 5 in the negative (a.f. 10.2 percent), 9 no opinion (a.f. 18.4 percent), and 6 no response.

Considering the controversy on the question of which party was the greater cause of intimidation, and hence of infractions of the ceasefire, we regard the a.f. 63.6 percent affirmation of impartiality to be a strong endorsement of the Monitoring Force. In comparison, the response to the similar question asked about the governor (see Chapter 2), 25 (a.f. 46.3 percent) answered in the affirmative and 23 (a.f. 42.0

percent) in the negative, with 6 having no opinion (a.f. 11.1 percent), and 1 no response, shows considerably less conviction in the impartiality of the governor than of the Monitoring Force. One reason is probably because the governor bore the brunt of criticism for his decisions on the use of the auxiliaries and his criticism of ZANLA, even though spokesmen for the Monitoring Force were making the same points.

We offer the results on the last question on the Monitoring Force, "In your opinion does the MF enjoy the confidence of the parties?" recalling that to the first questions, only 29 (a.f. 52.7 percent) responded that they had "sufficient information to judge the performance of the Monitoring Force."

	YES		NO		NO OPINION		NO RESPONSE	MISSING
	no.	a.f.	no.	a.f.	no.	a.f.		
UANC	15	34.9%	6	14.9%	21	48.8%	1	12
UNFP	8	23.5	1	2.9	24	70.6	1	21
UPAM	8	23.5	1	2.9	24	70.6	1	21
ZANU	15	37.5	3	7.5	20	50.0	2	15
ZANU PF	19	43.2	5	11.4	19	43.2	1	11
ZDP	9	26.5	1	2.9	23	67.6	1	21
PF	22	50.0	2	4.5	19	43.2	1	11
NFZ	9	26.5	1	2.9	23	67.6	1	21

In each case, a minimum a.f. 43.2 percent had no opinion, with significant numbers missing, suggesting that many respondents did not feel they were in a position to offer an opinion. Nonetheless, only in the case of the UANC (Muzorewa's party) did as many as 6 (a.f. 14.9 percent) and in the case of ZANU PF 5 (a.f. 11.4 percent) offer the opinion that the Monitoring Force did not enjoy the confidence of these two parties. In all other cases, the numbers believing that the Monitoring Force did not enjoy the confidence of the parties was 3 or less (a.f. 7.5 percent) and most as low as 1 or 2 (a.f. 2.9 percent). We suggest that these results reflect the fact that while each party conducted a struggle for power, all were determined that the elections be held as the means of bringing up a new government to power and consequently that the ceasefire also be maintained. The role of the Monitoring Force was therefore crucial. The parties, though at times suspicious of the Force's neutrality and effectiveness, extended confidence, however qualified, in the Force to fulfill its part of the trust to keep the ceasefire from breaking down and thereby destroying the possibility that the elections would be held.

The Cease-Fire Commission faired somewhat less positively than the Monitoring Force in the view of the observers. To the question, "In your opinion, is the Cease-Fire Commission effective in fulfilling its tasks of (1) ensuring the compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the Forces?" 25 (a.f. 46.3 percent) replied in the affirmative, 19 (a.f. 35.2 percent) in the negative, 10 no opinion (a.f. 18.5 percent), and 1 no response. To the second part of the question, with regard to fulfilling its assigned task in "the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the Cease-Fire," 27 (a.f. 50.9 percent answered in the affirmative, 15 (a.f. 28.3 percent) in the negative, 11 no opinion (a.f. 20.8 percent), and 2 no response. Upon consideration, however, of the fact that the commission, representing the commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces and chaired by the governor's military adviser, dealt with the most critical and controversial events, i.e., the incidence of violence and breaches of the ceasefire, we regard the affirmative responses of a.f. 46.3 percent and 50.9 percent as favorable under the circumstances and as recognizing that the ceasefire did hold under trying conditions.

Few of the observer reports make reference to the Monitoring Force, though some do comment on the fragility of the ceasefire because of excessive intimidation. The Commonwealth Observer Group, in greater detail than any other observers, noted some problems with respect to the limited size of the Monitoring Force and the high level of activity of the Rhodesian Security forces, and said, "We would make it clear that we have no criticism of the way in which the Monitoring Force carried out its duties. Rather, we would express our admiration of the way in which it tackled a task that must surely be without precedence in military history."(54)

NOTES

(1) Southern Rhodesia Elections, February 1980, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Elections Leading to Independent Zimbabwe, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, p. 40, art. 3.
(2) Ibid., p. 35, art. 9.
(3) "Attachment to Cease-Fire Agreement," Southern Rhodesia Elections, p. 47, art. 9.
(4) Ibid., articles 3 and 20, pp. 46 and 49.
(5) Financial Times, November 3, 1979.
(6) The Times (London), November 20, 1979.
(7) The Herald, December 24, 1979; See also Proceedings of Lancaster House Negotiations, statement by Lord Carrington at a Bilateral Meeting with the Patriotic Front, November 28, 1979.
(8) See "Command Structure of Liaison Advisory and Monitoring Organization," appendix F and "Breakdown of Liaison Advisory and Monitoring Organization," appendix G.
(9) Financial Times, November 3, 1979.
(10) The Washington Post, December 16, 1979.

(11) See Appendix D, "British Military Represented in the Liaison, Advisory and Monitoring Organization."
(12) Interview, New York City, March 25, 1980.
(13) Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, Cmnd. 7802, p. 40.
(14) New York Times, December 24, 1979.
(15) Ibid.
(16) New York Times, December 26, 1979.
(17) "Cease-Fire Arrangements," Southern Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 53.
(18) New York Times, December 27, 1979.
(19) Ibid., December 9, 1979.
(20) There is a discrepancy between the 23 assigned and 24 RV designated on the map, Rhodesia Press Briefing Map, Election 1980, see pp. 51-2.
(21) The Herald, January 6, 1980.
(22) The Herald, January 16, 1980.
(23) New York Times, January 3, 1980.
(24) Guardian Weekly, January 3, 1980.
(25) Southern Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 9.
(26) Sunday Mail, January 6, 1980.
(27) The Herald, January 11, 1980.
(28) "Attachment to the Cease-Fire Agreement," Southern Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 52.
(29) The Herald, January 19, 1980.
(30) New York Times, December 22, 1979.
(31) Sunday Mail, January 20, 1980.
(32) The Herald, January 16, 1980.
(33) Ibid.
(34) The Herald, January 21, 1980.
(35) There were as many as five refugee settlements in Mozambique, among them Tronga with 45,000 refugees, which was attacked by Rhodesian paratroopers on December 7, 1979. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, No. 2 (Jan./July 1980), p. 2.
(36) Southern Rhodesia Elections, p. 32.
(37) "The Pre-Independent Arrangements," Southern Rhodesia Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 36.
(38) "Notes on the Ceasefire in Southern Rhodesia," provided by Brigadier Gurdon.
(39) New York Times, January 13, 1980.
(40) Southern Rhodesia Elections, p. 22.
(41) "Letter from Anthony Duff to Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, 26 February 26, 1980," Southern Rhodesia Elections, p. 173.
(42) The Herald, March 7, 1980.
(43) Sunday Mail, January 20, 1980.
(44) "Preliminary Statement of the Observer Delegation of Denmark to the Elections in Southern Rhodesia in 1980," Salisbury, March 3.

(45) "First Report on the Rhodesian General Election," American Committee on Africa, Trans Africa and the NAACP, and the Washington Office on Africa.
(46) The Herald, January 25, 1980.
(47) The Times (London), February 5, 1980.
(48) Guardian Weekly, January 18, 1980.
(49) Guardian Weekly, February 27, 1980.
(50) Paraphrase of interview, Government House, Salisbury, March 5, 1980.
(51) Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections, p. 74.
(52) The Herald, February 22, 1980.
(53) Zimbabwe Times, February 20, 1980.
(54) Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections, p. 25.

4

The Observers

The presence of and the numerous roles played by the accredited observers had a profound impact on the transitional process and the elections. They were everywhere, or believed to be everywhere, and gathered large amounts of information of interest to the parties and of use in evaluation of the general situation. As observers they enjoyed special status and access to important officials and party leaders. These factors, together with the information gathered and the manner of its use and dissemination, comprised the elements of their influence on the parties and process within Rhodesia and the interpretations and responses abroad.

There were approximately 223 accredited observers from many countries who were to the greater extent nominated or organized into groups. Their stay in Rhodesia varied considerably from two to seven weeks, with a few present only for a few days, as for instance the representatives of the OAU and the United Nations, and the additional 33 Commonwealth observers permitted to be present only for the duration of the poll.(1)

The initial concept on the use of official observers was set forth and adopted at the Lusaka meeting where the Heads of Government "acknowledged that the government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers."(2)

Whatever may have been discussed about the organization, status, and functions of these observers, there were no further references in the communiqué. But with the continuous concern and input of the Commonwealth through the Secretary-General, Shridath S. Ramphal, and several heads of state, there can be little doubt that there must have been differences on this matter between the British government and the Commonwealth, among them Ramphal's demonstrated support for the Patriotic Front. These differences emerged in the latter days of

the Lancaster House deliberations and in the organizational stages of the Commonwealth Observer Group.

Ramphal argued that the Commonwealth group should follow a procedure of presenting a joint Commonwealth report on its observations of the election, whereas Lord Carrington insisted that each of the 11 members of the Commonwealth group should report individually to his own government. Among the Commonwealth countries, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand also expressed preference for separate subgroup national representation which would in the first instance report back to their home governments. They wished undoubtedly to maintain independence of action in avoiding acrimonious political controversy if the election results proved indecisive, or if for political reasons, it proved difficult to agree on a final report. In addition to their representation on the Commonwealth Observer Group, Australia and New Zealand each sent its own group of observers. The Commonwealth Observer Group itself was composed of 11 states: Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Canada, Ghana, India, Jamaica, New Guinea, Nigeria, Papua, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka, which held varying policy positions on the Rhodesian question and, of greater importance, on what actions should be taken if the objectives of the Lancaster Agreement were not achieved and the situation destabilized. The United Kingdom insisted upon distinct representation of Commonwealth members for similar reasons. Also, because the United Kingdom's own policies and actions were very much on the line, it preferred to enchance the legitimacy of its own judgment of events by defusing, dividing, or diminishing the credibility of the Commonwealth Observer Group.

During the last weeks in November, Lord Carrington invited each Commonwealth government to send observers to the Rhodesian elections (at their own expense). As reported in the Financial Times, he maintained privately "that whatever the Commonwealth governments might have thought they collectively agreed in Lusaka . . . a Commonwealth Observer Group of the type suggested by Mr. Ramphal could undermine the flexibility of Lord Soames . . . as he tries to juggle with the complexities of an election while trying to maintain a ceasefire."(3) And, further, "It is Britain which must in the end, be the sole judge of the voting."(4)

The Commonwealth insisted on a joint report and its views prevailed. An 11-member group of distinguished justices, parliamentarians, and civil servants were named by their governments to "serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their governments."(5) Each of the 11 was accompanied by two aides. As a headquarters staff prepared for departure to Rhodesia, delays occurred over differences with the governor in Salisbury on an acceptable arrival timetable. An initial exploratory visit had been made before Christmas, but the advance preparatory team left for Salisbury only on January 16. The observers themselves were delayed until January 24, barely five weeks before polling was due to begin. And to add to their difficulties, neither the United Kingdom nor the Rhodesian authorities

appeared willing to offer the preparatory group assistance in the form of office facilities, transport in Rhodesia, and the like. According to Sir John Boynton, "The first group of observers, the Commonwealth Group, arrived on 24 January, before proper facilities could be provided."(6) In the view of some observers, the apparent lack of assistance or of only limited assistance, was a further example of deliberate British obstruction. Whether or not such was the intent, the governor and particularly the Monitoring Force were all but overwhelmed with their own logistical problems, as exemplified by the need to provision the APs. The outcome was that the Commonwealth preparatory team had to make their own arrangements at a time when space and transport were all but impossible to acquire.(7) Because of the political delays in London and the time and effort required to make facilities and logistical arrangements in Salisbury, the Commonwealth observers did not begin to send observers throughout the country and to get fully under way until approximately the first week of February. By the eighth, however, they had already managed to visit half the 55 districts throughout the country.(8)

Much earlier, however, the British government had appointed its own group of 20 observers, mostly distinguished retired diplomats and former governors with wide African experience. They were advised "to report directly to Lord Soames."(9) In addition, a Parliamentary Observer Group of five Conservatives, four Labourites, and one Liberal, several with considerable knowledge of the situation, went to Rhodesia under the chairmanship of Geoffrey Rippon. This group was to report to Lord Carrington.

European Economic Community governments were also invited by the United Kingdom to nominate their own observers and the following did so; Belgium(4), Denmark (3), Federal Republic of Germany (5), France (5), Netherlands (4), Ireland (5), and Italy (3). The United States did not send an official party but was well represented by three members of its liaison office in Salisbury; they were listed among nongovernmental observers.(10) New Zealand also sent a group of four and Australia a group of eight. Canada declined. Why it may have been necessary for New Zealand and Australia to send additional teams when they were already participants of the Monitoring Force and members of the Commonwealth Observer Group is a matter of speculation. Perhaps they too had doubts about the Commonwealth Observer Group being able to operate effectively on consensus and not embroil them in political controversy about the implementation and observance of the ceasefire and the election process. In the event of crisis or controversy, they would then have an independent voice. Other states that had observers were South Africa,(11) Uganda, Norway.

In addition, the United Nations (more precisely the Secretary-General) and the OAU sent groups of official observers. But here too there was difficulty in negotiating agreement with London. Both organizations had long been involved in the search for a settlement of the crisis to ensure true black majority rule, and they closely monitored events at Lancaster House and subsequently in Rhodesia. African

states were severely critical of the United Kingdom for the continued presence of South African troops in Rhodesia, and the use of Rhodesian Forces and auxiliaries to harass the forces of the Patriotic Front and for their intimidation of voters and restrictions on the flow of returning refugees. On behalf of the OAU, they therefore called for a meeting of the Security Council on January 30, there "to consider the explosive situation in Southern Rhodesia arising from the gross violation of the Lancaster Agreement . . . by the United Kingdom, which is the administering colonial power."(12)

As discussed in Chapter 2, the council debate was characterized by African charges of British complicity in favor of Muzorewa. The United Kingdom denied the OAU charges in what one member of the delegation characterized as "Brit-bashing week" at the Security Council. The outcome of the debate was a resolution calling on all parties to comply with the Lancaster House Accord and, among other matters, "to keep the situation in Southern Rhodesia under review."(13) From thence arose the matter of sending special representatives of the Secretary-General as official observers. But the United Kingdom, judging such representatives as biased in favor of the OAU accusations, tried to restrict their entry to February 25 and departure by March 1, thereby enabling the observers to witness only the polling and nothing of the conditions of the electoral campaign itself. With pressure exerted by the Secretary-General, they were allowed to arrive on February 23 and to depart on March 2. As it happened, the head of the delegation, Javier Perez de Cuellar, had to leave before March 2 because of urgent business in Cyprus, leaving only three observers to assess the situation.

For similar reasons, the OAU was restricted to a visit from only February 25 to March 1, coinciding with the actual polling. The observers arrived in a high state of annoyance because they were prohibited from witnessing the campaign itself. Furthermore, the British government insisted that the OAU delegation be made up of appointed members of the Secretariat to the exclusion of elected political representatives.(14)

The last category consisted of the registered unofficial observers, i.e., nongovernmental numbering about 40. They came from Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, and South Africa. Many of them had extensive experience in Africa and were very knowledgeable of parties and events in Rhodesia. With the exception of the Commonwealth Observer Group and the British groups, however, most groups were small in number. With the further exception of the Commonwealth, none had a substantial support structure. Considering that the Commonwealth Observer Group was the only group deriving a mandate from Lusaka and the Lancaster Agreement, and that it could be required in one way or another to cover all the territory of Rhodesia, the Commonwealth decided on the need for an adequate support and administrative staff including legal, electoral, media, and security specialists, all of which, in light of their many tasks and duties, proved

understaffed and overworked. In addition to the support staff, which comprised a secretariat, each of the 11 official observers had two assistants from his own country, some of whom were foreign service officers, though the observers themselves were not officially representing their home governments.

The Commonwealth Observer Group, though atypical in terms of mandate, composition, and infrastructure, nonetheless provides a good example of the full range of procedures and functions of most observer groups and is discussed below in conjunction with relevant and comparative aspects of the other observer groups in Rhodesia.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The first matter of interest is the terms of reference. Deriving from Lusaka and Lancaster, the Commonwealth Observer Group was instructed as follows by the Secretary-General:

> The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Southern Rhodesia held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka Accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent.(15)

> In discharging these terms of reference the observers had no executive role. Their duty was to form a judgment within their terms of reference.

Once in Rhodesia, the group established four subcommittes which elaborated on the terms of reference as follows: (1) "Administration of electoral laws and process," (2) "General administration of the Government insofar as it bears upon the election with particular emphasis on how freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association were affected," (3) "Question of whether there was free and unreserved access to public media and freedom to adversaries and to publish political views," (4) "Question of the conduct of the political parties in contributing to free and fair elections, including inter alia their adherence to the election laws and the Lancaster House Agreement." (See Appendix H for the reports of these subcommittees, documents COG 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.)

The Group of Independent British Observers stated in their Report published after the elections that "Our principal task was defined as being to satisfy ourselves that the procedures being followed before, during and immediately after the poll were genuinely free and fair, as

provided in the Lancaster House Agreement."(16) They then discussed the conditions under which the elections were held, namely, the climate of accumulated apprehension, the cultural framework, continued military activity, and intimidation.

The Freedom House Group in their Interim Report of March 1 offers a comparison between the April 1979 election, which they also observed, and the 1980 election. For that reason, it is quoted at length, noting that both criteria and judgments of the two elections are treated together and that they are as much concerned with the purpose of the election, that is, "the transfer of power to the majority of the Zimbabwean people," as with the electoral process itself.

In this context, the Freedom House Observation Group considered that its task was the evaluation of the extent to which the 1980 election:

1) represented progress in the transfer of power to the majority of the Zimbabwean people,
2) is a sincere, adequate attempt by the British and Rhodesian administrations to support this transfer,
3) is likely to represent an outcome provisionally acceptable, as an expression of the will of the people, and
4) provides an adequate basis for the continuation and perfection of democratic rule. Without the availability of the final election results of information on any major defects that may come to light, we offer these preliminary conclusions.

A Comparison of Elections with Democratic Criteria

A democratic system requires elections that do not exclude major sections of the adult population from either active participation in the campaign or voting processes. Voting must be secret and the counting of the ballots must be fair. Electoral campaigns must allow for the competitive presentation of policies and programs by organized parties in a reasonably free atmosphere. All parties must have access to the communications media, and ideally the media should represent a variety of viewpoints. Finally, the constitutional system must provide elected representatives with the power to rule the country. . . .

In these terms we judged the common roll election held in April 1979 to be a "relatively free expression of the will of the people of Zimbabwe Rhodesia and to constitute a necessary step toward unfettered majority rule." We believe that subsequent events have confirmed this judgment. Nevertheless, we noted then a number of objections to the April elections. Two major political groups did not participate because they did not accept:

1) the constitution produced by the internal settlement and therefore
2) the legitimacy of the election.

Although there was an authentic contest among participating parties, the primary electoral struggle was between the externally based parties that opposed voting and the government that promoted it. In this context, enforced participation in the poll and enforced abstention were widely reported. There were no media generally available to the parties that urged abstention meetings and demonstrations opposing the elections were generally prevented; and many of those urging abstention were in detention. Some observers also argued that the constitution provided by the internal settlement gave unreasonable weight to the white ethnic interest.

Judged against the background of the last election, the present election represents on the surface a further step toward the perfection of democratic rule.(17)

All observers, individually and in groups, grappled with the elements and the criteria of free and fair elections, but few have published any in-depth analysis prior to embarking on the exercise. Yet, in their final reports many refer to the norms of democratic elections, and all demonstrated that they examined the same factors of intimidation, secrecy of the polls, the use of military forces, the role of the governor, etc. The unequivocal result of the elections and, as discussed later, the acknowledgment that under the circumstances prevailing in Rhodesia the elections were free and fair, made any further discussion or disagreement about the criteria of free and fair unnecessary. Had the election not been so decisive, the terms of reference would have become an issue of dispute. Withal, it should be recognized that in the unique circumstances of the Rhodesian election, any definition of criteria assumed by the observers had to be both a combination of democratic principles as applied to those unique circumstances, and in close correspondence to the criteria adopted by the Election Commissioner. This will also be relevant in the event similar practices are applied in similar situations.

PROCEDURES

By and large, observers were housed in several modern hotels and similar accommodations in Salisbury where they conducted their business. Because of its size, infrastructure, and scope of activities, the Commonwealth Observer Group required office space and supplies, and facilities such as telephones and transport. Upon arrival on January 17, the advance team set out immediately to secure their needs. Many of the things required were in short supply or almost nonexistent because of the war and sanctions. The most difficult requisition was

transport. Yet almost everything was accomplished by the target date of January 28. In addition, the group established contacts and working relationships with the governor's office, with the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, and his deputy and assistant commissioners, informed the directors of each of the parties that they were installed in Salisbury, submitted advertisements by January 24 to the major newspapers announcing their arrival and functions, arranged for media coverage of the arrival of the observers on the same day, and conducted reconnaissance visits to Bulawayo, Gwanda, and Gwelo.(19)

The modus operandi conducted by the group was based on a document prepared by the Commonwealth Committee on South Africa, December 13,(19) which was later restated and elaborated by the secretariat in Salisbury in a paper entitled "Modus Operandi" for discussion and decision by the group (see Appendix I). These documents dealt with functions to be performed prior to polling day in observation of the campaign process, the implementation of the electoral laws and regulations, "the general administration of government insofar as it bears on the elections," with a "watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on the voters" and with functions attendant to the polling process, with emphasis or freedom of access, non-interference, and secrecy of the ballot.

In addition, the "Modus Operandi" set out the procedures to be followed, the general strategy that was updated as the weeks went by. These included the methods of deployment throughout the country and the establishment of regional centers, reporting and debriefing procedures, contact with governmental and party officials, phasing, and in general "the speedy creation of an extensive network of contacts and information sources throughout the country, and the generation of relationships of confidence and trust," matters which are "critical to the success of the exercise." Of particular interest is the fact that the members of the Commonwealth group saw themselves as being able to contribute positively to the process through the performance of "good offices" at the local, regional, and national levels, wherever their intercession could help overcome particular abuses or problems. Most observers, in one way or another, attempted to intercede with the appropriate powers on several critical matters, and in that way performed "good offices" on a limited scale, though with varying degrees of influence.

Of particular importance to the Commonwealth Observer Group was the need to ensure that "the identity and official inter-governmental mandates of the Group be widely known and understood . . . (and that they) do not become blurred," or put more bluntly, submerged among all the other observers. It therefore determined to "maintain as high a public profile as possible" and to that effect had its own media specialist and urged its members to create "an extensive network of contacts and information sources throughout the country, and the generation of relationships of confidence and trust."

TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS

Everything, for all observers, depended on their ability to travel widely and freely throughout the country. Beginning on February 14, the Election Commission mounted several separate trips daily, by various means of air and land transportation, for observers and members of the press to specific and widely-dispersed areas of the country including tribal trust lands, protected villages, African townships, border areas, agricultural estates, refugee centers, and some assembly points. "All these trips were accompanied by members of the Department of Information and on occasion by members of the Governor's staff."(20) In a war-torn country which was unfamiliar to most observers and members of the press, the facility trips organized by the Election Commission enabled travel to places and contacts with people that might not otherwise have been possible. For many, the cost of widespread travel throughout the country would have been prohibitive as well as dangerous. The trips, including briefings by officials on location, were extremely well planned and executed. Since such planning, however, required advance notification to the officials and people at the places of destination and excluded some locations, there was occasional doubt about information received and about how free the people from all walks of life may have felt to relate information about assumed acts of intimidation or to name the parties responsible. Such doubts were in part overcome by one-to-one conversations outside earshot of officials or others of different color or political loyalty. Withal, the information gathered on such trips was generally regarded as forthrightly given, without fear of reprisal. For many the trips were the basic way of moving around the country and were widely used and appreciated.

Nevertheless, to avoid the implication of being dependent or restricted by official sources of travel and information, the Commonwealth Observer Group, the American Committee on Africa, and others used independent means of transport. The Commonwealth group was fortunate in that Canada assigned one of its three Buffalo aircraft in Rhodesia for their use. Independent means to move about the country was made easier for those observers who through former visits and associations had contacts with the parties and local friends among the people and the missionaries, who generally enjoyed the respect and confidence of the people with whom they worked.

The observers also attended campaign rallies, and, as we shall note later, the daily press briefings at the Miekles Hotel, held numerous interviews with government and party officials and gathered information through whatever means were at hand. Overall, the methods of gathering and sharing information of events and people's views were, under the circumstances, adequate. But this is not to say the task was without difficulty or hindrance. For example:

> On February 17 three members of our delegation [the Independent American Observer Delegation] and a journalist were interviewing residents of villages and a school in Chiota Tribal Trust Land in Mashonaland East about the election. We were accompanied by four officials of ZANU-PF from the Salisbury office. We were arrested at gunpoint by about 15 security forces personnel in a violent and abusive mood, apparently because we were traveling with "terrorists". We were taken to Mahusekwa base for questioning. . . . Upon arrival at Mahusekwa, one of the ZANU-PF officials was kicked in the chest and hit on the face. We were detained for about an hour for questioning and then driven to the provincial center, Marandellas (about one-half hour away) for more questioning. At about 5:30 P.M. we and the ZANU-PF officials were released without charges. This incident was reported to the office of the Governor but we did not receive a response.
>
> On February 19 a group of Dutch journalists traveling to an authorized political rally in Chiota Tribal Trust Land were stopped at gunpoint and taken to Mahusekwa base. The journalists told us that one security force member had accidentally fired a shot during the encounter.(22)

Because the ability to travel and gain access to people throughout the country with relative freedom was crucial to the performance of their task, we asked the observers about their modes of travel, the reliability of the several modes, the geographic extent of their travels, and whether they were subject to hindrance, as follows:

> Have you conducted your inquiry by officially organized facility trips?
> –independently organized facility trips?
> –other? (i.e., in conjunction with friends, journalists, arranged by the parties, etc.) and:
>
> In your opinion, which of the above to you consider to be the most reliable?
> The results of both questions are combined in the following table:

	TYPE TRAVEL		RELIABILITY	
	no.	a.f.	no.	a.f.
1) By officially organized trips only	6	11.1%	5	9.6%
2) By independent trips only	9	16.7	25	48.1
3) By other	–	–	5	9.6
4) By official and independent	18	33.3	7	13.5
5) By official and other	2	3.7	–	–

6) Independent and other	4	7.4	3	5.8
7) By official, independent and other	15	27.8	7	13.5
8) No response	1		3	
TOTAL SAMPLE	55	100	55	100

In answer to the first question, it is clearly apparent that the majority, a total of 48 (a.f. of 88.9%) utilized independent trips, other, and in combinations of official, independent and other, whereas only 6 (a.f. 11.1%) used the official trips exclusively. The results of the second question show the largest number of 25 (a.f. 48.1%) considered the independent trips the most reliable, with the balance distributed among the other categories, none exceeding 7 (a.f. 12.5%).

To the question on the extent of their travels – "Which of the following districts have you visited?" – the results demonstrate that they traveled very widely, each visiting an average of 5 districts:

District	Number of Visits
Manicaland	39
Mashonaland Central	32
Mashonaland East	39
Mashonaland West	22
Matabeleland North	27
Matabeleland South	21
Midlands	37
Victoria	29

We then asked the observers, "In your opinion, how reliable do you consider the information you have received from conversations with the people of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe? From official sources? From local media?" and asked them to grade the reliability of these sources on a scale from one to ten, least to most, with the results shown in the following table:

Scale of Reliability	People Abs. Freq.	People Cum. Freq.	Official Sources Abs. Freq.	Official Sources Cum. Freq.	Media Abs. Freq.	Media Cum. Freq.
1			3	5.8%	8	15.1%
2			2	9.6	8	30.2
3			4	17.3	13	54.7
4	1	2.0%	7	30.8	3	60.4
5	8	18.4	14	57.7	6	71.7
6	5	28.6	5	67.3	8	86.8
7	16	61.2	5	76.9	2	90.6
8	10	81.6	3	82.7	4	98.1
9	2	85.7	5	92.3	–	100.0
10	7	100.0	4	100.0	1	
No Response	6		3		2	
			55		55	

In adapting level 4 on the scale of reliability as a point of differentiation, the cumulative frequencies in percentages above (least) and below (most), show the following:

	People	Official Sources	Media
Above (least)	2.0%	30.8%	60.4%
Below (most)	98.0	69.2	39.6

It is clearly evident that, in rank order, the observers considered the people to be the most reliable source of information, then the official sources, and last, the media. This reflects the view we gathered in our conversations with the observers. In general, they also expressed a "healthy" skepticism of most sources of information, preferring to crosscheck where possible with several sources and with one another.

Lastly, on the conditions of observation, we asked, "Are you of the opinion that you have been hindered from a full and open inquiry?" All but one of the sample answered this question. Seventeen (a.f. 31.5 percent) said "yes" and 37 (a.f. 68.5 percent) said "no." On a scale of one to ten from least to most, the mean of those responding in the affirmative was 3.86, indicating that hindrance did not appear to be a severe limitation on their ability to perform their tasks.

OBSERVER INTERVENTIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR

Most groups met with the leaders of the major parties, exchanged views and assessments of the situation, and called upon the leaders and the governor himself to withhold specific actions in specific instances, such as disenfranchisement of parts of the country under Ordinances 7 and 8. Mr. Peter Emery, with the British Parliamentary Group, also made representations to Lord Soames on his selection of a party leader to form a government. It was widely believed that no party would win an absolute majority, and feared that in such circumstances, Lord Soames might bypass Mugabe, if his party won only a plurality, and would shape a coalition to exclude him. The British Parliamentary Group warned Lord Soames, who kept his counsel to himself on this matter, that to exclude Mugabe and ZANU PF could court a possible renewal of the war. The OAU group raised the issue while an independent observer statement recommended that the governor "commit himself to first calling upon the party which had won the greatest number of seats to form a government."(22) The Commonwealth Observer Group in turn added its weight to this point of view.

Frequent representations to the governor were also made on the slow repatriation of refugees(23) and the unauthorized distribution of election material by Police reservists.(24) But by far the most vigorous protestations were made in the allegations against the Auxiliaries of political activity, coercion, and intimidation.(25) To assess what influence such direct representation had on the governor

and his actions is difficult. Apparently such appeals had no effect on the repatriation of refugees, and perhaps some effect on curtailing some of the abuses of police reservists and auxiliaries in the unauthorized distribution of election material. But on representations on the larger issue of intimidation conducted by the auxiliaries, the governor, based on his intelligence, amply recorded on a map (see Appendix K), held firmly to the view that by far the greater amount of intimidation was committed by ZANLA. It would be fair to assume that the governor attempted to place such strictures on the auxiliaries as he could. He did issue a statement, but considering the difficult relationship between General Acland and General Walls, it was much easier to call the auxiliaries into the game than to referee their behavior. Since, however, the governor did issue a general mobilization order for some 70,000 reservists, this aggravated fears among the Patriotic Front forces and exacerbated the mood of general apprehension. There is little doubt, however, that under the circumstances, his major concern was about the ZANLA at large and his basic reliance was on the Rhodesian forces. He would bear the responsibility if things went wrong. But the observers and the press were constant witnesses and in that general sense had an impact on the actions of the governor, who knew that all his actions were subject to scrutiny and criticism.

When Ambassador Dayal, Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, was refused his request for permission to bring 55 additional assistants to oversee the polling, he threatened to take the matter to the Commonwealth South African Committee and thereby bring international pressure to bear on the governor. Dayal was mystified that no objection had been raised in London when the South Africa Committee had originally suggested 96 observers and that Britain had since invited so many of its own observers, as well as those from Europe, yet had refused the Commonwealth the needed extra personnel. After long protestations, the governor finally agreed to permit the entry of 30 additional assistants into Rhodesia.

PRESS BRIEFINGS

The press briefings held in the grand ballroom on the spacious mezzanine of the Miekles hotel in Salisbury with upwards of 500 in attendance were a singularly important daily event. The press room, the government information bureau, and the Election Commission office for facility trip arrangements were also located at this hotel. In the central lobby was the bar where press and observers gathered at the end of the day's travels and investigations to exchange experiences, news, and views over drinks. So much occurred on any one day that many events, or reports thereof, seemed to bring on a new crisis with uncertain outcome. With so much news, a high level of political tension, and worldwide attention, it is surprising (and a tribute to all concerned) that rumor and speculation were not more rife than was

actually the case. The press conference began with a greeting by Fenn, the foreign office spokesman and the chief press aide to the governor, seated at the raised head table under camera lights with officials at either side, a huge muted-color pastoral tapestry on the panelled wall behind him, and a large monitoring force operational map and an electoral map on his left. Fenn, in laconic BBC language, then presented the communiques of the day. These generally included any special statement of activity of the governor "and official thinking concerning events leading up to the elections,"(26) the issue of ordinances, Combined Operations Headquarters reports on the number of security forces contacts, number of incidents and deaths, with some particulars which had occurred in the previous 24 hours, and an update on the situation at the assembly places and on electoral matters, frequently followed by a presentation, such as by the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, on preparations for the polling and explanations of any misunderstandings.

There were also moments of humor, like the Coca Cola debate, where it was argued whether the dye (visible only under infrared light) into which each person's hand was dipped after voting could be washed off by Coca Cola thereby permitting that person to vote a second, or even a third time, and in such numbers as to negate the official results. That debate carried on long after it was conclusively demonstrated that Coca Cola had no such effect. A skeptic might assume that some journalists were more concerned with captivating headlines – Coca Cola Upsets Rhodesian Elections – than with reporting facts.

Occasionally, apart from announcements of policy and organizational or political initiatives, items of news would be all too brief in exposition or already known to those in attendance. Further, statements and allegations about perpetrations of violence and intimidation were often received with skepticism by the journalists and some observers who asked probing questions based on their own observations, sometimes contradicting the official versions of events and contrasting them with their own experiences.

As shown in response to the survey questions cited above, the observers and journalists were generally more trustworthy of evidence they themselves gathered in their daily inquiries than that received from official sources. Given that everyone acknowledged that excessive and widespread intimidation was taking place, one of the most important and reoccuring questions was, "Who were most responsible, ZANLA elements or the auxiliaries?" with the official version more condemnatory of ZANLA, and the press and some observers more condemnatory of the auxiliaries.

OBSERVER REPORTS ON INTIMIDATION

In Chapter 2 we cited the observers responses to the question, "Which parties have been most responsible for intimidation?", with ZANU PF ranked as most responsible by 24 respondents, UANC as most responsible by 22 respondents, and PF as most responsible by 2 respondents, showing a roughly equal division between ZANU PF and UANC.

What follows are quotations from several observer reports dealing with intimidation. The reader will by now appreciate the difficulty of being objective and factual in this matter, and the danger of subjectivity in selecting statements from the observer reports and press reports and commentary. With this caveat, the following is quoted from the "Report of the Freedom House Observer Team:"

> It is widely alleged that the Security Forces, and particularly the Auxiliaries, have been allowed a free rein while the forces of the formerly external parties been kept in camps, and that this, as well as bias in reporting campaign violence, represents an attempt by the combined administration of the country to use the government machinery to defeat the formerly external parties, and particularly ZANU (PF). We believe that a nation-wide, active security effort was essential and that given his resources, the Governor used the services most likely to secure a fair result. . . . Correspondingly, Governor Soames' biased ascription of intimidation to ZANU (PF) redounded to the benefit of ZANU (PF).(27)

The following is an extract from the Group of Independent British Observers Report:

> The methods adopted in the attempt to coerce voters in the ZANLA areas were particularly repugnant and sufficiently verified to satisfy us that they had occurred. . . . They extended from brutal "disciplinary matters" as examples of the fate awaiting those who failed to conform; to generalised threats of retribution or a continuance or resumption of the war if ZANU (PF) failed to win the election; to psychological pressures like name-taking and claims to the possession of machines which would reveal how individuals had voted; and to the physical interdiction of attendance in meetings. The universal longing for peace, and the ambience of recent violence, made the threats of general retribution or a continuance of the war a potent weapon even in the hands of unarmed activists, since it was independent of the secrecy of the ballot. . . . The Security Force Auxiliaries . . . were deployed in re-establishing civil administration, mainly on guard and patrol duty in protected villages and rural areas. In some areas they had been put to work restoring schools, cattle dips, etc. destroyed during the fighting. In general their presence for this purpose, as well as providing a counterweight to the ZANLA and ZIPRA elements who had not gone into Assembly Areas, appeared beneficial. There was evidence that some areas in which they were not deployed would have welcomed them.
>
> We are in no doubt that some Auxiliaries were guilty of activities and acts of intimidation in support of the UANC. Many of the accusations against them were in general terms. Specific allegations were investigated (often by the British

> Election Supervisor) and many were discovered to be inventions. Some cases, however, were successfully pursued to arrest and conviction by the civil authorities. . . . Their activities were certainly under closer scrutiny than those of ZANLA and ZIPRA activists in the rural areas, if only because they were immediately identifiable by their uniform and were accountable to the Government. Our impression was that the strident torrent of complaint about them, at its height at the time of our arrival, became muted as the facts above came to be better understood, as command and control became more effective, and as a general decline in the level of attempts at intimidation from all sides became perceptible towards the end of the preelection period.(28)

The Commonwealth Observer Report read:

> Perhaps here, as in some other areas of controversy, the whole truth may never be known. We do not seek to minimize the blame attaching to ZANLA and a lesser degree, ZIPRA. That some of their members were guilty of acts of intimidation is incontrovertible. Nevertheless, it is our view that intimidation by the guerillas was by no means as widespread or as brutal as official spokesman claimed. It was also hard to judge where the line was being drawn between political activism and intimidatory behaviour. It is also our view that the one-sided picture projected by the Authorities, and reflected by the media (in Rhodesia), which attempted to attribute blame for intimidation solely to ZANLA and ZIPRA and their political allies, was grossly misleading and must be corrected. Allegations of political activity, of coercion and of intimidation made against the Auxiliaries abounded. We were satisfied that, as with allegations against ZANLA, the activities of the Auxiliaries were not as bad as the charges against them claimed. At the same time, their activities were very much worse than government spokemen were prepared to admit.(29)

The opinion voiced in the Danish Observers Delegation Report, March 25, 1980, read:

> All the parties have complained over a large-scale intimidation of the voters by other parties, especially by ZANU (PF) and unreported ZANLA-personnel, and/or by the Security Forces Auxiliaries and the police. These complaints have been confirmed by people with whom the delegation have spoken. It has for obvious reasons generally not been possible for the few Danish observers to investigate and evaluate the accusations nor to determine which party has been responsible for the most widespread and/or serious intimidation. It seems, nevertheless, that the complaints by the Rhodesian authorities over ZANLA and ZANU (PF) have been exaggerated.

And finally, the Interim Statement from the Canadian Non-Government Observer Team of March 1, 1980 commented that:

> The British Administration has not seemed able to curb or leash the power of activities of the police or Rhodesia Security Forces . . . and our investigations have produced convincing evidence that since the ceasefire some sections of ZANLA and ZIPRA forces have engaged in serious acts of intimidation and have inflicted injuries on a number of people. . . . [But] it is important to note, however, that if the pre-ceasefire level of hostilities had prevailed, the death toll would have been approximately 3,500. Instead, this has been reduced to 290 fatalities since December 29.

The figures tell an important story, and speak favorably of the maintenance of the ceasefire, but the number of deaths cannot of itself be a measure of intimidation. The conflicting reports demonstrate how difficult was the task of observation and judgment and that a proliferation of observers could in fact confuse the issue. There can be no doubt, however, that the observers had a positive effect on the electoral process.

There was no confusion about the polling itself. The dissemination of information was massive and had the desired effect. The people were convinced of the secrecy of the ballot and well informed on the location of the polling stations. As the figures show, 2,702,275 of an estimated 2,883,000 cast their ballots. Of these 2,649,529 were validated.(30) The turnout was 93.73 percent, a much higher number than had been anticipated. It is probable that the voting population was very much higher than the estimate. By comparison, the number of valid votes cast in the 1979 election was 1,802,758. (The electorate in 1979 included approximately 100,000 white voters who voted separately in 1980.)

In the 1980 election, the people were well acquainted with the procedures of marking and depositing the ballots, although some required assistance by the polling officer. Seven polling station staff were dismissed at three stations on complaints of bias. But these and other minor matters (31) had no substantive effect on the process or on the results. Only 1.99 percent of the ballots were spoiled, as compared with 3.5 percent in the election of 1979.(32)

Polling stations were carefully monitored by officials, party representatives, and the observers. In sharp contrast to the intimidation, charges against the parties and general turmoil, the polling was calm and extremely well ordered and, according to all reports, secret. These are some examples of observer findings:

> We are completely satisfied with the integrity of the conduct of the poll in all its aspects, including the security of ballot boxes and the accuracy of the count.(33)

> Procedures assuring the secrecy and openness of the vote have been singularly adhered to.(34)

> The British have done well to ensure the secrecy of the poll.(35)

The massive turnout and the unquestioned secrecy of the polls allayed most fears that the high level of intimidation might badly distort the election results. It also became more apparent, though the process was slow, that freedom of movement, expression, and assembly did prevail in large parts of the country and particularly in the urban centers.

Attention was concentrated so heavily on the incidence of violence and intimidation that the observers and media lost sight of the openness of the flow of information which characterized much of the campaign.

When the polling was over, all the observers realized that they had to put their views publicly on record before the election results were announced, and most of them did so. With some differences on the cause and degree of intimidation, and equivocation regarding its impact, the reports were nonetheless unambiguous that the election results represented a satisfactory reflection of the will of the people.

The Irish Observer Group, Salisbury, March 2, wrote:

> Subject to the remaining stages of the election (verification and counting of the votes) being properly conducted, the election results should provide a fair reflection of the wishes of the electorate.

The Observer Delegation of the German Bundestag, Salisbury, wrote on March 1:

> The electoral process deserves to be called free and fair. . . . We have no evidence that these events (numerous incidents and intimidation) influenced the free choice of the voters nor that they critically impaired the final results of the election.

And from members of the British Parliamentary Group, Salisbury, no date but before 4 March:

> In our conversations with four main African party leaders, none advised that the election should be postponed, and three of them told us that they were prepared to accept the verdict.

The Australian National Observer Group, Salisbury, March 5:

> The Group noted earlier that freedom and fairness in elections are not absolutes but are gradations of scale. It is the Group's considered judgement that in all the circumstances the 1980 Rhodesian elections achieved a sufficiently high level on this scale to be described as free and fair.

The Canadian Non-Government Observer Team, Salisbury, March 1, concluded:

> Based on evidence available at the close of the polls, we believe that the actual voting results will reflect the best available expression of the people because most voters were convinced their votes were secret.

And finally, from The Commonwealth Observer Group, Salisbury, March 2:

> It is the unanimous conclusion of the Commonwealth Observer Group that the election up to the end of polling can be considered to have been free and fair to the extent that it provided an adequate and acceptable means of determining the wishes of the people in a democratic manner.

It would be redundant to cite further examples and, given the decisive results, equally redundant to quote from reports published after the results were announced. The institutions and procedures put in place by the Lancaster House Agreement, and above all, the people responsible for the execution enabled Zimbabweans to determine their future through their duly elected government. The responsibility for the future now rests in their hands.

NOTES

(1) The survey questionnaire conducted by Henry Wiseman in Rhodesia was hand delivered and reached 184 of the observers, of which 128 were governmental and 56 represented private organizations. Fifty-five completed and returned the questionnaires. See Appendices A and B for a list of observers as gathered from official sources and personal inquiry and for commentary on the Opinion Survey conducted by Henry Wiseman.
(2) The Lusaka Cummunique, August 1979, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, p. 4.
(3) December 13, 1979.
(4) The Washington Post, December 21, 1979.
(5) Southern Rhodesia Elections, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, February 1980, p. 85.
(6) Southern Rhodesia Independent Elections, p. 1.
(7) Hotel space was so tight that when the first group of observers went for several days to outlying areas, they were asked to give up their hotel rooms in Salisbury.
(8) Financial Times, December 12, 1980.
(9) Ibid.
(10) See Appendix B, List of Election Observers.
(11) The South African Observers were the previous diplomatic representatives to the Muzorewa government.
(12) United Nations Press Release, SC/4161, January 30, 1980.
(13) United Nations Press Release, SC/4166, February 2, 1980.

(14) Interview with members of the OAU delegation and see Report of the OAU Secretarial Observer Team to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to Monitor the Election Process, February 25th or March 1st, 1980, ECM/2 (XIII).
(15) Southern Rhodesia Elections, p. 1.
(16) Appendix 1D, Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 8.
(17) "Report of the Freedom House Observer Team" World Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 89-90.
(18) Commonwealth Observer Group, "Work of Advance Party," COG 1, January 26, 1980.
(19) Zimbabwe Elections, Commonwealth Observers: Operational Requirements," CSA (79)4. A copy appears in Southern Rhodesia Elections, p.85.
(20) Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 34.
(21) "First Report on the Rhodesian General Election of 1980," p. 4.
(22) An Independent Observer's Statement on the Coming Election, Dominique Boisvert, Brian Haddon and George Hauser, Salisbury, February 25, 1980.
(23) See letter from Rajeshwar Dayal, Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, to Lord Soames, Southern Rhodesia Elections February 1980, p. 166.
(24) See letter from Rajeshwar Dayal, Chairman of the Commonwealth Observer Group, to Sir John Boynton, Southern Rhodesia Elections February 1980, p. 151.
(25) The Herald, January 29, 1980.
(26) Report of the Election Commissioner, p. 34.
(27) World Affairs, Summer 1980, pp. 92-3.
(28) Report of the Election Commissioner, pp. 11-12.
(29) Southern Rhodesia Elections, pp. 31-33.
(30) Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections 1980, pp. 24-27.
(31) Ibid., p. 9.
(32) Ibid, p. 97.
(33) Ibid, p. 24.
(34) Interim Report of Dr. S. Sean Randolph, observer for the American Security Council.
(35) Report of the OAU Secretariat Observer Team to South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to monitor the election process, OAU Ecm/2(XIII); see further commentary "Report of the Election Commissioner," p. 99.

5
Conclusions

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The primary objectives of the Lancaster House negotiations and resultant agreements were to establish a constitutional structure for Zimbabwe, and to devise a process of transition based on the modalities of a ceasefire and an electoral process under the authority of a British governor so as to achieve a democratic black majority government. These objectives were fully realized in a very short span of time, from December 12, 1979 when Lord Soames assumed the governorship of Southern Rhodesia to the completion of the elections on March 4, 1980. The ceasefire held, the elections were judged free and fair "under the prevailing circumstances," and a democratically elected party won black majority rule and formally assumed the reins of government under the agreed constitution at the hands of Prince Charles on April 18, 1980.

That the elections were judged free and fair "under the circumstances" does not diminish the efficacy of the process or the legitimacy of the results. Rather this phrase explains the unique character of the total situation undergoing political, military, and, to some extent, a social metamorphosis in the Rhodesian and African context. It was a volatile yet constrained period, pulsating with expectant radical change in the lives of the people. Yet for everyone, in hope or dismay, there was and would continue to be a carry-over of attitudes and behavioral patterns generated by the long and bitter years of civil war.

Intellectually and politically, it was understood that the terms of the Lancaster Agreement made new demands on everyone. But not all the demands could be met, whether from suspicion, fear, or disbelief. Hence, within this environmental context, free and fair elections "under the circumstances" takes into account the aberrations, essentially those

of intimidation, which affected the electoral process. It could not have been otherwise, that is, that every act had to be in conformity with the letter and spirit of the agreement in order for the election to be judged free and fair. For these and related reasons, none of the observers or officials charged that intimidation, however abhorrent, so radically skewed the results that a distribution of seats might have otherwise denied a majority to the victor, ZANU PF.

The overall success of the process is fundamentally attributable to the sound and viable terms of the agreement, the commitment of the parties to uphold the agreement (the proposed coup d'etat notwithstanding), the very firm governance of Lord Soames, and the proficiency of the Monitoring Force, all under the watchful and critical eyes of the observers and world press. Beginning with the situation wherein all the parties and concerned states wanted to negotiate and see a final and workable agreement for Rhodesia implemented, the slow but growing trust among the parties and the direct and immediate movement from negotiation to implementation were the key operational factors. Three elements – the assumption of full governmental authority by the United Kingdom, the sound electoral structure, and the viable ceasefire defined in the agreement – provided the firm foundation for success.

The first two elements are by now self-explanatory. The third, the ceasefire, demands elucidation of one basic decision, namely, that instead of the separation of military forces along demarcation lines, enabling each side to remain in control of its portion of territory, it was agreed that the movement of all forces to assembly points and bases was to be monitored by the Monitoring Force. Had the first pattern been adopted, "territoriality" would have become so zealously guarded that the governor's authority would have been critically diminished and the electoral process made more complicated and difficult, putting the outcome and its acceptance in doubt. The pattern of movement to assembly points and bases that was adopted did add considerably to the complexity of the military situation and to the duties and burdens of the Monitoring Force (in contrast to an alternative monitoring of ceasefire demarcation lines). As events showed, the Monitoring Force proved adequate to the task. Moreover, this pattern added to rather than diminished the freedom of movement of the Monitoring Force (freedom of movement in most United Nations operations is strictly delineated and usually abridged in practice) and exposed all military forces to better observation by the Monitoring Force, observers, and the press. It could well be argued that such exposure helped to limit clandestine activities and intimidation.

With the agreement in place, two further factors contributed significantly to the success of the process. The first was the elaborate prior planning; the second, the persistent momentum. Prior planning was detailed in terms of procedures and personnel that were moved into place with what seemed to some to be undue haste. But the facts that an advance team went out as early as mid-November, 1979, "to plan a structure capable of discharging all the responsibilities which would be

assumed by the Election Commissioner under the pre-independence arrangements";(1) that an early decision was made on the choice of governor who subsequently took up his post in Salisbury on December 12, even before the ceasefire was in place; and that the Monitoring Force was in Rhodesia and deployed to stations within hours after the ceasefire was signed, all brought enormous pressure to bear on each of the parties to act in fulfillment of their part of the agreement. No time was left for second thoughts. It is rare in such cases that the "third party" possesses the resources and is so well prepared in advance to execute the terms of an agreement. In the case of United Nations operations, a Security Council resolution in establishment of a mandate should precede instruction to the secretariat before full-scale planning and preparations for a peacekeeping operation can take place. This makes extensive preplanning all but impossible, except in the case of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) for Namibia. The United Nations does, however, have the advantage of a very experienced secretariat in peacekeeping operations which is able to draw headquarters and other elements from existing operations, all of which helps to overcome some of the difficulties of "ad hocracy."

In Rhodesia, time was a critical element in the implementation of the process. The Patriotic Front sought six months for the duration of the transition, while the United Kingdom insisted on a short duration and won the point. The arrival of Soames in Salisbury to the announcement of the election results spanned only 83 days. The initial momentum was therefore sustained at a feverish pace. As previously discussed, this rapidity heightened tensions and elevated some incidents to crisis proportions. But it also meant that these crises had to be dealt with with dispatch, forcing resolution or accomodation as all parties moved on with the conduct of the campaign. There was little time for events or perceptions of such events to erode the process. Paradoxically, the rapid sequence of events pushed the peak of one crisis onto the next, preventing the stabilization of the process. This aggravated fears and expectations and gave more credence to the threats and dire predictions that the entire process would break down and the civil war resume. But had the process been extended over a longer period of time, each crisis would have lingered, become more aggravated, and given opportunity for even more volatile behavior and contravention of the Lancaster Agreement. It was a choice between moving rapidly to a conclusion under high but manageable levels of tension, or moving slowly and ponderously, trying the patience of all concerned, and in such a way that some precipitous action could shatter the underlying stability of the process. Any analagous comparison of other "peacekeeping" operations provides ample contrast to the rapid implementation of the Lancaster Agreement.

What kept the process intact was that the various centers of political and military power were maintained in equilibrium by the independent governing authority, the Monitoring Force, and by the commitment of the parties to enable the process to work. The commitment of each of the parties contesting the election was twofold.

The first was the agreement to a peaceful electoral transfer of power to black majority rule. The second was the determination of each to maximize its own position by winning enough seats to form that parliamentary majority, or to be part of a majority coalition. Whereas in the first instance they were committed to the process, in the second instance several of the parties were ready to defy the process, short of causing a total breakdown. In their drive for power, the three major parties, ZANU PF, PF, and UANC, came dangerously close to doing so through the use of excessive violence and intimidation. Even more so was the intent of General Walls to launch a coup d'état. But the governor and the Monitoring Force, under the scrutiny of the observers and the press, effectively kept the worst of these tendencies in check.

THE GOVERNOR

Governance under these circumstances was a test of skill and determination to restrain the activity generated by the second-level commitments of the parties from shattering the first, and in so doing to avoid leaning too far to one side to counteract the other lest the precarious equilibrium be destroyed. It was therefore incumbent on the governor to avoid bias, or the appearance of bias, because either would be interpreted as if the governor, while fully committed to the process, used his position to contrive a particular configuration of black majority rule. Allegations to that effect persisted. The Commonwealth Observer Group was critical of some of the governor's actions, as was Colin Legum of the Observer, who wrote that:

> Lord Soames has failed to maintain his position as an impartial Governor. To be fair to him, he has had his difficulties. From the very start, he felt it important to prevent white Rhodesians from panicking and therefore made every effort to reassure them. But in doing so, he upset both wings of the Patriotic Front. . . . Moreover, Lord Soames did not have the power to compel General Peter Walls to obey what would have been unpopular orders. This explains, but does not justify, why the Rhodesian Security Forces and the Bishop's Auxiliaries were allowed a virtually free hand from the start of the cease-fire.(2)

Nonetheless, he did maintain his position sufficiently above the political turmoil and stood as a symbol of power, thereby enhancing his authority to influence the parties beyond his capacity to exert substantive power.

THE MONITORING FORCE

In Rhodesia the maintenance of the ceasefire was due in large measure to the determination of the parties that the elections take place. This was the sine qua non to allow the Monitoring Force to perform its

assigned tasks. Even so there were crises and the Monitoring Force had to be prepared for contingencies. Yet while the parties either allowed or encouraged their forces to intimidate the populace and kept close watch on one another, no major clashes occurred. As we have noted, there were only 207 alleged breaches of the ceasefire that were brought before the Cease-Fire Commission, of which 18 were unattributed. The administration of the framework and the monitoring of the ceasefire, however, were absolutely crucial to the avoidance of its breakdown. The Monitoring Force performed these and related functions with diligence and dispatch. Its military capability, even as a possible threat against any of the parties, was purposely negligible. Yet the level of its credibility and authority was greatly enhanced by the quality of its presence. Its well-organized and exacting behavior asserted maximum authority in the circumstances. Although in no position to command the Rhodesian Forces, the auxiliaries or ZANLA to take certain actions, it managed to exert its will sufficiently to supervise the ceasefire. As with the governor, it had to tread a fine line between what the situation required and what was possible in the completion of its mission, as for instance in the control of General Walls or in fostering the integration of rival forces. Moreover, though its responsibilities were linked to the ceasefire, its actions affected the electoral process in that violations of the ceasefire spilled over into the area of intimidation and vice versa. Though on occasion criticized, it maintained its impartiality above the political turmoil and violence.

Several factors contributed to its mastery of the situation. First, though called a Commonwealth force, it was inherently organized and executed by a single state, the United Kingdom, thus greatly simplifying the making of decisions and coordination. Second, because the United Kingdom directed the negotiations at Lancaster House with a prior conception of the shape of the final agreement, the designated commanding officers of the Monitoring Force could perform extensive advance planning, make careful individual selection of the most able men for the task from the British forces, and also influence the choice of contributing states from the Commonwealth. These, together with the careful planning of organization, briefing, and deployment, created a lean, capable, and integrated force responsive to command and the exigencies of the moment.

Third, the Monitoring Force had direct and immediate access to its political superiors in Salisbury and London with quick and ready response to its needs, as in the supply of goods and services to house, feed, and care for the Patriotic Front forces in the APs. By contrast, United Nations peacekeeping by its very nature lacks the capacity to dictate the selection of individual and of national contingents, the exception being the commander, and even there, political considerations have to be taken into account. Though practice has in part overcome some of the resultant problems, the short notice from mandate to implementation and the integration of diverse contingents from many countries requires a period of familiarization in the field before maximum levels of efficiency are achieved. United Nations

peacekeeping is also subject to the problem of overly large headquarters staff, in that each contributing country wishes to be represented at the place of command. Nor are the political and military aspects in United Nations peacekeeping so clearly and closely coordinated in policy and personnel as they were in Zimbabwe, so that commanders in the field do not always enjoy quick and ready response to their needs.

Fourth, the close coordination of political and military decisions allowed for a substantial degree of flexibility, enabled rapid response to specific situations, and assisted the introduction of projects to improve the climate of confidence, such as the military free zones on the perimeter of the APs, the joint visits of commanders to the APs, and the initiation of the integration of all armed forces.

Fifth, the Cease-Fire Agreement was fully supported by the neighboring states so that, other than the alleged attempts to introduce military elements as refugees, there was to our knowledge no substantial infiltration of men or arms across the borders.

Lastly, the costs were heavy. The total cost to the British government of the "Rhodesian Settlement" was about £25M, which included the provision for the extra costs to the Ministry of Defence which were borne on Foreign and Commonwealth Office votes. We do not have separate figures for the costs of the Monitoring Force. Costs were not, however, an encumbrance, as is often the case in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

THE OBSERVERS

One of the unique aspects of Rhodesian arrangements was the provision for observers. Commonwealth observers were specifically called for in the agreement, with many others added at the invitation or with the permission of the British government. Their mandate was self-defined, apart from having "to observe that the elections are genuinely free and fair and that the British Government is carrying out its responsibility to supervise them. No restrictions will be placed on their movements, and, every effort will be made to facilitate their task."(3) Their tasks accordingly revolved about the electoral process, not the ceasefire. But because all aspects of the transition period were so critically interrelated, elements in the management of the ceasefire affected the elections and were therefore not excluded from the scrutiny of the observers. With this in mind, as we have seen, there emerged a general understanding among all observers that their terms of reference called upon them to judge what was free and fair in the given circumstances and to determine whether the British government "was carrying out its responsibilities" under the agreement. We have discussed the nature of assistance and facilities granted to the observers and whether they viewed these as being adequate or restrictive, as for example, the preference for independent travel arrangements to the use of facility trips. A precondition to their own impartial access was self-reliance.

While there were some complaints about restrictions placed on travel and observation, such as at times to the APs and Rhodesian force bases, on the whole the observers enjoyed more than adequate access in the performance of their tasks.

The Commonwealth Observer Group, which kept complete records, spent 2,646 man-days in Rhodesia and covered a total of 72,000 kilometers by road and 97,600 kilometers by air. During the poll, they visited 267 of the 335 static stations and 170 of the 322 mobile stations.(4)

Similarly, "In the period preceding the poll, we the [Group of Independent British Observers] completed between us an extensive programme of visits to all parts of the country. . . . These covered 42 of the 55 administrative districts, in all eight provinces."(5) A modest estimate of the travels of all observers would certainly be four times as great as for these two groups. In a country of 150,000 square miles with a transport system partially crippled by the war and still dangerous in some areas, coverage by the observers, despite several serious cases of hindrance, must be considered by any standards as more than adequate. It remains a moot point whether the observers should have been granted, upon request, access to militarily sensitive areas related primarily to the cease-fire. None of the observer reports we have examined (see Bibliography for list) complained of official obstacles placed in the way of their investigations, and the same was reported by Sir John Boynton: "None complained that they had been unable to cover every aspect of the election and to satisfy themselves that under the circumstances, the election procedures had been satisfactory."(6)

Still, it will be recalled from Chapter 4, in response to the question of whether or not they were hindered in their investigations, 31.5 percent replied in the affirmative. We do not doubt that the perception of hindrance did exist among some, but under conditions prevailing at the time, it is also our view that the observers were able to conduct their inquiries to the extent required for their mission.

One of the major concerns of the observers was whether the governor was free of bias in intent and in action. In fairness, it must also be asked whether the observers were free of similar tendencies. It is unlikely that any were without preconception of events to take place in Rhodesia. Such would be analogous to trying to pick a jury in a case where all prospective jurors had already been inundated by an overzealous and opinionated press. As in the case of the officials themselves, however, the observers were highly professional and careful in their investigations, and they undoubtedly sought to minimize private opinion from coloring their observations. Nevertheless, Boynton commented that "A very few of the observers appeared to have arried with their minds made up and asked loaded questions without always waiting for an answer. However, all but this tiny minority were seen by those in Salisbury and in the field, British and Rhodesian, to be performing an important and valuable task." And, he added, "it was seen that they were contributing to the success of the elections by providing a totally independent viewpoint, and in a sense reinforcing the

British supervisory presence."(7) We shall add to the latter statement presently. But on the matter of inherent bias or predilection, there were many observers, governmental and nongovernmental, who favored one outcome or the other. Once in Rhodesia, no one could be unaffected by the general tension, anticipation, and critical nature of the process and electoral results. But this is not to say that objectivity was thrown overboard. Considering that the British authorities themselves invited several governments to send observer groups in addition to that from the Commonwealth, it was appropriate that they were confronted by observers with varying viewpoints once the process was underway. The general uniformity of their judgments of "free and fair under the circumstances," and the fact that most so reported before the election was known, attests to their general impartiality.

This leads us to the question of what use was made of the judgments of the observers. Officially, governmental observers or representatives of international organizations reported their findings to their home offices. But there was no procedure established for their reports to be submitted to the governor, except in the case of the Group of Independent British Observers appointed by the British government who were to "assist" the Governor's Election Commissioner and presumably report to the governor through him; and since the Lancaster negotiations ended with the signing of the agreement, there was no continuing body to receive their reports. It was therefore primarily up to the British government and the parties to make use individually of the published observer reports if they so wished, or for the governments and international organizations which had observers in Rhodesia to respond to their reports. Publication of the reports, which universally accepted the results, was the primary form of reference. In some cases, governments sent congratulatory messages to the United Kingdom for their successful and judicious administration of the Lancaster Agreement.

The greatest impact of the observer views and reports was their direct influence on events as they unfolded, and as a moral assessment for the people of Rhodesia and for world public opinion of the actions of the British government and all parties to the agreement. Within Rhodesia, the black population seemed to regard the observers as independent watchdogs of the process, as people whom they could trust to ensure by their very presence that the will of the people would not be abrogated. They were also seen as a check on violations of the agreements and electoral procedures by the parties. They could not prevent such violations, but they were a significant international physical and moral presence with an effective voice. At least this was true so far as Mugabe was concerned. At a private meeting with the Commonwealth Observer Group before their departure on March 8, he had this to say:

> I would like to congratulate you on the role you have played in directing the course of this election by pointing out irregularities and acts of intimidation in various places either by

> us or by others; also for your advice to the Governor about the need for him to refrain from using the extensive powers which he had given himself under the ordinances. It was only because of this that people were ultimately able to freely express their wish and cast their votes the way they wanted. I am indeed grateful for the role you have played.
>
> Your presence had a double effect – firstly, it acted as a restraint on the Governor and secondly, it also served as a check on various other forces working to disrupt the election. The Rhodesian Security Forces would have been rampant if you had not been there. It was a magnificent role you played. We shall always look back to this election exercise where your presence was not only extremely valuable but essential. Please accept my personal appreciation for the role you played, as well as that of my party and of the people of Zimbabwe.

We understandably have no words from Mugabe that the activities of ZANLA were similarly restrained because of the presence of the observers. But in light of the fact that other observer groups were equally and openly critical of ZANLA, it is reasonable to assume that to some degree that was the case.

Beyond their immediate effect on events, the observers were a direct link with government and international organizations which would be in a position, should they have deemed it advisable, to deny the credibility of the results and withhold recognition from whichever party might form a government, or of course, as it turned out, to accord affirmation as well. Boynton stated that "in a sense" the observers could be viewed as "reinforcing the British supervisory presence." That may be partially the case, but they were fundamentally there to observe and confirm whether the process was free and fair and to be independent of the British administration. It is for that reason that the non-British observer groups, particularly the Commonwealth Observer Group, should be regarded as the best form of representation of the international community in assessing events in Rhodesia. Without impugning the character of any of the observers, the most broadly represented international observer groups which covered a variety of attitudes and which had to function by consensus, were least likely to be self-serving.

There are no absolutes in political objectivity. But there are procedures and international bodies which can add weight to the quality of individual professionalism. In the case of Rhodesia, the results confirmed the validity of the process and the mutual affirmation of the British administration and the observer groups. In negotiating arrangements for any future case akin to that of Rhodesia, it will provide a valuable source of experiential reference.

The Rhodesian transitional process, from the Lancaster House Agreement to the postelection period, is in its totality unique. The numerous "third parties," the governor, the Monitoring Force, and the

observers all played vital roles. The most exceptional aspects are that both the governor and the Monitoring Force were acting in law and in effect on behalf of the interim sovereign authority of Rhodesia independent of the parties vying for power, and that when warfare had run its course, all parties resorted to the democratic process as the solution. Therefore, however the Rhodesian case may be regarded as historically unique, there is much to be learned from it for the future resolution of conflict.

We have offered some comparisons between the Rhodesian transitional process and United Nations practice. Some may argue that the Rhodesian transition process was not peacekeeping in the historical sense and that the comparisons are overdrawn. It is not our intention to argue in preference for one form of peacekeeping over another; both occur as a result of particular sets of political forces. But because United Nations peacekeeping, ad hoc as it generally is, has evolved over years of practice, and because it is still in a developmental stage, new forms of United Nations and regional practice are likely to occur, requiring a better understanding of possibilities, limitations, and opportunities for joint endeavors. The present distinction between United Nations and other forms of peacekeeping practice is likely to be narrowed. We have only to look at the United Nations Observers and Security Force in West New Guinea of 1962-1963 where the United Nations itself became the "temporary Executive Authority," in fact, the sovereign authority to maintain security and supervise the elections; at the 1980-1981 discussion for cooperation between the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations with regard to some form of peacekeeping and supervision of elections for Chad; and at the United Nations arrangements of the transference of power in Namibia, evolved after a long series of negotiations, to realize the possibilities for new and innovative organizational forms of peacekeeping.

At present, the negotiations on Namibia are in a dormant interim phase following the failure of the January 1981 Geneva All Party Conference, owing to South African intransigence and by the adoption of new policies by the Reagan government, leaving indefinite when and if elections in Namibia may take place under the umbrella of United Nations peacekeeping. South Africa has charged the United Nations with partiality in favor of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO). Whether this is truly a grave concern of South Africa or simply a tactic, we are not in a position to know. We have no doubt that United Nations experience and the integrity of the secretariat would ensure its impartiality. The conditions in Rhodesia, however, attest to the fundamental requirement that the "third party" adhere scrupulously to a judicious neutrality in the implementation of agreements. For surely there will be those on all sides who are ready to cry bias whenever they deem an action contrary to their own interests.

Clarity of mandate and firm direction by the Secretary-General and the Under Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs are necessary preconditions for judicious and impartial action, for in sensitive cases – they always are – they have to cope with the diverse political interests

in the Security Council as well as with the difficulties and political pressures in the field. In the case of Namibia, they have to face the fact that the administration and the elections will be in the hands of the South African-supported government, under the supervision and control of the United Nations. This is very similar to the relationship of Lord Soames to the local Rhodesian election machinery. The primary responsibility of existing police forces in Namibia for the maintenance of law and order, as distinct from the United Nations Transition Assistance Group's role in the supervision of the ceasefire and the disposition of forces, is also similar to the use of the indigenous police in Rhodesia. There, "the Administrator General (of South West Africa) to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period."(8) There are gray areas in which both South Africa, through its administrator general, and the United Nations will "share" overall direction of the elections in some form of "condominium." There was no such vague locus of authority in Rhodesia. Were that the situation, the process would have been, in our view, unmanageable. In regard to Namibia, an additional consideration is the ultimate structure of the constitution and the modalities of the transfer of power to a newly-elected government of an independent Namibia. Leaving these matters to the election of a constituent assembly could be a source of conflict and breakdown of the process. As presently planned, too much is expected to be accomplished during the period in which United Nations peacekeeping forces are meant to keep the peace. Without a hard and fast timetable, interminable debate on a constitution could lead to aggravated political strife and force the United Nations into the unenviable position of having to prolong its stay until the process is completed. It is easy to be wise after the fact. But the Rhodesian experience demonstrates the considerable advantages of a total package – a constitution, an interim authority, a supervised ceasefire and election, and a hard and fast agenda.

Historically, with the exception of the West Irian case, peacekeeping has been a last resort to restrain conflict in the twofold belief that a cessation of hostilities is in itself desirable, and that once hostilities have stopped, the peace process could begin. In every case of United Nations peacekeeping, a process of negotiation, mediation, and reconciliation was invoked. But while the record of success in peacekeeping itself is a good one, the same cannot be said of the process of the diplomacy of peace which followed. Rhodesia offers a valuable model in the integration of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The United Kingdom played a forceful role in the entire process, yet it was a negotiated settlement which included all the parties. It was also a settlement in which the major protagonists, black and white, found a formula for cooperation and interdependence to mutual advantage.

Peaceful resolution of conflict does not require an interregnum of peacekeeping if the parties in conflict choose to settle their dispute on their own or through third-party intervention. Peacekeeping, however,

is only a half-measure if the diplomatic resolution of the conflict in question does not follow and succeed. In that sense, peacekeeping and peacemaking are symbiotic.

We have stressed repeatedly the unique character of the Rhodesian case. Without contradicting ourselves, however, we may note one overriding aspect in which it is not unique at all, in which it rather typifies so many of the conflicts on the global agenda. That one aspect is in the plurality of parties and elements to the conflict. Contemporary conflicts are laced with inextricable domestic and interstate dimensions in which recognized sovereign entities are in conflict with nongovernmental or nascent governmental organizations. El Salvador in Central America, Lebanon in the Middle East, Namibia and Chad in Africa, and Kampuchea in Southeast Asia are but a few of the examples. These are the inevitable, the undeniable characteristics of contemporary politics and the consequences of an interdependent world struggling for survival and for development.

The Charter of the United Nations, wrought in the aftermath of war, enshrined the inviolability of domestic jurisdiction. More and more, the United Nations is faced with conflicts that threaten international peace and security and which are domestic in origin or have domestic components to an otherwise interstate conflict that cannot be ignored if resolution is to be achieved. The Charter is ill equipped to handle these kinds of conflicts. For this and other reasons, the preamble to the Charter, the "faith in fundamental human rights," the need "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom," and the need "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples" emerge with growing salience to challenge the inviolability of domestic jurisdiction. The right to national self-determination is already firmly entrenched.

Peacekeeping itself demonstrates this change. Historically linked to the process of decolonization and interstate conflict, wider considerations have come to play a larger role. The Congo case (1960-1964) was unquestionably international and domestic in character. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1968 is even more multidimensional in the issues and in the number of state and nonstate parties to the dispute, and for that reason is incredibly difficult for the United Nations to handle. The Namibia case, involving the domestic and external parties, the Front Line states, the Western Five, and South Africa is again multidimensional in character. All the issues are synthesized in the right to national self-determination. But every element of the preamble to the Charter is equally involved.

We return then to the Rhodesian case, where the process of settlement had and took into account all the elements of the conflict in their complexity and multidimensionality. It is in this sense, therefore, that future international efforts in the resolution of conflicts of similar complexity will have to take cognizance of the Rhodesian experience.

It is also noteworthy that though the United Nations strenuously fostered a settlement, the settlement itself was eventually

accomplished through the intervention of the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, and new forms of multilateral collaboration outside the structural framework of the United Nations. The settlement was, however, achieved by means of "regional arrangements," broadly interpreted as coming under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Rather than regarding the efforts of the United Nations itself as a failure, the fact that the peacekeeping experience of the United Nations is now being adopted by other international organizations is recognition of the effectiveness and maturity of the process, a process which has evolved from the years of experience of the United Nations. It will continue to be one of the major services rendered by the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and a critical aspect of conflict resolution. But because of the Rhodesian experience, the international system now possesses greater strength than ever before in the management of conflict. With the Organization of American States in Latin America, the Organization of African Unity in Africa, through the agency of the Commonwealth, or other structures which emerge to serve the needs of specific situations, peacekeeping will evolve in new forms to complement that of the United Nations. Crises give rise to their own set of intractable issues, often so complex that, from all appearances, they defy resolution. Yet in responding to these crises, the international community, whether involved directly or as third parties, should give more attention to the processes adopted for conflict resolution because the process itself has a profound effect on the management of the issues and the responses of the parties to a conflict.

The uniqueness of the Rhodesian transitional process lays in its own historical context. Those who are party to the conflict and recognized the historical necessity and opportunity of the moment deserve the credit for their success. History, however, will accord them even greater credit should the process be emulated by the parties to other grave and dangerous conflicts.

NOTES

(1) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, Report of the Election Commission, Salisbury, March 1980, Cmnd. 7935, p. 3.
(2) The Observer, February 17, 1981.
(3) Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Constitutional Conference, p. 38.
(4) Southern Rhodesia Elections, Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, p. 7.
(5) Southern Rhodesia, Independence Elections 1980, p. 9.
(6) Ibid., p. 82.
(7) Ibid., p. 83.
(8) Letter dated April 10, 1978 from the representatives of Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council, containing a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian situation.

Appendix A
Opinion Survey

QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED TO THE ACCREDITED OBSERVERS, GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL

In Rhodesia, Henry Wiseman made arrangements to gather as much relevant information from as many sources as possible through direct interviews, the gathering of all newspapers published in Rhodesia from the beginning of January to March 8, the assembly of documents, press releases, reports of meetings, and through personal travel throughout Rhodesia. Travel throughout the country, however, would have replicated no more than what each individual observer was able to do in a short span of time. Since the primary task of all observers was direct and independent of the conduct of the election and the actions of the parties and of officials, it was realized that collectively they would touch all the bases.

It was therefore decided to submit a questionnaire on the central issues to each of the observers, with the request that these be filled in before the election results were announced. The questionnaire was prepared in consultation with Dean Hasu H. Patel and associates of the University of Rhodesia. Every care was taken to assure the anonymity of the respondents. Some of the observers were in Rhodesia for short periods and left prior to the circulation of the questionnaire. Others could not be located. The survey, however, was hand-delivered to 184 of the 223 observers listed by the Election Commissioner, including the 33 Commonwealth observers granted permission to be present only for the duration of the poll. Of these, 55 were completed and returned.

Given the professional character of the observers, whom we assume shared a general antipathy to questionnaires, the sensitivity of some of the questions on the performance and impartiality of key officials and institutions, the fact that the observers were traveling constantly throughout the country with the general limitations of time, we consider 55 responses from a known population of 184 to be a highly

acceptable rate of return for a self-administered questionnaire. The history of surveys of self-administered questionnaires supports this claim.

An analysis was conducted of possible differences between the group of respondents and the group of nonrespondents, to discover any bias caused by a limited return. We found that no differences appeared with respect to the characteristics of these two groups, there being in each a similar proportion of governmental and nongovernmental observers. The authors recognize, however, that there is no basis for describing the sample of respondents, relative to the entire population of observers named on the original lists, with precise mathematical probability. For this reason, we have not applied statistical tests of significance which would, of course, be appropriate for a probability sample. (See Hannah Selvin, "A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research," American Sociological Review, October 22, 1957, pp. 519-527, which presents sound argumentation for this approach.)

Examination of the characteristics of the respondent group show that the duration of the stay in Rhodesia of 51 of the respondents ranged from 5 to 50 days with a mean of 26.43 days, two were there 90 days or over, two did not indicate the duration of their stay, and 14 of their number had been in Rhodesia on previous occasions. On the questions regarding their knowledge of the situation in Rhodesia, 48 (with an adjusted frequency of 89.3 percent) said they were familiar with the issues before being named as observers, six said they were not, and one did not reply. Of those who did have prior knowledge, most acquired their information from the following sources in rank order, with many giving equal weight to several sources: the media (23); academic study (18); official briefings (16); journals (12); other (14); and association with the parties (13). With regard to their knowledge of the Lusaka Nine Point Plan for Zimbabwe (the plan that led to the Lancaster House negotiations), on a scale of one to five, 25 indicated that they were most familiar and 5 least familiar, with the mean sample group at 3.80, in all showing a good knowledge of the subject. On a similar question with regard to the Zimbabwe Constitution Order, their knowledge was even greater, with 33 most familiar, 14 slightly less familiar, and only 1 least familiar. The mean for the group was 4.40 on a scale of one to five.

We are satisfied that the data derived from the questionnaire provides a valuable source of the information gathered by the entire population of observers, that it offers insight, and sheds light on the complicated ongoing political and military processes in every corner of the territory of Rhodesia during the period of transition from Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. Moreover, to the extent that the survey data of observer observations gives an accurate picture of events and of observer judgments, it becomes possible to compare this data with the published observer reports, the statements by the parties, the media reports, official statements, and the like, especially with respect to the matters of intimidation, the activities of ZANLA elements and the auxiliaries, and on the manner in which the institutions and individuals put in place by the Lancaster House Agreement fulfilled their mandate.

For these reasons, and to provide the reader with as much evidence or information as possible, the results of the survey are treated as appropriate throughout the several chapters of the study.

Appendix B
List of Election Observers

GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*
Commonwealth Observer Group and Assistants

Australia

Mr. K.C.O. Shann, CBE, Former Australian Ambassador
Mr. L.A. Rowe, Diplomat
Mr. W.D. Bowtell, Diplomat

Bangladesh

Mr. Justice K.M. Nurual Islam, Chief Election Commissioner of Bangladesh
Lt-Col. Badiuzzaman, Military
Mr. Basharat Ali, Official

Barbados

Sir Carlisle Burton, Permanent Secretary to the Prime Minister of Barbados
Mr. S. Harris, Assistant Chief Electoral Officer
Mr. L. Sealy, Security Officer

Canada

Mr. G.R.L. Fairweather, OC,QC, First Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission

*Compiled from lists published by the Election Commissioner in Rhodesia and contained in Southern Rhodesia Independence Elections 1980, pp. 84-92.

Mr. M.B. Phillips, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission, Nairobi
Mr. J.E. Forrester, Election Official
(Miss D.C. Jessen), (Secretary)

Ghana

Mr. Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe, Ghana Appeal Court Judge and former Electoral Commissioner
Mr. Lindsay, Former Police Officer
Mr. Asilijoe, Official

India

Ambassador Rajeshwar Dayal, Chairman; Former Foreign Secretary and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the Congo, Senior Ambassador
Mr. Girish Mehra, Official
Mr. K.N. Daruwala, Official

Jamaica

Mr. Ivo S. DeSouza, OBE, Former Jamaican High Commissioner
Senator Hopeton Caven, Senator
Senator Princess Laws, Senator

Nigeria

Mr. S.G. Ikoku, Executive Member of the Peoples Redemption Party of Nigeria
Dr. O.O. Fafowara, Official
Col. B.K. Mammon, Military

Papua New Guinea

The Hon. Oscar Tammur, MP, Minister of Education, Science and Culture
Col. T. Nauna, Military
Mr. M. Kanai, Official

Sierra Leone

The Hon. Justice Sheku M.F. Kutubu, Appeal Court Judge

Mr. David Sheku, Prov. Secretary
Mr. Francis Karemo, Official

Sri Lanka

Mr. J.W. Subasinghe, Former Registrar Supreme Court Senior Crown Counsel and Chairman of Presidential Committee
Mr. R.P.E. Jayasinghe
Mr. W. Jayamaha

Commonwealth Group – Polling Assistants

Australia

Mr. L.A.G. Heaton
Mr. G.R. Landwehr
Mr. W.E. Lang
Miss Joan Norwood

Canada

Mr. Warren R. Bailie
Mr. Andrew Robinson
Mr. Alex MacFarlane
Miss Jean Pearce

Ghana

Mr. Agyei-Sakyi
Mr. Kofi Duku
Mr. Sam Okudzeto
Mr. Agyenin-Boateng

India

Mr. S.R. Arya
Mr. Baleshawar Rai
Mr. S.G. Sharma
Mr. S.R. Sharma

Nigeria

Mr. E.A. Aina

Jamaica

Mr. Trevor Dixon
Mr. D. Knight
Mr. L. Moipton
Miss Norma Segre
Mr. Robert Pickersgill

Papua New Guinea

Mr. Allen Jonathan
Mr. Reuben Karinlo
Mr. Moses Wardulu

Sierra Leone

Mr. H.V. Abu
Mr. Jack Harris
Mr. Sylvanus Koroma

Sri Lanka

Mr. Kulatunga
Mr. D.C. Perera
Mr. G.N.G. Perera
Mr. W.D.N. Perera

Observers Nominated by Governments

United Kingdom

Sir Glyn Jones, HMOCS – retired
Sir Francis Loyd, HMOCS – retired
Mr. J.T. Brockbank, Chief Executive, Local Government – retired
Mr. R.E. Wainwright, HMOCS – retired
Sir Stephen Olver, Diplomat – retired
Sir Denis Wright, Diplomat – retired

Sir John Moreton, Diplomat – retired
Sir Maurice Dorman, HMOCS – retired
Sir Alan Campbell, Diplomat – retired
Sir Edgar Unsworth, Justice of Appeal, Gibraltar
Professor Ronald Robinson, Oxford University
Mr. H. Crossley, Chief Executive, Local Government
Professor Kenneth Kirkwood, Oxford University
Mr. A. Campbell, HMOCS – retired
Sir Edgar Trevor Williams, Oxford University
Mr. P. Boyce, Chief Executive, Local Government
Sir Stanley Fingland, Diplomat – retired
Sir John Johnston, Diplomat – retired
Sir Martin Le Quesne, Diplomat – retired
Sir Laurence Pumphrey, Diplomat – retired

UK Parliamentarians

Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, Conservative MP
Mr. Ivor Stanbrook, Conservative MP
Mr. Peter Emery, Conservative MP
Mr. Ted Rowlands, Labour MP
Mr. John Concannon, Labour MP
Miss Joan Lestor, Labour MP
Mr. Russel Johnston, Liberal MP
Lord Fortescue, Conservative Peer
Lord Chelwood, Conservative Peer
Lord Underhill, Labour Peer

New Zealand

Mr. P. Wilkinson, MP
Dr. G. Wall, MP
Mr. D.K. McDowell, Diplomat
Mr. G.K. Ward, Official

Australia

Mr. Neil Brown, MP Liberal Party and Chairman
The Hon. R. Katter, MP Country Party
Senator E.A. Robertson, Senator, Labour Party
Dr. Neil Blewett, MP Labour Party
Mr. K. Pearson, Chief Australian Electoral Officer
Mr. A.T. Griffith, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet

Mr. D.W. Evens, Department of Foreign Affairs
Dr. G. Snider, Electoral Officer

Denmark

Mr. K. Heinessen, Social Democrat MP
Mr. N. Kofoed, Liberal MP
Mr. C. Oldenburg, Head of the Africa Department, MFA
Miss Kondrup-Palmqvist, Secretary

Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. Peter Corterier, MP
Dr. Richard Jaeger, MP
Mr. Peter Peterson, MP
Mr. Helmuth Schaefer, MP
Dr. Hiller, First Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Netherlands

Mr. T.J.A.M. Van Lier, Member of the Council of State
Dr. P.H. Kooijmans, Professor, International Law, Leyden University
Mr. H.J.D. Vonhoff, Mayor of Utrecht
Mr. L.P. Van Vliet, Head of Central and Southern Africa Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Belgium

Comte Y. Du Marceau, Senator
Mr. Jos Van Elewyck, MP
Dr. P.C. De Vlies, MP
Mr. Van Overberghe, Officer

France

Mr. Andre Chandernagor, Socialist Deputy, President of the Regional Council of Limousine
Mr. Jean Jacques Peyronnet, Senior Counsellor, MFA
Mr. Gerard Cros, Counsellor, French Embassy, Pretoria
Mr. Daniel Jouanneau, Consul-General
Mr. G. Longuet, MP

Ireland

Mr. and Mrs. Robert Molloy, Former Minister of Defence and also of Local Government
Mr. Patrick Cooney, Former Minister of Justice
Mr. R. Quinn, Labour Party Spokesman on Environment, MP
Mr. R.J. Townsend, Official

Italy

Mr. G. Orlando, Senator
Mr. A. Conte, MP
Dr. F. Bascone, Diplomat

South Africa

Mr. P.H.J.J. Van Vuuren, Diplomat
Mr. G.C. Stroebel, Diplomat
Mr. G.C. Nel, Diplomat

Uganda

Mr. Indule-Amoko, Diplomat
Mr. G. Kinuka, High Commissioner

UN Secretary-General Representatives

Mr. Perez De Cuellar
Mr. M. Pedamon
Mr. G. Schlittler-Silva
Mr. A.H. Kabia

OAU

Mr. F.X. Ngenga, Kenya
Mr. Laban S. Oyaka, Uganda
Mr. I.O. Mensah-Bonsu, Ghana

Norway

Mr. Vraalsen, Special Adviser on Security Council Affairs
Mr. K. Thommessen, Diplomat

INDEPENDENT AND NONGOVERNMENTAL OBSERVERS

Belgium

Mr. C. Du Monceau, Personnel Assistant

Canada

Canadian Human Rights Group

Me Dominique Boisvert, Lawyer, 2nd member of various working committees of the Human Rights League of Quebec
Dr. Bonnie Camble, Chairman of the Political Science Department of the University of Quebec in Montreal
Father Roger Poirier, omi, Episcopal vicar of the Diocese of Hull, President of the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace
Mr. Yvon Charbonneau, Former President of and later special adviser to the CEQ (Quebec Teachers Union)

Canadian Independent Observers

Rev. Murry MacInnes, Director for Africa, World Missions of the Anglican Church of Canada
Mr. Bryan Haddon, Specialist in Southern Africa, former Director of CCIC
Ms. Susan Hurlich, Regional Field Officer East, Central and Southern Africa of OXFAM – Canada
Dr. Henry Wiseman, Director Peacekeeping Programs, International Peace Academy, New York

Federal Republic of Germany

Dr. H. Ohlraun, Liaison Officer

Germany

Mr. P. Brosch, German Consulate
Mr. Erich Holtze, Official of Friedrich-Ebert Foundation

Ireland

Mr. Charles Hayes, Independent Observer

Japan

Mr. Tsujimoto, Diplomat

Netherlands

Mr. J.W. Wessels, Consulate-General

OAU

Mr. James Dongwe, Ghana
Mr. B.A. Atiase, Ghana

South African Institute of Race Relations

Mr. Seamus Cleary, Research Assistant of the Institute
Mr. Paul Weinberg, Author

Sweden

Mr. H.G. Frank, MP
Mr. C. Lidbom, MP
Mr. L. Leifland, Official
Jan K. Eliasson, Swedish Liaison Officer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. H. Nilson
Ms. K. Vadfors
Mr. B. Save-Soderbergh, Secretary of the International Centre of SLM
Mr. G. Farm, Personal secretary to the Chairman of the Trade Union Confederation

Mr. H. Goran Franck, Human Rights lawyer
Mr. C. Lidbon, Social Democratic MP, former Cabinet Minister
Mr. Leif Leifland, Permanent Under-Secretary (Foreign Minister)

United Kingdom Independent Observers

Mr. Nicholas Winterton, MP
Lord Forrester
The Earl of Onslow
Mr. Patrick Wall, MP
Lord Chitnis
Miss E. Sudworth
Mr. Peter Shore, MP
Lord Hatch
Mr. L. Cliffe, Lecturer at the University of Leeds
Mr. B. Munslow, University of Leeds
Miss D. Burgess, University of Leeds

USA

Mrs. Pauline Baker, Senior Staff member of the African Subcommittee of the Senate
Mr. R. McCall, Staff member of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate
Ms. Cynthia Kennedy, Observer for the National Association of the Advancement of Colored People
Mr. J.H.S. Davidow, Diplomat
Mr. R. Sullivan
Mr. L. Dupart
Mr. E. Lockwood
Mr. George Houser, American Committee on Africa
Mr. Tilden LeMelle, American Committee on Africa
Miss Cynthia Cannady, Transafrica and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
Dr. Raymond D. Gastil, Director, Freedom House
Mr. Leonard R. Sussman, Executive Director, Freedom House
Mr. Bayard Rustin, Trustee, Freedom House
Dr. Howard Penniman, Georgetown University and Freedom House
Mr. Dick McCormack, Staff member of Senator Helms offices
Mr. Beldon Bell, Heritage Foundation of the USA
Mr. Sean Randolph, American Security Council
Miss Margret Ling, Independent

Zambia

Col. A. Mwanza, Diplomat

Appendix C

Parties Contesting Election and Election Results

Table C.1. Political Parties Contesting the Common Roll Election

Abbreviation	Full Title	Party Leader	Election Council Representatives
1. NDU	National Democratic Union	Mr. Chihota	K.N.K. Muskwe X. Mutenderi
2. UANC	United African National Council	Bishop Muzorewa	Dr. S.C. Mundawarara Mr. S.V. Mtambanengwe
3. UNFP	United National Federal Party	Chief Ndiweni	Mr. G.M. Pincus Mr. Z.M. Bafanah
4. UPAM	United People's Association Matabeleland	Dr. Bertrand	Dr. Frank Bertrand Mr. E. Sutton-Pryce
5. ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union	Rev. Sithole	David Zamchiya Dr. Sithole
6. ZANU(PF)	Zimbabwe African National Union (PF)	Mr. Mugabe	Edson Zvobgo Mr. Chirunda
7. ZDP	Zimbabwe Democratic Party	Mr. Chikerema	Mr. E. Dumbutshena Mr. E. Zhuwarara
8. PF	Patriotic Front	Mr. Nkomo	Mr. J. Chinamano Mr. R. Austin
9. NFZ	National Front of Zimbabwe	Mr. Mandaza	Mr. C. Chitando Mr. C. Rambanapasi

Table C.2. Results of Common Roll Election, February 1980.

Party	Total Valid Votes Cast	Percent of Valid Votes	Seats
NDU	15,056	0.568	–
NFZ	18,794	0.709	–
PF	638,879	24.113	20
UANC	219,307	8.277	3
UNFP	5,796	0.219	–
UPAM	1,181	0.045	–
ZANU	53,343	2.013	–
ZANU (PF)	1,668,992	62.992	57
ZDP	28,181	1.064	–
Total Valid Votes	2,649,529	100 Percent	
Spoilt Papers	52,746	1.99	
Total Poll	2,702,275		
Total Seats	–		80

Appendix D

Deployment of the Monitoring Force

Outline Deployment of Monitoring Force and Equipment
(As of January 8, 1980)

MONITORING FORCE	VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT (1)
ADVISORY GROUP	
Milad	LR
Milad/Governor Personal Staff	–
Staff for Milad	LR
Royal Military Police Detachment for Government House	–
MONITORING ORGANISATION	
HQ Monitoring Organisation	3 LR
JOCS X 5	
5 X Lt. Cols 5 X Capts/Maj 5 X Sgts 10 X Clerks	5 LR

Sub Jocs (13 Teams)

a.	4 UK	Each	
b.	4 AUS	1 X Lt/Capt/Maj	13LR
c.	3 NZ	1 X Sgt	
d.	2 KENYA	1 X Cpl	

Company Bases (45 Teams)

a.	16 UK	Each	
b.	14 AUS		
c.	8 NZ	1 X Lt/Snco	–
d.	7 KENYA	1 X Cpl	

Airfields (2 Teams)

3 X Offrs	UK(RAF)	2 LR
2 X Snco		

3 X ZIPRA/5 X ZANLA Commissioners (8 Teams)

a.	7 UK	Each	8 LRM
b.	1 AUS	1 X Lt Col 1 X Capt Maj 1 X Snco 2 X Cpls	

ZIPRA/ZANLA Assembly Places (16 Teams)

a.	5 UK	Each	30 LRM
b.	5 AUS	1 X Capt/Maj	
c.	2 NZ	1 X Wo/Ssgt	
d.	2 FIJI	3 X Sgts	
e.	1 KENYA	9 X Cpls	

PF Rendezvous Points (16 ZANLA/7 ZIPRA)
(23 Teams)

1 X Lt/Capt/Maj) All UK
8 X Ncos)

46 LRM

Border-Crossing Group (7 Teams)

a. 5 UK) Each
1 X Maj
1 X Capt/Wo
3 X Sncos 1 X Dvr

7 LR

b. 1 NZ) Each
)
c. 1 KENYA) 1 X LT Capt/Maj
5 X Snco
5 X Cpl

Liaison Teams (3 Teams)

1 X Lt Col, All UK

2 X Reserve Teams

1 X Lt/Capt/Maj)
5 X Sncos) All UK
5 X Cpls)

2 LR

SUPPORT FOR ADVISORY
AND MONITORING ORG

AAC SQN

2 FFR
2 X LR
6 GAZELLE
6 SCOUT

Communications

a. UK

R Signals
CGRM

18 FFR
1 X 4 TON

b. Commonwealth

(1) 5 AUS)
(2) 2 NZ) 3 MEN EACH FOR
(3) 1 KENYA) PF ASSY PLACES

Administrative and Logistic Support		2 LRA 8 LR 3 EAGER BEAVE 4 TRLRS AIRPT
RAF		
a.	PUMA DET	6 PUMA 3 LR 2 X 4 TON
b.	C 130 DET	7 HERCULES
Commonwealth HQ Staffs		

Note.

(1) Vehicles and Equipment:

a. LR – landrover 1/2 ton with trailer.
b. FFR – landrover 3/4 ton FFR with trailer.
c. LRM – landrover 3/4 ton mineproofed with trailer.
d. LRA – landrover 3/4 ton ambulance.

BRITISH MILITARY UNITS REPRESENTED IN THE LIAISON, ADVISORY, AND MONITORING ORGANIZATION

Army

8 Field Force HQ and Signal Squadron
London District Provost Company
30 Signal Regiment
650 Squadron, Army Air Corps
70 Aircraft Workship, Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME)
10 Ordinance Support Batallion
244 Signal Squadron
6 Field Force Signal Squadron
8 Field Workshop REME
47 Air Detachment Squadron, Royal Corps of Transport
158 Provost Company
Queen's Royal Irish Hussars
2 Coldstream Guards
22 Engineer Regiment
1 Irish Guards
32 Guided Weapons Regiment, Royal Artillery (RA)
3 Light Infantry
4 Field Regiment, RA
3 Royal Green Jackets
2 Royal Green Jackets
3 Royal Anglian
13/18 Hussars
1 Royal Regiment of Wales
1 King's Own Scottish Borderers
1 Royal Horse Artillery
38 Engineer Regiment
1 King's Regiment
1 Black Watch
47 Field Regiment, RA
39 Engineer Regiment
1 Cheshire Regiment
36 Engineer Regiment
1 Prince of Wales's Own Regiment of Yorkshire

Royal Marines

HQ Training and Reserve Forces
Royal Marines Pool
Commando Training Center
42 Commando
Commando Logistics Regiment

3 Commando Brigade HQ and Signals Squadron
29 Commando Regiment, RA

Royal Air Force

33 Squadron, 230 Squadron	Puma
47 Squadron, 70 Squadron	Hercules

Note: In addition, a small number of personnel from all three services provided medical support.

TABLE D.1. Breakdown of Liaison Advisory and Monitoring Organization

	UK			Commonwealth				
	RN	ARMY	RAF	AUS	NZ	FIJI	KENYA	Total
HQ & Advisory Group		40		20	4	2	2	68
Monitoring Organization	16(RM)	500	10	113	70	22	48	779
Support Elements	14	460	210	17				701
Total*	30 (6)	1000 (120)	220 (50)	150 (26)	74 (14)	24 (4)	50 (11)	1548 (281)
			1250			298		

*The numbers of officers included in the totals are shown in the brackets.

Fig. D.1 Command Structure of Liaison, Advisory, and Monitoring Organization.


MILITARY ADVISER
CHIEF OF STAFF
ROYAL MILITARY POLICE DETACHMENT
COMMONWEALTH CONTINGENTS' COMMANDERS
COMMAND MONITORING ORGANIZATION
AIR COMPONENT COMMAND ELEMENT GROUND AND AIR CREWS OF HERCULES, PUMAS, SCOUT, AND GAZELLE
LOGISTIC PERSONNEL
8 PATRIOTIC FRONT COMMISSIONERS
14 ASSEMBLY POINT MONITOR TEAMS
23 RENDEZVOUS POINT MONITOR TEAMS
5 JOINT OPERATIONAL COMMAND COMMISSIONERS
13 SUB-JOC MONITOR TEAMS
45 COMPANY BASE MONITOR TEAMS
2 AIRFIELD MONITOR TEAMS
6 BORDER CROSSING POINT TEAMS
2 RESERVE MONITOR TEAMS

Appendix E
Election Council

Agenda Items

Political party broadcasts.
Election procedures.
Showing of the film "How to Vote."
Allocation of seats to the Electoral Districts.
Intimidation (item repeated at most of the meetings).
Identification of refugees at the poll.
Conditions under which a party may be disqualified from contesting the election for breaches of the ceasefire.
Rights and duties of polling agents.
Procedure at mobile polling stations.
Arrangements for polling in the Assembly Camps.
Polling arrangements for refugees.
Identification of voters.
Security arrangements for candidates.
Identification of party agents.
Statement on intimidation by party leaders.
Deployment of election supervisors.
Importation of goods by political parties.
Political activity in Protected Villages.
Briefing of senior party agents.
New legislation to counter intimidation.
Processing of refugees: military personnel.
Numbers of polling stations.
Arrangements for counting the votes.
Party leaders to stress the secrecy of the voting procedure.
Arrangements for persons returning from outside Rhodesia to vote.
Further new Ordinance to counter intimidation.

Formation of local Election Councils.
Use of British police as polling station supervisors.
Bussing of voters.
Alteration in rights of polling agents in rural areas: new Ordinance.
Security arrangements for the elections.
Parties to notify areas where they cannot campaign.
Prohibition on assembly, music, etc., within vicinity of polling stations.
Observers (list circulated).
Proof of citizenship by persons coming to vote from outside Rhodesia.
Main differences between the Common Roll Elections 1980 and that held in April 1979.
Rights and duties of candidates.
Allocation of polling stations in Buhera District.
Role of British policemen (job description circulated).
No access to polling stations by Press.
Election information circulated by Rhodesian National Election Directorate.

Summary of Main Decisions Made by the Election Council

Subject	Proposed/ announced by	Decision
Arrangements for party political broadcasts	Commissioner	Accepted
Allocation of Common Roll Seats to Electoral Districts	Commissioner	Accepted
Provision for alteration of party lists of candidates	Political parties	Agreed – amending Ordinance issued
Disclosures of election expenses	Commissioner	Rejected
No political meetings at Assembly Points	Commissioner	Accepted
Special importation procedures – reduction of deposit against duty	Political parties	Agreed – reduced from $100,000 to $50,000
Security of candidates	Political parties	Commissioner of Police agreed to issue side arms
Statement reaffirming intention to campaign peacefully	Commissioner	Signed by all leaders
Briefing of party agents	Political parties	Agreed and implemented
Marking of documents produced by young voters	Political parties	Agreed and implemented
Bussing of voters	Political parties	Agreed – amendment issued to Emergency Regulations
Polling agents in rural polling stations	Commissioner	Rejected – parties felt their presence would be intimidatory
Use of British police as Assistant Election Supervisors in rural areas	Commissioner	Agreed

Rights and liabilities of candidates and polling agents	Commissioner	Agreed
Prohibition on assembly, music, etc., in vicinity of polling stations	Political parties	Agreed – amending Ordinance issued
Need for adequate security arrangements at the poll	Commissioner	Agreed

Appendix F

1980 Common Roll Election

EQUIPMENT

I. Ballot Papers

1) Printed by govt. printer, Salisbury, under British (H.M. Stationary Office) supervision.
2) All ballot-papers consecutively numbered in top right-hand corner.
3) Accurate accounting of ballot-papers at all stages from printers to the count.
4) Allocation to a polling-station (example).
   Ballot papers issued: 0001-3000
   " " used: 0001-2765

   Balance (unused) 2766-3000
   (i.e., 235 to be accounted for)



Name of Parties in Alphabetical Order	Abbreviation	Symbol	For Voter's X 1 2 3 4 5 6
African Brotherhood Corporation	A.B.C.		
Democratic Electors Force	D.E.F.		
Greater Hinterland Institution	G.H.I.		
Jubilee Kraals of Limpopo	J.K.L.		
Mashonabele North Organization	M.N.O.		

(Examples shown - All Fictional)

5) Ballotpapers will be validated before issue to voters with a punch. Punch will deface last four numerals.
6) If punch fails – rubber stamp will be used with presiding officer's initials – party agents will be informed.

II. Ballot Boxes

1) Locally-made (ply-wood, glue, metal edges and screws).
2) Boxes: All marked with electoral district marks and numbers.
3) Before use, empty ballot boxes will be displayed for all concerned.
4) Ballot boxes will be sealed when full or at end of day, whichever is soonest. Party agents can also affix their seals alongside those of presiding officer.



III. Marking of Voters

1) Colourless fluorescent dye which lasts several weeks.

2) Ultra-violet light box colourless fluid shows white under u/v lamp.



FACILITIES, STAFF, AND SECURITY

IV. Polling Stations

1) Types

(i) Static: in convenient buildings (open 0700-1600 hrs-rural)

(ii) Mobile: by road, air, and water using buildings, tents, or open air (open as long as necessary at each scheduled stop)

(iii) Approx. Numbers:
Static = 350) Approx.
Mobile = 325) Total
Total = 675) for 8 electoral districts.



(iv) Distribution
Throughout 55 adm. districts in 8 electoral districts (provinces) density greater in urban areas. (Average: approx. 12 stations per adm. dist.)

2) Staff

(i) Polling Station Staff (Central & Local Govt. Employees)

Average: 1:Presiding Officer & 3:Polling Clerks per polling station

(ii) Policing of Polling Stations

(Urban & Rural with radios)

Average 5:Policemen per polling station (environs)

To maintain the Queen's peace and uphold provisions of the Electoral Act at the polling stations.

3) Security of Polling Stations



(i) Urban Areas: Normal Policing

(ii) Rural Areas:

(a) Normal Peaceful situation
As for Para 2 (ii) above.

(b) Security Threat Situation
Such defence measures as may be necessary to meet that threat. (N.B. this cannot be assessed at this time)

(iii) Approx. 5,000 policemen will be required for ordinary policing of polling stations referred to in Paras 2 (ii) and 3 (ii) above.

(iv) Mobile polling stations: Normal police complement will also guard aircraft or boat.

VOTING, COUNTING, AND SECURITY

V. (A) Voting Procedure at Polling Stations (Voters may cast their votes at any Polling Station)

1) Physical search for weapons in polling station compound: men search males, women search females.
2) Age Determination of young voters: by polling station staff i.e., teacher, medical, or by birth certificate.
3) Personal identification of voters, where possible. (e.g., identity certificate, etc.)
4) Hand check under u/v light - if "clean", then application of colourless flourescent liquid.
5) Voter then receives ballot paper (validated with punch in top right-hand corner).
6) Voter enters booth and:
   (i) makes his/her X on ballot paper
   (ii) folds ballot paper
   (iii) places ballot paper in ballot box
7) Voter leaves booth and departs.

N.B. presiding officer will assist blind or incapacitated voters

(B) The Count (in presence of U.K. Supervisors, election officials and party agents at all stages)

1) All ballot-boxes (under proper escort) to admin. district headquarters.
2) All ballot-boxes receive extra seal by supervisors prior to count at provincial H.Q.
3) All electoral districts (i.e. provinces) count votes in presence of supervisors. Presiding officers, and party agents, totals transmitted to Registrar-General.
4) Registrar General (in Salisbury) using legal formula, calculates party totals and announces results for whole country, by electoral districts (i.e., Provinces).

NOTE: Dates: 27, 28 & 29 Feb. '80 - Polling Days (Common Roll)
1st March '80- Recovery of ballot-boxes to dist. and prov. H.Q.
2nd March '80 - Counting starts
3rd March '80(approx)- Counting ends and results announced.

(C) Security of Ballot Boxes and Contents

1) All movements of unused and used (i.e. sealed) ballot boxes will be under official escort, i.e., presiding officers, party agents, and police.
2) All ballot-boxes will be stored overnight in places of security, under lock and key, and under police guard (keys remain with presiding officers) and party inspectors.
3) All guards at (1) and (2) above will be in radio contact with nearest H.Q.
4) Party agents can accompany ballot-boxes during movements and storage.
5) After official count, all ballot papers will be flown to Britain for storage over statutory (6 months) period.

Appendix G

Complaints by Parties Placed Before the Election Council

Commentary from the Report of the Election Commissioner, Sir John Boynton, MC:

NDU	=	0
NFZ	=	1
PF	=	4
UANC	=	5
UNFP	=	2
UPAM	=	0
ZANU	=	3
ZANU (PF)	=	4
ZDP	=	0
Total		19

Complaints from the contesting parties about arrangements for the electoral processes and the election itself generally took the form of enquiries or suggestions at meetings of the Election Council and, without exception, these matters were either answered immediately or at the next meeting of the Election Council. Indeed, the answers to some queries were often common knowledge among other party representatives and, in many instances potential complaints were silenced when the Election Commissioner or his staff explained in detail the proposed arrangements, for example, for the sealing of the ballot boxes, their overnight security and steps taken to ensure the secrecy of the ballot. In general, therefore, complaints from the parties about the arrangements for the election were minimal and these were usually withdrawn when the facts were fully explained to them.

Appendix H

Reports of Subcommittees of the Commonwealth Observer Group

As requested by Observers when they met on 1 February 1980 we have compiled a list of suggested membership for the four sub-committees now to be established, whose members are enjoined to give special attention to the subject matter in question over and above their other duties. The observers are as agreed at this morning's meeting and it might be that they may wish to make some variation in membership between themselves. The principle which has guided us in the preparation of this suggested list is that wherever possible, specialists should be attached to their area of expertise, and that the Assistants from each country should be divided between 2 sub-committees.

2. Sub-committees 2 and 3 may be assisted by Deputy Chief Superintendent J.H. Carroll and Mr. D. Ingram respectively, the Group's Security and Media Advisers.

3. It will be for each sub-committee to choose its Secretary (or perhaps, 2 joint Secretaries). Members should be reminded that it was the hope expressed at this morning's meeting that short preliminary papers from each sub-committee might be available for discussion at tomorrow's meeting (9 a.m. at the COG Office).

Sub-committee 1

Administration of electoral laws and processes (including preparation of check-lists for –

a) Provincial visits
b) Polling days
c) White Roll election on 14 February

OBSERVERS: Mr. Justice Crabbe, Mr. J.W. Subasinghe

ASSISTANTS:
Mr. K.N. Daruwala (India)
Dr. O.D. Fafowora (Nigeria)
Mr. J.E. Forrester (Canada)
Mr. S.A. Harris (Barbados)
Senator H. Caven (Jamaica)
Mr. W. Jayamaha (Sri Lanka)
Mr. D. Sheku (Sierra Leone)

Sub-committee 2

General administration of the Government in so far as it bears upon the election with particular emphasis on how freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association were affected.

OBSERVERS: Mr. Justice Kutubu, Mr. S.G. Ikoku, Mr. R.G.L. Fairweather

ASSISTANTS:
Mr. F. Karemo (Sierra Leone)
Col. A.B. Maman (Nigeria)
Mr. T.O. Lindsay (Ghana)
Mr. M.B. Phillips (Canada)
Lt. Col. S. Badruzzaman (Bangladesh)
Mr. L.W. Sealy (Barbados)
Col. T.T. Nauna (Papua New Guinea)
(+Mr. J. Carroll)

Sub-committee 3

Question of whether there was free and uncensored access to the public media and freedom to advertise and publish political views.

OBSERVERS: Sir Carlisle Burton, Mr. Justice A.K.M. Nurul Islam, The Hon. O. Tammur, MP

ASSISTANTS:
Mr. E.K. Asilijoe (Ghana)
Senator P. Laws (Jamaica)
Mr. M. Kanai (Papua New Guinea)
Mr. G. Mehra (India)
Mr. W.D. Bowtell (Australia)
(+Mr. D. Ingram)

Sub-committee 4

Question of the conduct of the political parties in contributing to free and fair elections, including inter alia their adherence to the election laws and the Lancaster House agreement.

OBSERVERS: Mr. K.C.O. Shann, Mr. I.S. DeSouza

ASSISTANTS: Mr. L.A. Rowe (Australia)
Mr. A.M. Basharat Ali (Bangladesh)
Mr. J.W. Jayasinghe (Sri Lanka)
Mr. A. Ashimolowo (Nigeria)
Mr. F. Karemo (Sierra Leone)

1 February 1980 Jeremy Pope

SUB-COMMITTEE 1.

Administration of Electoral Laws and Processes

Part I
Proposed Check Points
Provincial Visits

1. Siting and number of Polling Stations (static and mobile) in relation to the voting population – maximum distance voters have to travel to a polling station.

2. What is the policy for recruitment of polling staff. What departments are personnel being recruited from?

3. What instructions will be given to residing officers re identification to be provided by refugees at the polling stations?

4. What are the arrangements for the Custody of ballot papers, ink, peforating machine and other security items before the polling day and overnight on the first and second days of the poll.

5. i) What arrangements have been made for security at polling stations?
ii) What directions have been given to the Police about their duties at polling stations?

6. Will party agents be permitted to travel with ballot boxes when they are transported after and during polling periods (e.g., will this be possible when aircraft and mine-proof vehicles are used)?

7. What arrangements have been made for the security of the ballot box, its contents and sealed packets containing unused ballot papers at all times, specially overnight between polling days and after the voting is over until it is delivered at counting places.

8. What arrangements have been made to accommodate party agents inside the polling stations?

9. What action the Provincial Commissioner/District Commissioner/ Police are taking on complaints regarding intimidation of voters? Have there been many complaints and what are the nature?

10. Are there any instances where political parties have been refused permission to hold political meetings. If so, what are the reasons?

11. Have there been any instances or complaints that former Government Ministers are using the administrative machinery,

specially provincial administrative machinery to their political advantage?

12. Have there been complaints of Government officials misusing their positions in favour or the disadvantage of any political party?

13. Have there been any instances of undue influence, e.g.,
i) employers inducing employees to vote for a particular party;
ii) religious organisations inducing members to vote for a particular party or to refrain from voting for a particular party?

14. Are there any instances where people are being detained under emergency powers? If so, how many – what are the nature of alleged offences.

SUB-COMMITTEE 2 - GENERAL ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT

Agreed Plan of Action

The general objective of members of this sub-group will be to form a preliminary judgment on whether the general administration of government has or has not contributed to the conduct of free and fair elections. In doing so it will rely on the observations of Observers/Assistants on the Sub-group and on input from all members of the Commonwealth Observer Group.

Among the important issues to be dealt with will be:

a) whether there has been freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement for both the political parties and people at large;
b) whether there has been any misuse of the laws and machinery of Government to influence, intimidate or obstruct the political parties and voters;
c) whether the British administration in Rhodesia has taken all possible action to modify the laws, or the manner of their enforcement, to ensure a free and fair election.

Among the more specific questions which flow from the above are: how the continued existence of martial law is affecting the election campaign and how the activities of the Rhodesian security forces (armed forces, including auxiliaries, and police) are affecting the campaign. Relating to this last question it would appear necessary for the Sub-group to seek information both from private and official sources concerning the size and composition of all elements of the Rhodesian security forces and whether their activities conform with the Lancaster House agreements. As far as possible it should also keep track of their daily activities by comparing information from official sources with our own collective observations.

It might be noted, to avoid confusion, that the Sub-group considers that by virtue of the subjects allocated to other Sub-groups it will not cover such matters as:

- Intimidation carried out by political parties (the mandate of Sub-group 4).
- The administration of any aspect of the electoral laws (including regulations and ordinances), all of which falls to Sub-group 1.
- How freedom of expression has been affected by the attitude of the media (the mandate of Sub-group 3).

Within Sub-group 2 the division of work should be such that Assistants with a military background undertake the compilation of information from a variety of sources on the questions regarding the Rhodesian forces set out above; details of the police and their activities would be a separate assignment. Another assignment within the Sub-group could relate to keeping informed on the evolving situation regarding political detainees both within Rhodesia and outside, as well as the re-admission of refugees. Another assignment could be the preparation of a short description (and analysis) of the laws in force relating to expression, assembly, association and movement – for possible inclusion in the final report.

(Note: The Sub-group has a number of military and police experts. Each of these Assistants will take responsibility for compiling background information and maintaining the Group's records relating to the day-to-day activities of the separate sections of the Rhodesian security forces. Information on the specific responsibilities carried by each Assistant will be circulated separately. In order to keep accurate records all Observers and Assistants are asked to identify, where possible, the specific element of the security forces engaged in any incident repored.)

SUB-COMMITTEE 3

General Objectives

For the attainment of free and fair elections:

1) to consider whether there was free and uncensored access to the public media and freedom to advertise and publish political views.
2) to assess the effect of material published by Government agencies including electoral authorities, the Ministry of Information, Combined Operations and Monitoring Forces with particular reference to the quality, content and distribution of such material.

Activities

1) to obtain and evaluate statistics of public media coverage of the political parties contesting the elections.

2) interview the Director General of ZRBC and other such media managers/editors concerning their relationships with party officials and their measures for maintaining the principles of equal treatment.

3) contact the Information officials of the political parties in order to give them opportunities to state their complaints against the public media, government departments and parastatal bodies.

4) obtain in the course of interviews held by COG the general views of party leaders on the fairness of the media.

5) study periodicals, newspapers and newspaper clippings with a view to discovering whether they practice fair methods of reporting and of presenting extracts from overseas press and whether they avoid provocation and inordinate emphasis on trivial incidents.

6) monitor the output of Government agencies (such as the Electoral authorities and the Ministry of Information) on such topics as the right to vote and the secrecy of the ballot and also pay attention to the method and scope of their circulation.

7) monitor and evaluate the communiques issued by Combined Operations Headquarters.

8) obtain and evaluate circulation figures of newspapers as well as the number and distribution of television sets and radios.

9) consider the effects of censorships and other emergency regulations on the public media.

10) exhort members of the sub-groups to bear in mind these objectives in the course of their field activity.

2 February 1980

SUB-COMMITTEE 4

Terms of Reference

The Sub-Committee's task is to investigate the question of the conduct of the political parties in contributing to free and fair elections, including inter alia the adherence to the election laws and the Lancaster House Agreement.

Issues to be covered

1) The extent to which all parties are abiding by the Lancaster House Agreement as outlined and agreed in paragraph 4 of the Report (para.4 is reproduced below).*

2)a Cease-fire adherence with particular reference to the activities of all forces. There are a large number of allegations and some substantial examples of cease-fire violations by ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. The Group will have to try to ascertain the extent of the violations by obtaining documented evidence from those making these allegations. This can be done through contact with political parties in Salisbury and by groups in the field as well as by continuing contacts with the Cease-fire Commission.

2)b Some parties have argued that the activities of the auxiliaries are a factor in the continuing cease-fire violations and some attention will have to be given to the question of the auxiliaries' activities and particularly to the extent to which they provoke responses by the ZANLA and ZIPRA forces. At all times it will be necessary to obtain as far as possible verifiable evidence of violations by all sides.

3) Intimidation. Once again there are widespread claims of intimidation being made alleging violations by one party against another. The Group will have to try to build up a verified picture of intimidation at all levels throughout the country. This would include both physical intimidation, the prevention of electioneering by one side against the other and general disruption of campaigns.

4) Adherence to the electoral laws. The Group will have to be alert to any breaches of the electoral laws.

5) It will be necessary to continue to monitor the Election Council to ascertain the extent to which parties are using it for the resolution of problems as they arise.

6) Information should also be obtained on the effect of the use by former Ministers of their ministerial rank and perquisites.

7) The group will have to monitor party political statements to assure itself that parties are not able to run widespread and defamatory campaigns. Caution will have to be exercised in using press reports and these will have to be verified with parties where apparent instances of defamation are alleged.

(*) Lancaster House Agreement, paragraph 4

4. In concluding this agreement and signing this report the parties undertake:

a) to accept the authority of the Governor;
b) to abide by the Independence Constitution;
c) to comply with the pre-independence arrangements;
d) to abide by the cease-fire agreement;
e) to campaign peacefully and without intimidation;
f) to renounce the use of force for political ends;
g) to accept the outcome of the elections and instruct any forces under their authority to do the same.

Appendix I

Modus Operandi of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa Zimbabwe Elections

COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS: OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS*

Membership of the Group

1) Drawn from eleven countries.

2) Members of the Group will serve in their individual capacity, not as representatives of their Governments. The Group will have a Chairman, as well as its own Secretary.

Mode of Appointment

3) The Group will be appointed by the Commonwealth Secretary-General after the necessary consultations with Commonwealth Governments.

Terms of Reference

4) In accordance with earlier precedents, the Group will be given terms of reference. The following is suggested:

> The Observer Group will observe and report to Commonwealth Heads of Government on all relevant aspects of the organisation and conduct of the elections in Southern Rhodesia held pursuant to the agreement at the Lancaster House Conference. Their function will be to ascertain in their impartial judgement, whether, in the context of the Lusaka accord and the Lancaster House Conference, the elections were free and fair. In furtherance of this objective, it will be competent for the Group to bring to the attention of the administering authorities from time to time such matters as they consider pertinent.

5) In discharging these terms of reference the observers will have no executive role. Their duty will be to form a judgement within their terms of reference.

*Southern Rhodesian Elections 1980, pp. 185-190.

Reporting

6) The group will report to the Commonwealth Heads of Government through the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

Functions

7) (a) Prior to Polling Day

(i) The Group will observe every aspect of the electoral campaign. They will have a duty to examine the process within the terms of the agreement reached at Lancaster House and to assess how the electoral laws and regulations are being implemented.

(ii) They will need to consider such important issues as freedom of expression, assembly, association and movement (consistent with the terms of cease-fire agreed by the parties) with a view to ascertaining whether parties and individuals contesting the elections are unfettered in their ability to do so. This may involve special consideration being given to the position of political prisoners and refugees.

(iii) It will be their duty to take note of the general administration of government in so far as it bears on the elections and to keep under scrutiny particular areas of governmental activity such as the functioning of the police and the Department of Home Affairs, the governmental information services including broadcasting and television and government publications generally. Similarly, the Group will need to keep a watchful eye on the conduct of all those who may be in a position to exercise undue influence on voters.

(b) Functions During and After Polling

The Group will observe the conduct of the poll in all its aspects with right of access to all polling stations and supervising officers. In the absence of registration, critical questions of eligibility (determination of age, citizenship or residence as the case may be) will necessarily arise at polling stations throughout the country. The Observer Group must be able to satisfy themselves that these matters are fairly dealt with. The Group will also need to satisfy themselves about other relevant matters, such as the handling of ballot boxes and the counting of the votes after polling.

Procedures

8) (a) In order to carry out their functions, the Observer Group will have complete freedom of movement and access to all parts of the country and the right of inquiry into every aspect of the electoral process.

(b) The Group and supporting staff will need to have complete immunity from civil and criminal process and inviolability for their premises and archives.
(c) The Group should be free to receive representations from individuals, political parties and organisations about the electoral process and to bring any relevant matter to the attention of the appropriate authorities. This will necessitate adequate publicity so that the public is aware of the presence of the Observer Group and their functions.
(d) The Group will need to maintain close liaison with the Governor, the Election Commissioner, the Election Council, the Cease-fire Commission and the Cease-fire Monitoring Force as well as with all the political parties.
(e) It is expected that the Governor and his administration will wish to co-operate to the full with the Group.

Phasing

9) It will be the aim that the Observer Group should be in position as soon as practicable after cease-fire day, along with their immediate staff.

10) A larger number of staff would be required to observe the actual poll. It is envisaged that they will need to be in Salisbury at least 10 days before polling in order to permit time for briefing, familiarization and travel to their allocated destinations within the country.

11) If the Group feels that some of the supporting staff should arrive earlier, their judgement in the matter will be accepted. The organisational structure will be flexible to permit deployment or redeployment to meet the needs of the situation as it evolves.

12) Having regard to the wide-ranging nature of the work of the Group prior to polling day as indicated in para 7(a), each observer will be invited to bring with him two assistants.

Operational Structure

13) While it will be for the Group to decide how it will organise its work, provision will be made for a Headquarters Unit in Salisbury under the direct authority of the Chairman with, if necessary, sub-units in other electoral districts.

Headquarters Unit

14) The Headquarters Unit will include specialist and administrative staff and will be co-ordinated by one of their members provided by the Commonwealth Secretariat who will serve as Secretary to the Group. Specialist staff will include a legal, an electoral, a media and a security adviser. Administrative staff will handle transportation, accommodation, travel and communication needs of the Group in liaison with the local authorities. The Group will require the services of

secretarial and other staff including interpreters, who will, where appropriate, be locally engaged. It will be the intention to organise the Headquarters Unit as well as field units of the Observer Group as far as practicable on a pan-Commonwealth basis.

Supporting Staff

15) To discharge its functions the Group will require adequate supporting staff and, in particular, a sufficient number of suitably qualified persons to observe effectively the conduct of the poll throughout the country. It is difficult to estimate the number of supporting staff with any precision. Even after allowing for the fact that polling will be spread over 3 consecutive days and that it should be possible, especially in the urban areas, for one person to cover several polling stations, the needs of a country the size of Southern Rhodesia will impose their own demands. Its total area is 150,000 square miles; which would give, if there are eight electoral districts, an average size of 18,750 square miles, i.e. two-fifths the area of England for each district.

16) It is expected that the staff in each of the electoral districts will need to be augmented by an average of 8, if polling is to be observed effectively.

Summary of Time-Table

17) In summary, this memorandum envisages the observers and their staff arriving in two groups, as follows:

(a) Soon after cease-fire day – 11 observers each with 2 staff = 33
Additional Headquarters staff (4 advisers as enumerated in para 14 + an administrative unit of about 8) = 12

45

(b) 10 days before polling remaining supporting staff (8 x 8), unless some are required earlier by the Observer Group = 64

109

Secretariat Suport

18) Apart from the Secretary to the Group and a small number of Secretariat officials to assist in the planning, co-ordination, and ground arrangements for the whole exercise, and to render such other substantive assistance as the Chairman and observers may from time to time require, it is envisaged that supporting staff, like the Observer Group itself, will be drawn from member countries.

Logistical Support

19) Effective logistical support will be essential if the Group and its support staff are to carry out their functions effectively. This includes:

Suitable ground and air transport
Radios for two-way communication
Accommodation facilities
Office equipment

International Affairs Division
Commonwealth Secretariat
Marlborough House
Pall Mall
London SW1

13 December 1979

Appendix J

Intimidation Recorded on Intelligence Map of Governor



LEGEND TO MAP PROVIDED BY GOVERNOR

LIST A: (AREAS SHADED WITH RED DIAGONAL LINES)

AREAS: TRIBAL TRUSTLANDS

No. 1 Kachuta, Bakasa, Sipolilo.

No. 2 Chiswiti, Kandeya, Masoso, Chimanda, Pfundwe, Mkota, Ngarwe, Maramba, Mudzi, Chikwize, Uzumba, Mtoko, St. Swithin's, Sawunyama, Tanda, Zimbiti, Inyanga.

No. 3 Sabi

No. 4 Matsai, Manjirenji, Bangala, Nyajena, Matibi No. 1, Maranda.

No. 5 Musikavanhu, Ndowoyo, Sangwe, Matibi No. 2, Gonarezhou, Malapiti, Sengwe, Manjinji Pan.

LIST B: (AREAS SHADED WITH BLUE DIAGONAL LINES)

AREAS: TRIBAL TRUSTLANDS

No. 1 Chiweshe

No. 2 Madziwa

No. 3 Mangwende

No. 4 Wedza, Sabi North, Narira

No. 5 Maranke

No. 6 Muwushu

No. 7 Gutu, Bikita, Ndanga, Chikwanda, Zimutu, Mtilikwe, Victoria

No. 8 Serma

No. 9 Chilimanzi

No. 10 Selukwe, Runde, Mashara, Mazvihwa, Ungova, Chibi, Belingwe.

Appendix K

Attachment to Cease-Fire Agreement

RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS*

1) The British Government puts forward the following amplified proposals for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive monitored cease-fire agreement.

Basis of the Cease-fire

2) The purpose of the cease-fire is to bring an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Zimbabwe to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this Conference. Given a commitment by all the parties to abide by the results of the elections, it will also provide a basis on which post-war military problems can be resolved by agreement and a lasting peace can be established.

Responsibility for the Cease-fire

3) The Commanders of the forces involved will be directly responsible to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces under their command.

4) The Governor will be assisted by a British Military Adviser of the rank of Major-General. The Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front will nominate equal numbers of military representatives to a Cease-fire Commission which will be established in Salisbury from the beginning of the cease-fire. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include:

(a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;

*Report of the Constitutional Conference, pp. 52-55.

(b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
(c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate with any commander concerning the exercise of their functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.

Monitoring the Cease-fire

5) The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force which will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The organisations will operate under the authority of the Governor and the command of his Military Adviser. The Commanders of the Rhodesian security forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be required to undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

6) Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned:
(a) to maintain contact with the Rhodesian security forces and Patriotic Front forces command structures throughout Rhodesia;
(b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
(c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.

7) For this purpose liaison and monitoring teams will be established as follows:
(a) five liaison teams, each led by a senior officer (i.e., of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel) will be assigned to maintain contact with each of the security forces Joint Operations Commands (JOCs);
(b) a number of teams of equivalent rank will be assigned to maintain contact with the Patriotic Front forces command structure;
(c) fifteen teams, each led by a junior officer (i.e., Captain or Lieutenant) will be located with the security forces at sub-JOC level;
(d) a number of teams led by a Lieutenant or Senior NCO will be located at security forces company base level;
(e) up to fifteen teams, each led by an officer, will be located at places designated for assembly of Patriotic Front forces;
(f) up to twelve teams, each led by an officer, will be located at border crossing points; and
(g) two teams, each commanded by an officer of the rank of Flight Lieutenant or Squadron Leader, will be located at military airfields.

8) The force will be organised under British auspices; and the majority of its personnel will be British. The Australian, New Zealand, Kenyan and Fijian governments have agreed to participate in the monitoring force. Members of the force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and helicopters carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communications network.

Dispositions of the Forces

9) Disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. The activities of the security forces and their maintenance of the cease-fire will be monitored from their existing bases. In the case of the Patriotic Front forces at present inside Rhodesia, it will be essential that they should assemble at pre-determined places so that their maintenance of the cease-fire can be similarly monitored and arrangements can be made for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements.

10) Up to fifteen such places will be designated for this purpose. In addition, a larger number of intermediate collection points will be designated to which Patriotic Front personnel will report with their arms and equipment during the initial phase of the cease-fire and from which they will make their way by agreed safe-routes to their assembly places. A Patriotic Front representative and a monitoring team will be present at each intermediate collection point during this phase. The police and defence forces will not be involved in the assembly process and will not be present at the collection points. Patriotic Front personnel will be guaranteed safe passage from the collection points to their assembly places.

Cross-Border Activity

11) A major objective of the cease-fire arrangements must be to secure a cessation of all movement by the security forces into neighbouring countries and by the Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia. The Governor will be responsible for ensuring compliance with this requirement by the forces inside Rhodesia. The governments of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique will be invited to agree on effective cross-border liaison arrangements to ensure compliance with this requirement for forces based outside Rhodesia and to prevent cross-border movements by such forces. This will involve the establishment of liaison officers outside Rhodesia. At the same time, provision must be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia during the cease-fire in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Up to twelve border crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.

The Time Scale

12) A fully effective cease-fire cannot come into operation immediately. Time will be required for the transmission of orders to

subordinate commanders in the field and for the implementation of the agreed arrangements for the separation of the opposing forces. But it is essential that the cease-fire should be brought into operation quickly if it is to be effective. It is therefore proposed that as soon as agreement has been reached on the cease-fire:–

(a) All parties should issue instructions forthwith for its implementation on a given date. All cross-border military activity will cease. Elements of the monitoring force will be despatched to Rhodesia;

(b) On cease-fire day the Cease-fire Commission will be established. The monitoring force will deploy to the collection points and assembly places for the Patriotic Front forces. All hostilities within Rhodesia will cease. The process of assembly of the forces will begin immediately and should take not more than seven days. The completion of the deployment of the monitoring force will have taken place by then.

13) During the cease-fire the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order will rest with the police, acting under the Governor's authority and supervision. All forces which have assembled and accepted the Governor's authority and continue to comply with his directions will be acting lawfully. Any forces which fail to assemble, and fail to accept the Governor's authority and abide by the cease-fire agreement, will be acting unlawfully. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders on both sides, through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the liaison teams operating with the forces at area level. It will be for the Commanders to ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with them using the forces which have accepted his authority.

Instructions to Military Personnel

14) The leaders on each side will ensure that clear and precise instructions are issued to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the agreed arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. The leaders of the delegations at the Conference will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.

The Longer Term

15) An effective cease-fire during the pre-independence period, a peaceful election campaign and an election the result of which is accepted and respected by all parties will bring about a permanent end

to the war. Many of those at present under arms will wish to return to civilian life. Others will wish to continue to pursue a military career. Decisions on post-war military planning will be a matter for the government which will be constituted following the elections and under which Zimbabwe will become independent. The British Government will be ready to assist with the re-training and resettlement of those elements of the forces which wish to pursue a civil career.

22 November 1979.

Glossary

a.f.	adjusted frequency
AP	Assembly Point
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
MF	Monitoring Force
NIMBAR	No Independence Before Majority Rule
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PF	Patriotic Front
RV	Rendez Vous Point
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organization
TTL	Tribal Trust Land
UANC	United African National Council
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNFICYP	United Nations Forces in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Liberation Army
ZRBC	Zimbabwe Rhodesia Radio Station

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